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13 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green2 sentences2019"The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'"1 Priester v. Cromer, 401 S.C. 38, 43 , 736 S.E.2d 249, 252 (2012) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). "'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ). 2019"The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'"1 Priester v. Cromer, 401 S.C. 38, 43 , 736 S.E.2d 249, 252 (2012) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). "'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ). | 1 | 3 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendongreen2 sentences2019"To discern Congress'[s] intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute." Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990)). 2012“To discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 , 111 S.Ct. 478 , 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990). | 1 | 2 |
Priester v. Cromergreen2 sentences2019"The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'"1 Priester v. Cromer, 401 S.C. 38, 43 , 736 S.E.2d 249, 252 (2012) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). "'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ). 2019"The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'"1 Priester v. Cromer, 401 S.C. 38, 43 , 736 S.E.2d 249, 252 (2012) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). "'[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis." Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 ). | 1 | 1 |
Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd.green2 sentences2006Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 552 , 397 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1990). [4] We have not expressly followed the same preemption analysis in deciding whether a state law preempts a local law as we have applied in deciding whether a federal law preempts a state law or regulation. 2006Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 552 , 397 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1990). [4] We have not expressly followed the same preemption analysis in deciding whether a state law preempts a local law as we have applied in deciding whether a federal law preempts a state law or regulation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game MacHinesgreen2 sentences2006Compare Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. at 552-53 , 397 S.E.2d at 663 with State v. 192 Coin-Operated *396 Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186 , 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000) (federal law may preempt a state law as follows: (1) Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to preempt state law, (2) Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, or (3) federal law may preempt state law to the extent the state law actually conflicts with the federal law, such that compliance with both is impossible or the state law hinders the accomplishment of the federal 2006Compare Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. at 552-53 , 397 S.E.2d at 663 with State v. 192 Coin-Operated *396 Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186 , 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000) (federal law may preempt a state law as follows: (1) Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to preempt state law, (2) Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, or (3) federal law may preempt state law to the extent the state law actually conflicts with the federal law, such that compliance with both is impossible or the state law hinders the accomplishment of the federal | 1 | 1 |
Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn., Inc. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd.green2 sentences2006Compare Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. at 552-53 , 397 S.E.2d at 663 with State v. 192 Coin-Operated *396 Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186 , 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000) (federal law may preempt a state law as follows: (1) Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to preempt state law, (2) Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, or (3) federal law may preempt state law to the extent the state law actually conflicts with the federal law, such that compliance with both is impossible or the state law hinders the accomplishment of the federal 2006Compare Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. at 552-53 , 397 S.E.2d at 663 with State v. 192 Coin-Operated *396 Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 186 , 525 S.E.2d 872, 877 (2000) (federal law may preempt a state law as follows: (1) Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to preempt state law, (2) Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, or (3) federal law may preempt state law to the extent the state law actually conflicts with the federal law, such that compliance with both is impossible or the state law hinders the accomplishment of the federal | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. Crop Hail Managementgreen1 sentence2000See Owen v. Crop Hail Management, 841 F.Supp. 297 (W.D.Mo.1994) (holding that the FCIA completely preempts state law); Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.Tex.1993) ("Congress and the TJSDA have clearly demonstrated that the FCIC and FCIC reinsured entities are immune from suit based on state law.”). . | 1 | 1 |
Horn v. Rural Community Insurance Servicesgreen1 sentence2000Servs., 903 F.Supp. 1502, 1505 (M.D.Ala.1995) (stating that 7 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (1) "provides a preemption defense where state or local laws conflict with provisions in a contract made pursuant to the FCIA ”) (emphasis added). . 7 C.F.R. § 400.176 (b) (2000). . 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508 (j)(2)(A)-(B) (1999). . 7 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (d) (1999). . | 1 | 1 |
Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agencygreen1 sentence2000Co., 878 F.Supp. 848 (D.S.C.1995) (holding that the FCIA’s provision for exclusive original federal jurisdiction in 7 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (d) refers only to suits brought by or against the Corporation, not to other parties, such as private insurers); see also Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 669 (9th Cir.1993) ("[T]he FCIA does not have the extraordinary preemptive force necessary for the application of the doctrine of complete preemption.”); Bullard v. Southwest Crop Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc.green1 sentence2000See Owen v. Crop Hail Management, 841 F.Supp. 297 (W.D.Mo.1994) (holding that the FCIA completely preempts state law); Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 519, 526 (S.D.Tex.1993) ("Congress and the TJSDA have clearly demonstrated that the FCIC and FCIC reinsured entities are immune from suit based on state law.”). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 321, 128 S.Ct. 999 . 2009Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1008 . | 2 | 2009–2012 |
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
green
2 sentences1996Congress further intended the preemption clause to “avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 , 115 S.Ct. at 1677-78 . 1996Congress further intended the preemption clause to “avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.” Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 , 115 S.Ct. at 1677-78 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. v. William Hamilton Smythe, III
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 604-05 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Malone v. White Motor Corp.
