preemption doctrine in New York

2002Assn. v Town of Guilderland ( 74 NY2d 372, 376-377 ), the Court of Appeals stated the long-standing rule that notwithstanding the Municipal Home Rule Law, a local government’s superseding and amending powers under the preemption doctrine represent a fundamental limitation on the “home rule powers” of a municipality.

1998Assn. v Town of Guilderland ( 74 NY2d 372, 377 [1989]): “The preemption doctrine represents a fundamental limitation on home rule powers (see, Dougal v County of Suffolk, 65 NY2d 668 , affg on opn at 102 AD2d 531, 532 ; 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 15.20, at 101-104 [3d ed 1989]).

2021Nor is plaintiff's claim preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA") ( see 49 USC § 41713 [b][1]; American Airlines v Wolens, 513 US 219, 228 [1995] ["We do not read the ADA's preemption clause ... to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings."]).

2020While the ADA's preemption clause ( see 49 USC § 41713 [b] [1]) and its saving clause ( see 49 USC § 40120 [c]), read together, have been interpreted as limiting litigants in breach of contract actions involving air travel "to the parties' bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement" ( American Airlines, Inc. v Wolens , 513 US 219, 233 [1995]; see also Lentini v Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 159 AD3d 802 , 803 [2018]), the ADA does not prohibit "state-law-based court adjudication of routine breach-of-contract claims" ( American Airlines, Inc.

2013Defendants refer us to the legislative history of 42 USC § 1396b (q) (3), including various excerpts from the Congressional Record, in further support of their contention with respect to express preemption, but such history is not germane to this preemption analysis (see Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 [1992]; Smith, 959 F2d at 8 [preemption analysis turns on “the statute’s express objectives, its structure, the plain meaning of its language, and its interpretation by the courts”]).

2013Defendants refer us to the legislative history of 42 USC § 1396b (q) (3), including various excerpts from the Congressional Record, in further support of their contention with respect to express preemption, but such history is not germane to this preemption analysis (see Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 [1992]; Smith, 959 F2d at 8 [preemption analysis turns on “the statute’s express objectives, its structure, the plain meaning of its language, and its interpretation by the courts”]).

1998While localities have been invested with substantial powers both by affirmative grant and by restriction on State powers in matters of local concern, the overriding limitation of the preemption doctrine embodies ‘the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act * * * with respect to matters of State concern.’ (Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 497 .) Preemption applies both in cases of express conflict between local and State law and in cases where the State has evidenced its intent to occupy the field (see, e.g., Matter of Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v New York City Dept

1996While localities have been invested with substantial powers both by affirmative grant and by restriction on State powers in matters of local concern, the overriding limitation of the preemption doctrine embodies 'the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act * * * with respect to matters of State concern.’ (Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490, 497 .) Preemption applies both in cases of express conflict between local and State law and in cases where the State has evidenced its intent to occupy the field (see, e.g., Matter of Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v New York City Dept

2010Where the Legislature has not expressly forbidden local governments from superseding state law, a local government may nevertheless be prohibited from enacting superseding legislation, pursuant to the doctrine of preemption, where the State has evidenced an intent to occupy the field (see Matter of Cohen v Board of Appeals of Vil. of Saddle Rock, 100 NY2d at 400 ; Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423, 430 [1989]; Albany Area Bldrs.

2010However, this local power is subject to fundamental limitation by the preemption doctrine (see Matter of Cohen v Board of Appeals of Vil. of Saddle Rock, 100 NY2d 395, 400 [2003]).

1997The Court, after reaffirming that State regulation governing conduct and controlling policy can be as effectively asserted through common law as through official enactments, stated: " 'We must give effect to [the] plain language [of the preemption clause] unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning’ ” (Cipollone v Liggett Group, supra, at 521, quoting Shaw v Delta Air Lines, 463 US 85, 97 ).

1993(Shaw v Delta Air Lines, 463 US 85, 91 [1983]; Alessi v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., supra, 451 US, at 510-511, n 5 .) To ensure Federal control in this field, Congress enacted a broad preemption clause ( 29 USC § 1144 [a]) which renders unenforceable those State statutes, rules, and State court decisions that "relate to” the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans ( 29 USC § 1144 [c] [1], [2]).

2005We engaged in a preemption analysis to determine whether the Nyack Zoning Code was preempted by article 19 of the Mentad Hygiene Law (see Incorporated Vil. of Nyack, 78 NY2d at 505 ).

