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32 Washington opinions name it 3 courts 1972–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Wisconsin Central Transportation Co.green2 sentences2011However, the language has remained virtually unchanged. [6] See also Anderson, 327 F.Supp.2d at 977 ("If no speed restrictions were in place at the time of the accident, a timetable speed of thirty-five miles per hour [for freight trains] would correspond to class three track."); Murrell, 544 F.Supp.2d at 1150 ("[T]he timetable speed of 35 m.p.h. set by Union Pacific meant Union Pacific must maintain the track at the crossing up to classification three FRA standards, including the Class three speed limits for passenger trains."). [7] See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 , supra, note 4. [8] As noted, head-en 2011However, the language has remained virtually unchanged. [6] See also Anderson, 327 F.Supp.2d at 977 ("If no speed restrictions were in place at the time of the accident, a timetable speed of thirty-five miles per hour [for freight trains] would correspond to class three track."); Murrell, 544 F.Supp.2d at 1150 ("[T]he timetable speed of 35 m.p.h. set by Union Pacific meant Union Pacific must maintain the track at the crossing up to classification three FRA standards, including the Class three speed limits for passenger trains."). [7] See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 , supra, note 4. [8] As noted, head-en | 2 | 2 |
Murrell v. Union Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences2011However, the language has remained virtually unchanged. [6] See also Anderson, 327 F.Supp.2d at 977 ("If no speed restrictions were in place at the time of the accident, a timetable speed of thirty-five miles per hour [for freight trains] would correspond to class three track."); Murrell, 544 F.Supp.2d at 1150 ("[T]he timetable speed of 35 m.p.h. set by Union Pacific meant Union Pacific must maintain the track at the crossing up to classification three FRA standards, including the Class three speed limits for passenger trains."). [7] See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 , supra, note 4. [8] As noted, head-en 2011However, the language has remained virtually unchanged. [6] See also Anderson, 327 F.Supp.2d at 977 ("If no speed restrictions were in place at the time of the accident, a timetable speed of thirty-five miles per hour [for freight trains] would correspond to class three track."); Murrell, 544 F.Supp.2d at 1150 ("[T]he timetable speed of 35 m.p.h. set by Union Pacific meant Union Pacific must maintain the track at the crossing up to classification three FRA standards, including the Class three speed limits for passenger trains."). [7] See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 , supra, note 4. [8] As noted, head-en | 2 | 2 |
cluster 798194green2 sentences2008Accordingly, the key determination in any case where state law claims challenge the legality of actions taken by federal savings associations against their customers is "which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the common law side." Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 644. ¶12 When OTS promulgated the final version of 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 , it explained how to make this decision. 2008Accordingly, the key determination in any case where state law claims challenge the legality of actions taken by federal savings associations against their customers is “which claims fall on the regulatory side of the ledger and which, for want of a better term, fall on the common law side.” Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 644. ¶12 When OTS promulgated the final version of 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 , it explained how to make this decision. | 2 | 2 |
Californians For Safe And Competitive Dump Truck Transportation v. Roberta E. Mendoncagreen2 sentences2007See generally Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Transp. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184 , 1187-89 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining evolution of the Court’s interpretation of the preemption clause). 2007See generally Californians for Safe & Competitive Dump Truck Trans. v. Mendonca, 152 F.3d 1184 , 1187-89 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining evolution of the Court's interpretation of the preemption clause). | 2 | 2 |
Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.green2 sentences2000The operative phrase in the preemption clause of 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1) is "related to." Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 665, 668 (N.D.Ga.1997). 2000The operative phrase in the preemption clause of 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1) is “related to.” Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665, 668 (N.D. | 2 | 2 |
cluster 754196green2 sentences1998See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 143 F.3d 481 (holding that a tribal-state compact governed the question of public disclosure of state records relating to Indian gaming operations and further holding that a preemption analysis in these circumstances is inappropriate). 1998See Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 143 F.3d 481 , (holding that a tribal-state compact governed the question of public disclosure of state records relating to Indian gaming operations and further holding that a preemption analysis in these circumstances is inappropriate). | 2 | 2 |
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberggreen2 sentences2021In Northwest, Inc., v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276, 289 , 134 S. Ct. 1422 , 188 L. 2021In Northwest, Inc., v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276, 289 , 134 S. Ct. 1422 , 188 L. | 1 | 1 |
Adler v. Fred Lind Manorgreen1 sentence2014Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 293,303 , 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); accord Adler v. Fred Lind Manor. 153 Wn.2d 331, 344-45 , 103 P.3d 773 (2004). 4 The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause, which provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... , shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. | 1 | 1 |
Adler v. Fred Lind Manorgreen1 sentence2014Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 293,303 , 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); accord Adler v. Fred Lind Manor. 153 Wn.2d 331, 344-45 , 103 P.3d 773 (2004). 4 The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause, which provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... , shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. | 1 | 1 |
Hesling v. Csx Transportation, Inc.green1 sentence2011Id. at 637. | 1 | 1 |
Haehl v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.green1 sentence2008Bank, F.A., 277 F.Supp.2d 933, 940 (S.D.Ind.2003). ¶11 Intrinsic to this preemption framework, then, is that federally chartered savings associations are subject to the majority *159 of generally applicable state laws, except when those laws purport to affect their lending operations, in which case the state laws are superseded. | 1 | 1 |
| Kenepp v. American Edwards Laboratoriesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. MaCraegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sowers v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim
green
