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11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Electric Co.green1 sentence2012Co., 128 Hawai'i 314 , 235 P.3d 310, 316-17 (2010) (noting that a majority of courts conduct a preemption analysis based on "the factual allegations underlying each claim" rather than the elements of the claims). | 1 | 1 |
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.green1 sentence2002In light of this ruling, we conclude that the Utah Supreme Court's preemption analysis in Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 969 (Utah 1992) (applying Lingle to LRMA preemption analysis), applies also to preemption analysis under the RLA. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2000Although I agree that the Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-14-101 to -102 (1999), does not apply to social hosts serving beer to minors as long as such beer is not provided at a location allowing consumption on the premises, I do not agree with the majority’s preemption analysis for much the same reasons set out in my dissent in Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 (Durham, J., dissenting). ¶ 26 In four simultaneously decided cases, including the instant case, this court has been presented with an opportunity to construct a coherent body of jurisprudence concerning the Dra 2000Although I agree that the Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-14-101 to -102 (1999), does not apply to social hosts serving beer to minors as long as such beer is not provided at a location allowing consumption on the premises, I do not agree with the majority’s preemption analysis for much the same reasons set out in my dissent in Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 (Durham, J., dissenting). ¶ 26 In four simultaneously decided cases, including the instant case, this court has been presented with an opportunity to construct a coherent body of jurisprudence concerning the Dra | 1 | 1 |
Robertson v. Gem Insurance Co.green1 sentence1998Co., 828 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah Ct.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C 1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C | 1 | 1 |
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brackergreen2 sentences1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C 1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.green2 sentences1994Preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595-96 (1981) (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 , 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1451-52 (1947)). 1994Preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595-96 (1981) (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 , 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1451-52 (1947)). | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Louisianagreen2 sentences1994Preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595-96 (1981) (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 , 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1451-52 (1947)). 1994Preemption analysis “starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2129 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595-96 (1981) (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 , 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152 , 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1451-52 (1947)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
green
2 sentences2008It could indicate either that Congress was comforted by the Supreme Court's less literalistic approach to preemption announced in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), or it could evidence acquiescence in broad application of the preemption clause. 2008It could indicate either that Congress was comforted by the Supreme Court's less literalistic approach to preemption announced in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 , 115 S.Ct. 1671 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), or it could evidence acquiescence in broad application of the preemption clause. | 2 | 1995–2008 |
State v. Gonzalez.
green
1 sentence2012Co., 128 Hawai'i 314 , 235 P.3d 310, 316-17 (2010) (noting that a majority of courts conduct a preemption analysis based on "the factual allegations underlying each claim" rather than the elements of the claims). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kentucky Assn. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
green
2 sentences2008Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. 329 , 123 S.Ct. 1471 , 155 L.Ed.2d 468 . 2008Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. 329 , 123 S.Ct. 1471 , 155 L.Ed.2d 468 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2008Indeed, a state law may run afoul of the preemption clause even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 105 S.Ct. 2380 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ). 2008Indeed, a state law may run afoul of the preemption clause even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 105 S.Ct. 2380 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Indeed, a state law may run afoul of the preemption clause even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 105 S.Ct. 2380 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ). 2008Indeed, a state law may run afoul of the preemption clause even if the law is "consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 , 105 S.Ct. 2380 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux
green
2 sentences2008Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. 329 , 123 S.Ct. 1471 , 155 L.Ed.2d 468 . 2008Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 , 107 S.Ct. 1549 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. 329 , 123 S.Ct. 1471 , 155 L.Ed.2d 468 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000See Red Flame, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 ; Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15 , 995 P.2d 1233 ; Adkins v. Uncle Bart’s Inc., 2000 UT 14 . 2000See Red Flame, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 ; Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15 , 995 P.2d 1233 ; Adkins v. Uncle Bart's Inc., 2000 UT 14 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
MacKay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp.
green
2 sentences2000See Red Flame, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 ; Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15 , 995 P.2d 1233 ; Adkins v. Uncle Bart’s Inc., 2000 UT 14 . 2000See Red Flame, 2000 UT 22 , 996 P.2d 540 ; Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15 , 995 P.2d 1233 ; Adkins v. Uncle Bart’s Inc., 2000 UT 14 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 1999Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Williams v. Lee
green
2 sentences1995The second barrier to the exercise of state authority is that such authority "may unlawfully infringe `on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.'" White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142 , 100 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 , 79 S.Ct. 269, 270-71 , 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)). 1995The second barrier to the exercise of state authority is that such authority "may unlawfully infringe `on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.'" White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142 , 100 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 , 79 S.Ct. 269, 270-71 , 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Rebaldo v. Cuomo
green
1 sentence1995This ease therefore turns on whether plaintiffs’ state law claims, namely, professional malpractice and breach of contract for legal services arising from the alleged malpractice, frustrate Congress’s intent “ ‘to prevent state interference with federal control of ERISA plans.’ ” United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193 (quoting Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 138 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence1995This ease therefore turns on whether plaintiffs’ state law claims, namely, professional malpractice and breach of contract for legal services arising from the alleged malpractice, frustrate Congress’s intent “ ‘to prevent state interference with federal control of ERISA plans.’ ” United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1193 (quoting Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 138 ). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of NM
green
2 sentences1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C 1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation
green
2 sentences1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C 1995It follows that a preemption analysis requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 , 100 S.Ct. at 2584 ; see Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 184 , 109 S.Ct. at 1711-12 ; Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 , 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3398 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156-57 , 100 S.C | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Patricia Joanne Settles v. Golden Rule Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1992Settles, 927 F.2d at 508 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
English v. Southern Pacific Co.
green
2 sentences1992In English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407 , 45 P. 47 (1896), the Utah Supreme Court established that, when utilizing public crossings, railroads may owe pedestrians a duty of care that transcends any imposed by statute. 1992In English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407 , 45 P. 47 (1896), the Utah Supreme Court established that, when utilizing public crossings, railroads may owe pedestrians a duty of care that transcends any imposed by statute. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.