green
2 sentences2012The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). “ ‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis.” Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 504 , 98 S.Ct. 1185 , 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)). 2012The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and provides that any state law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). “ ‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis.” Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 504 , 98 S.Ct. 1185 , 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences2011CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). 2011CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bullard v. Southwest Crop Ins. Agency, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000Agency, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 531 (E.D.Tex.1997); Horn v. Rural Community Ins. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
O'Neal v. Cigna Property & Casualty Insurance
green
1 sentence2000Co., 878 F.Supp. 848 (D.S.C.1995) (holding that the FCIA’s provision for exclusive original federal jurisdiction in 7 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (d) refers only to suits brought by or against the Corporation, not to other parties, such as private insurers); see also Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 669 (9th Cir.1993) ("[T]he FCIA does not have the extraordinary preemptive force necessary for the application of the doctrine of complete preemption.”); Bullard v. Southwest Crop Ins. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lewis ex rel. Estate of Lewis v. Local 382, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
neutral
1 sentence1999PREEMPTION UNDER ERISA Finally, a majority of the Court of Appeals held Lewis’ claim was preempted by Section 514(a) of ERISA as his claim for damages “related to” an employee benefit plan within the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause. 12 It held the resolution of Lewis’ claim directly affected the pension fund as it “potentially alters the criteria for receipt of benefits.” 481 S.E.2d at 142 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Medical Park OB/GYN, P.A. v. Ragin
green
2 sentences1996In Medical Park OB/GYN v. Ragin, 321 S.C. 139 , 467 S.E.2d 261 (Ct.App.1996), we held: In interpreting the scope of this preemptive language, the United States Supreme Court has held the phrase “relate to” should be given its broad, common sense meaning such that a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan within the meaning of § 1144(a) if it has a “connection with or reference to” such a plan. 1996In Medical Park OB/GYN v. Ragin, 321 S.C. 139 , 467 S.E.2d 261 (Ct.App.1996), we held: In interpreting the scope of this preemptive language, the United States Supreme Court has held the phrase “relate to” should be given its broad, common sense meaning such that a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan within the meaning of § 1144(a) if it has a “connection with or reference to” such a plan. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981)). 1996Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996A state law “relates to” an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan, within the purview of ERISA’s preemption clause, “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 , 103 S.Ct. at 2900 . 1996A state law “relates to” an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan, within the purview of ERISA’s preemption clause, “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 , 103 S.Ct. at 2900 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux
green
2 sentences1996Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981)). 1996Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981)). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06 , 108 S.Ct. at 1881 . 1996Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06 , 108 S.Ct. at 1881 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin
green
2 sentences1984Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U. S. 264, 273 , 94 S. Ct. 2770, 2776 , 41 L. 1984Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U. S. 264, 273 , 94 S. Ct. 2770, 2776 , 41 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.