2 sentences2011PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 355 , 144 P.3d 276 . [10] The court also cited Cherry for "the general proposition that when a municipality acts in a capacity that is comparable to that of a private party, the preemption clause does not apply." PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 357 , 144 P.3d 276 . 2011PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 355 , 144 P.3d 276 . [10] The court also cited Cherry for "the general proposition that when a municipality acts in a capacity that is comparable to that of a private party, the preemption clause does not apply." PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 357 , 144 P.3d 276 . | 3 | 2008–2011 |
Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System
green
2 sentences2011Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash.2d 424, 430-31 , 759 P.2d 427 (1988); U.S. CONST. *613 art. 2011Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash.2d 424, 430-31 , 759 P.2d 427 (1988); U.S. CONST. *613 art. | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 . 2. 1995The United States Supreme Court recently clarified in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, the application of the preemption doctrine to a statute containing an express preemption clause similar to that in FIFRA: When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,” "there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions” (Citations omitted.) Ci | 3 | 1995–1995 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
green
2 sentences2021Following Garmon, this court has stated the preemption standard in terms of whether the activity is “‘potentially subject to federal regulation.’” Beaman, 116 Wn.2d at 704 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 ). 2021Even though we must accept the facts stated in the complaint as true, Garmon emphasizes that the “‘type of conduct’” involved is what determines the preemption analysis. 359 U.S. at 247-48 ; see also Amalg. | 2 | 1972–2021 |
PNSPA v. City of Sequim
green
2 sentences2021“Cherry supports the general proposition that when a municipality acts in a capacity that is comparable to that of a private party, the preemption clause does not apply.” Id. 2011PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 355 , 144 P.3d 276 . [10] The court also cited Cherry for "the general proposition that when a municipality acts in a capacity that is comparable to that of a private party, the preemption clause does not apply." PNSPA, 158 Wash.2d at 357 , 144 P.3d 276 . | 2 | 2011–2021 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732 . 2011Id. at 664-65 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Amici rely heavily on Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992), in which the Court gave a broad interpretation to an identical preemption clause in the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), Pub.L. 2007Amici rely heavily on Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992), in which the Court gave a broad interpretation to an identical preemption clause in the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), Pub.L. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N. A.
green
2 sentences2007The California court reasoned that although the prevailing wage law was “in a certain sense” “ ‘related to’ [the appellants’] prices, routes and services,.. . the effect is no more than indirect, remote, and tenuous.” Id. at 1189 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr, NA, 519 U.S. 316 , 117 S. Ct. 832 , 136 L. 2007The California court reasoned that although the prevailing wage law was “in a certain sense” “ ‘related to’ [the appellants’] prices, routes and services,.. . the effect is no more than indirect, remote, and tenuous.” Id. at 1189 (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr, NA, 519 U.S. 316 , 117 S. Ct. 832 , 136 L. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Lenci v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1997Preemption: Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664 , 388 P.2d 926 (1964), cited by appellant, sets forth a preemption test that asks whether the Legislature intended concurrent jurisdiction: the plenary police power in regulatory matters accorded municipalities by Const. Art. 11, § 11, ceases when the state enacts a general law upon the particular subject, unless there is room for concurrent jurisdiction. 1997Preemption: Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664 , 388 P.2d 926 (1964), cited by appellant, sets forth a preemption test that asks whether the Legislature intended concurrent jurisdiction: the plenary police power in regulatory matters accorded municipalities by Const. Art. 11, § 11, ceases when the state enacts a general law upon the particular subject, unless there is room for concurrent jurisdiction. | 2 | 1996–1997 |
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 248 n.6. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters
green
1 sentence2021Because state courts should not interfere with conduct actually protected by the act, the Court observed that “[c]onsiderations of federal supremacy, therefore, are implicated to a greater extent when labor-related activity is protected than when it is prohibited.” Id. at 200 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Beaman v. Yakima Valley Disposal, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Following Garmon, this court has stated the preemption standard in terms of whether the activity is “‘potentially subject to federal regulation.’” Beaman, 116 Wn.2d at 704 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1384 v. Kitsap Transit
neutral
1 sentence2020Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1384 v. Kitsap Transit, 187 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Petstel, Inc. v. County of King
green
2 sentences2017The general rule is that an ordinance need not be supported by specific findings: “There is no constitutional rule which requires that [county commissioners] conduct a special investigation or make formal findings before they exercise their police power.” Petstel Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 151 , 459 P.2d 937 (1969). 2017The general rule is that an ordinance need not be supported by specific findings: “There is no constitutional rule which requires that [county commissioners] conduct a special investigation or make formal findings before they exercise their police power.” Petstel Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 151 , 459 P.2d 937 (1969). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 293,303 , 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); accord Adler v. Fred Lind Manor. 153 Wn.2d 331, 344-45 , 103 P.3d 773 (2004). 4 The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause, which provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... , shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 293,303 , 103 P.3d 753 (2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted); accord Adler v. Fred Lind Manor. 153 Wn.2d 331, 344-45 , 103 P.3d 773 (2004). 4 The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause, which provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... , shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 675 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
green
1 sentence2009E.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good , 129 S. Ct. 538 , 543 (2008). 3. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Becker v. U.S. Marine Co.
green
1 sentence1998Becker v. U.S. Marine Co., 88 Wn. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Mason green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Ridgway v. Ridgway green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.