preemption doctrine in Illinois

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 30 (“the courts below erred in construing section 13 — 207 as not saving Pape’s counterclaim despite her failure to comply with the limitations period of section 302(a)(1) of the Marriage Act”); Ogg, 121 Ill.

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill.2d at 30 , 163 Ill.Dec. 898 , 582 N.E.2d 164 ("the courts below erred in construing section 13-207 as not saving Pape's counterclaim despite her failure to comply with the limitations period of section 302(a)(1) of the Marriage Act"); Ogg, 121 Ill.App.3d at 34 , 76 Ill.Dec. 531 , 458 N.E.2d 1331 ("The saving clause opens the door and exposes the initiating party to otherwise stale claims"); Benckendorf, 112 Ill.App.3d at 663 , 68 Ill.Dec. 193 , 445 N.E.2d 837 (section 13-207 "`saves' otherwise barred claims"); Ogg, 121 Ill.App.3d at 34 , 76 Ill.Dec. 531 , 458 *27 N.E.2

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 30 (“the courts below erred in construing section 13 — 207 as not saving Pape’s counterclaim despite her failure to comply with the limitations period of section 302(a)(1) of the Marriage Act”); Ogg, 121 Ill.

2005See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill.2d at 30 , 163 Ill.Dec. 898 , 582 N.E.2d 164 ("the courts below erred in construing section 13-207 as not saving Pape's counterclaim despite her failure to comply with the limitations period of section 302(a)(1) of the Marriage Act"); Ogg, 121 Ill.App.3d at 34 , 76 Ill.Dec. 531 , 458 N.E.2d 1331 ("The saving clause opens the door and exposes the initiating party to otherwise stale claims"); Benckendorf, 112 Ill.App.3d at 663 , 68 Ill.Dec. 193 , 445 N.E.2d 837 (section 13-207 "`saves' otherwise barred claims"); Ogg, 121 Ill.App.3d at 34 , 76 Ill.Dec. 531 , 458 *27 N.E.2

2025See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, JJ.).

2025See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000).

2025Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21 . ¶ 15 Question 1: Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1) (2024), Preempt Claims for Negligent Hiring/ Selection Against a Broker in a Common-Law Personal Injury Suit? ¶ 16 The preemption doctrine stems from the supremacy clause of United States Constitution, which states that federal law “ ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land ***, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ ” Haage v. Zavala, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting U.S. Const., art.

2025Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21 . ¶ 16 Question 1: Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1) (2024), preempt claims for negligent hiring/selection against a broker in a common-law personal injury suit? ¶ 17 The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution, which states that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land ***, any Thing in the Constitutions or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Haage v. Zavala, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting U.S. Const., art.

2025See Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334 , 346 (2019) (“Redundancy is not a silver bullet,” meaning, “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”). ¶ 45 Finally, we reject Echo’s argument that interpretating the safety exception to protect state negligence claims against brokers would lead to the safety exception “swallowing” the preemption clause itself.

2025See Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 346 (2019) (“Redundancy is not a silver bullet,” meaning, “Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”). ¶ 46 Finally, we reject Echo’s argument that interpretating the safety exception to protect state negligence claims against brokers would lead to the safety exception “swallowing” the preemption clause itself.

2016The majority's decision is contrary to law and effectively forecloses the preemption exception recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg. ¶ 59 Unlike Minnesota law at issue in Ginsberg, Illinois law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. 4 See Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (2001) (listing cases where Illinois courts have rejected attempts to recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Northern Trust Co. v. VIII

2015The majority's decision is contrary to law and effectively forecloses the preemption exception recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg. ¶ 59 Unlike Minnesota law at issue in Ginsberg, Illinois law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. 4 See Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (2001) (listing cases where Illinois courts have rejected attempts to recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Northern Trust Co. v. VIII

2016The majority's decision is contrary to law and effectively forecloses the preemption exception recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg. ¶ 59 Unlike Minnesota law at issue in Ginsberg, Illinois law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. 4 See Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (2001) (listing cases where Illinois courts have rejected attempts to recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Northern Trust Co. v. VIII

2015The majority's decision is contrary to law and effectively forecloses the preemption exception recognized and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg. ¶ 59 Unlike Minnesota law at issue in Ginsberg, Illinois law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. 4 See Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (2001) (listing cases where Illinois courts have rejected attempts to recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Northern Trust Co. v. VIII