2005We engaged in a preemption analysis to determine whether the Nyack Zoning Code was preempted by article 19 of the Mental Hygiene Law ( see Incorporated Vil. of Nyack, 78 NY2d at 505 ).

2017Corp. v City of New York, 96 NY2d 91, 94 [2001]).

2013Corp. v City of New York, 96 NY2d 91, 95 [2001]; Albany Area Bldrs.

2010The United States Supreme Court defined the “relating to” language in the ADA preemption clause as “having a connection with, or reference to, airline ‘rates, routes, or services’ ” (Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 US 374, 384 [1992]). 6 As Justice Scalia stated in Morales , “[s]ince the relevant language of the ADA is identical” to the language of the preemption clause in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) ( 29 USC § 1144 [a]), “we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline ‘rate

2010The United States Supreme Court defined the “relating to” language in the ADA preemption clause as “having a connection with, or reference to, airline ‘rates, routes, or services’ ” (Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 US 374, 384 [1992]). 6 As Justice Scalia stated in Morales , “[s]ince the relevant language of the ADA is identical” to the language of the preemption clause in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) ( 29 USC § 1144 [a]), “we think it appropriate to adopt the same standard here: State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline ‘rate

2017Accordingly, “the power of local governments to enact laws is subject to the fundamental limitation of the preemption doctrine” (Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v Town of Hempstead, 91 AD3d at 133 ; DJL Rest.

2013Thus, the power of local governments to enact laws is subject to the fundamental limitation of the preemption doctrine” (Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v Town of Hempstead, 91 AD3d 126, 133 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2012(A) is different from, or is in conflict with, any requirement applicable under this section; and (B) relates to the . . . use, . . . dispensing, or administration by qualified persons of the covered countermeasure” (42 USC § 247d-6d [b] [8]). 3 In the context of preemption, “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties” (Riegel v Medtronic, Inc., 552 US 312, 324 [2008]; see Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 441 [2005]).

2011This court also rejects Scripto’s contention that the holding in Colon is no longer persuasive in light of the Supreme Court decision in Riegel v Medtronic, Inc. ( 552 US 312 [2008]), which held that the preemption clause enacted in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (21 USC § 360k) bars common-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a medical device given premarket approval by the Food and Drug Administration.

2025I agree with that general proposition that neither the CSA nor the Supremacy Clause confer a private right of action (See Welch v. Atmore Cmty. Hosp. , 704 Fed.

2025I agree with that general proposition that neither the CSA nor the Supremacy Clause confer a private right of action (See Welch v. Atmore Cmty. Hosp. , 704 Fed.

2023We agree with Supreme Court that the regulations at issue are discriminatory on their face — regardless of their remedial purpose — insofar as the admissions cap applies solely to individuals with serious mental illness ( see Bangerter [*5]v Orem City Corp. , 46 F3d 1491, 1500 [10th Cir 1995]; see also International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.

2023We agree with Supreme Court that the regulations at issue are discriminatory on their face — regardless of their remedial purpose — insofar as the admissions cap applies solely to individuals with serious mental illness ( see Bangerter [*5]v Orem City Corp. , 46 F3d 1491, 1500 [10th Cir 1995]; see also International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.

2012Corp., 18 NY3d 173, 179 [2011], cert denied sub nom.

2012Corp., 18 NY3d 173, 179 [2011], cert denied sub nom.

2012(A) is different from, or is in conflict with, any requirement applicable under this section; and (B) relates to the . . . use, . . . dispensing, or administration by qualified persons of the covered countermeasure” (42 USC § 247d-6d [b] [8]). 3 In the context of preemption, “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties” (Riegel v Medtronic, Inc., 552 US 312, 324 [2008]; see Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 441 [2005]).

2012(A) is different from, or is in conflict with, any requirement applicable under this section; and (B) relates to the . . . use, . . . dispensing, or administration by qualified persons of the covered countermeasure” (42 USC § 247d-6d [b] [8]). 3 In the context of preemption, “[a]bsent other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes its common-law duties” (Riegel v Medtronic, Inc., 552 US 312, 324 [2008]; see Bates v Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 US 431, 441 [2005]).

2011Trades Council v Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 US 218, 226-229 [1993]), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the preemption doctrine will not apply when a state obtains goods or services in a proprietary capacity, acting in the same manner as a private entity seeking to obtain necessary goods and services.