2016App. 3d 355, 367 (1995) ("[a]lthough the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is used as an aid in construing a contract, it does not form the basis of an independent tort recognized in Illinois."); McCleary v. Wells Fargo Securities, L.L.C., 2015 IL App (1st) 141287, ¶21 (finding that a plaintiff sustains a cause of action for breach of contract for abuse of discretion based on a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by alleging a defendant exercised its discretion in a manner contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties). ¶ 60 Under Illinois law, the c

2015App. 3d 355, 367 (1995) ("[a]lthough the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is used as an aid in construing a contract, it does not form the basis of an independent tort recognized in Illinois."); McCleary v. Wells Fargo Securities, L.L.C., 2015 IL App (1st) 141287, ¶21 (finding that a plaintiff sustains a cause of action for breach of contract for abuse of discretion based on a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by alleging a defendant exercised its discretion in a manner contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties). ¶ 60 Under Illinois law, the c

2012"The determination of whether laches applies depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [Citation.] A trial judge's ruling with respect to laches is reviewed under the `abuse of discretion' standard of review." Marshall v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Retirement Fund, 298 Ill.App.3d 66, 74 , 232 Ill.Dec. 292 , 697 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (1998). ¶ 53 In this case, the trial court did not err in allowing defendant, in effect, to amend its answer to incorporate the preemption defense or in finding the defense was not barred b

2012"The determination of whether laches applies depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [Citation.] A trial judge's ruling with respect to laches is reviewed under the `abuse of discretion' standard of review." Marshall v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Retirement Fund, 298 Ill.App.3d 66, 74 , 232 Ill.Dec. 292 , 697 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (1998). ¶ 53 In this case, the trial court did not err in allowing defendant, in effect, to amend its answer to incorporate the preemption defense or in finding the defense was not barred b

2007Ed. 2d 407, 422 , 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992). 11 Accordingly, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of a court’s review under the preemption doctrine.

1995VI.) Because of the supremacy clause, a State law conflicting with Federal law is preempted, or "without effect." ( Maryland v. Louisiana (1981), 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595 .) Preemption analysis must begin with "the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." ( Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947), 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 , 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459 .) Thus, Congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysi

2002Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 , 131 L.

2002Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 , 131 L.

1995In a footnote, the United States Supreme Court indicated that "[s]ome State actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to’ the plan.” (Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983), 463 U.S. 85 , 100 n.21, 77 L.

1993Ed. 2d 490, 501 , 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2900 .) The Morales Court determined that because the relevant language of section 1305(aXl) of the Deregulation Act is identical to the preemption clause in ERISA, it should be given the same broad interpretation.

2025Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020), as a “watershed” case where the Ninth Circuit ruled negligent selection claims were saved from preemption by the safety exception. ¶6 In Echo’s reply, it cited Aspen American Insurance Co. v Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023), from the Eleventh Circuit, which found negligent selection claims were covered by the preemption clause but not rescued by the safety exception.

2025Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020), as a “watershed” case where the Ninth Circuit ruled negligent selection claims were saved from preemption by the safety exception. ¶ 7 In Echo’s reply, it cited Aspen American Insurance Co. v Landstar Ranger, 65 F. 4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) from the Eleventh Circuit, which found negligent selection claims were covered by the preemption clause but not rescued by the safety exception.

2025Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115 , 125 (2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, the court does “not invoke any presumption against preemption”). ¶ 22 Jamie also argues that the exercise of reasonable care should not be considered a “service,” and thus state negligence law, and its requirement that actors conduct themselves with reasonable care, is distinct from any “service” referenced in the preemption clause.

2025Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Trust, 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, the court does “not invoke any presumption against preemption.”). ¶ 23 Jamie also argues that the exercise of reasonable care should not be considered a “service,” and thus state negligence law, and its requirement that actors conduct themselves with reasonable care, is distinct from any “service” referenced in the preemption clause.

2012Plaintiff responds that section 1621(d) does not end the preemption inquiry because the United States Supreme Court has held that a saving clause “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” (Emphasis in original.) Geier v. Honda American Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).

2012In Geier, the Supreme Court held that a federal safety standard, which gave car manufacturers a “range of choices” in installing passive restraint systems, impliedly preempted a tort suit that created a duty for defendant-manufacturers to install air bags. 529 U.S. at 874-75 .