1995Trades Council v Associated Bldrs. & Contrs., 507 US 218, 225 [1993] ["Garmon pre-emption prohibits regulation even of activities that the NLRA only arguably protects or prohibits”]; Breininger v Sheet Metal Workers, 493 US 67, 74 [1989] ["as a general matter, neither state nor federal courts possess jurisdiction over claims based on activity that is 'arguably’ subject to §§ 7 or 8 of the NLRA”].) Delta-Sonic’s argument, that the Council’s proposed activity is clearly outside both section 7 and section 8, and that therefore there is nothing to defer to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

1999(Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 US 386, 392-393, 398-399 [1987].) The complete preemption doctrine applies when a statute’s preemptive force is so extraordinary that it “converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” (Metropolitan Life Ins.

1989It remanded the action to the State court on the ground that there was no complete preemption, since "the complete preemption doctrine did not apply because the rights asserted by the employees were neither created by nor 'substantially dependent upon interpretation of * * * the collective bargaining agreement” (supra, 858 F2d, at 941, quoting Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 US 386, 395 [1987]).

1998In CSX Transp. v Easterwood ( 507 US 658 ), the Supreme Court held that a preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act ( 45 USC §§ 421-444 ) invalidating any State “law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety” ( 45 USC § 434 [emphasis supplied]), once a Federal regulation was issued covering the same subject matter, preempted a common-law tort claim based upon excessive speed of a train at a grade crossing, in view of regulations fixing a maximum speed at such a crossing (CSX Transp. v Easterwood, supra, at 662, n 2).

1998In CSX Transp. v Easterwood ( 507 US 658 ), the Supreme Court held that a preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act ( 45 USC §§ 421-444 ) invalidating any State “law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety” ( 45 USC § 434 [emphasis supplied]), once a Federal regulation was issued covering the same subject matter, preempted a common-law tort claim based upon excessive speed of a train at a grade crossing, in view of regulations fixing a maximum speed at such a crossing (CSX Transp. v Easterwood, supra, at 662, n 2).

2012When reviewing a preemption defense, we first consider whether our analysis must be guided by the presumption against preemption. 4 In so doing, we begin with the “assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” (Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]). 5 Indeed, the presumption has particular force where an act of Congress implicates a state’s historic “police powers” (see Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr, 518 US 470, 485 [1996]).

1999Similarly in Ambrosio v Barnes-Hind, Inc. (supra, at 74), the Appellate Division, Third Department, found that the plaintiffs common-law tort claims based on an allegedly defective lens care product were preempted by “[t]he plain language of the MDA’s preemption clause.” Both of these Appellate Division decisions, however, were either written prior to or without reference to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr ( 518 US 470 ), which was decided virtually at the same time as the Appellate Division decision in Berger . 1 In Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr (supra), the

2003Again, “the preemption doctrine does not turn on semantics” (Lansdown, supra at 764) and the City Council cannot achieve even laudable goals by making illegal what is specifically allowed by state law (People v De Jesus, supra).

1989Rather, the direct consequences of a local ordinance should be examined to ensure that it does not "render illegal what is specifically allowed by State law” (People v De Jesus, 54 NY2d 465, 472 , supra; see, e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v City of New York, 12 NY2d 998 , affg 17 AD2d 327 ).

2021As we made clear in rejecting a preemption challenge to a City ordinance making it a misdemeanor to possess an imitation pistol, “[t]he mere fact that a local law may deal with some of the same matters touched upon by State law does not render the local law invalid” (People v Judiz, 38 NY2d 529, 531-532 [1976] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1982The plethora of such provisions suggests that the preemption doctrine precluding local legislation in subject areas marked by a pervasive scheme of State legislation (see Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 51 NY2d 679 ; People vJudiz, 38 NY2d 529 ; People v Cook, 34 NY2d 100 ) may also be applicable.

2011Indeed, the Supremacy Clause "vests in Congress the power to supersede not only State statutory or regulatory law but common law as well" ( Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]).

2011Indeed, the Supremacy Clause “vests in Congress the power to supersede not only State statutory or regulatory law but common law as well” (Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]).

1996A claim for breach of a union’s duty of fair representation is an exception to the preemption doctrine, and this Court would have jurisdiction over such a claim (Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171 ).

1995(Supra, at 244 . ) Similarly, when an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the NLRA, the State courts "must defer to the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” (Supra, at 245. ) Nevertheless, the Court has been equally forceful in stating that this preemption doctrine does not, "as a matter of wooden logic” (Machinists v Gonzales, 356 US 617, 619 [1958]) preclude State court jurisdiction in every instance where a particular controversy "touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships betw