preemption doctrine in Texas

2020The ordinary meaning of “related to” is broad, reaching state provisions that have “a connection with or reference to” air carrier prices even if they are not “specifically addressed to the airline industry” or their “effect is only indirect.” Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 386, 388 .

2011Because of the broad ―related to‖ language used therein, the preemption clause not only preempts states from actually prescribing rates, routes, or services of an air carrier but also preempts state enforcement actions ―‗having a connection with or reference to, airline rates, routes, or services.‘‖ Id. at 749–50 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 , 384–86 (1992)).

1995A. Preemption The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); Moore v. Brunswick, 889 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex.1994).

1995A. Preemption The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); Moore v. Brunswick, 889 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex.1994).

2019In resolving questions of inconsistency between state and federal law, courts must look not only at the particular federal statutes and constitutional provisions, but also at “the policies expressed in [them].” Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. 1994).

1995A. Preemption The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992); Moore v. Brunswick, 889 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Tex.1994).

2013See Black, 116 S.W.3d at 753 (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226 , 115 S.Ct. at 823 , in which the term “services” was used to include “access to flights and class-of-serviee upgrades”).

2011Appellees rely on Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. 2003), a seminal Texas case regarding the preemption clause.

2007In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the ADA’s preemption clause. 513 U.S. at 227-28 , 115 S.Ct. at 823-24 .

2007In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the ADA’s preemption clause. 513 U.S. at 227-28 , 115 S.Ct. at 823-24 .

2019However, the Supreme Court “limits the preemption doctrine by presuming that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Great Dane Trailers v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 2001) (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 748 ).

2008See Maryland, 451 U.S. at 746 , 101 S.Ct. 2114 , 68 L.Ed.2d 576 ; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 , 97 S.Ct. 1305 , 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).

2021“The United States Supreme Court limits the preemption doctrine by presuming that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 2001).

2019However, the Supreme Court “limits the preemption doctrine by presuming that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Great Dane Trailers v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 2001) (citing Maryland, 451 U.S. at 748 ).

2013See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ; Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 200-01 (holding that the preemption doctrine is broad in scope and should be applied to any state law cause of action that applies to conduct arguably covered by the Act).

2013See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ; Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 200-01 (holding that the preemption doctrine is broad in scope and should be applied to any state law cause of action that applies to conduct arguably covered by the Act).

2013Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc., 391 F.Supp.2d 538, 540 (S.D.Tex.2005)).

2011Co v. Daybreak Express, Inc., 391 F.Supp.2d 538, 540 (S.D.Tex.2005).

2006See Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir.2001).

2005Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir.2001).

2013Id.

2003Airlines, Inc., 17 S.W.3d 52, 58-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied); Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 99 Wash.App. 646 , 994 P.2d 901, 905 (2000). *751 C Kiefer In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morales and Wolens , lower federal and state courts have struggled with determining when the ADA preempts state law claims. 4 This Court considered the scope of the ADA’s preemption clause in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1996).

2008The Court also construed the Safety Act's preemption clause and saving clause together, concluding that the Safety Act does not expressly preempt "nonidentical state standards established in tort actions covering the same aspect of performance as an applicable federal standard.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. at 1918 . .

2008The Court also construed the Safety Act's preemption clause and saving clause together, concluding that the Safety Act does not expressly preempt "nonidentical state standards established in tort actions covering the same aspect of performance as an applicable federal standard.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. at 1918 . .

2007Id. at 752; see also Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (narrowly defining services as “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail”); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. , 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (broadly defining services to include “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself”).

2007Id. at 752 ; see also Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 , 1261 (9th Cir.1998) (narrowly defining services as “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail”); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.1995) (broadly defining services to include “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself’).

2015Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998)).

2014Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir.1998)).

2007See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(1) ("the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter . . . ."); Mills v. Warner Lambert Co. , 157 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. 2005). 5.

2007See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(1) ("the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter....”); Mills v. Warner Lambert Co., 157 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex.2005). 5 .

2007Id. at 752; see also Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (narrowly defining services as “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail”); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. , 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (broadly defining services to include “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself”).

2007Id. at 752 ; see also Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 , 1261 (9th Cir.1998) (narrowly defining services as “the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail”); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.1995) (broadly defining services to include “ticketing, boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in addition to the transportation itself’).

2006See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 211 , 116 S.Ct. 619 .

2006See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 211 , 116 S.Ct. 619 .

2006Ct. App. 2006), appeal allowed by , 852 N.E.2d 1213 (Oh. 2006) (unpublished table opinion No. 2006-1025). [6] In Stier , a case involving a nonresident seaman injured in the territorial waters of another nation, the court concluded that under either standard, the seaman = s state law tort claims were impliedly preempted. 992 S.W.2d at 429 . [7] Preemption analysis under maritime law is somewhat different than preemption in other areas of the law.

2006See Stier, 992 S.W.2d at 428 .

2020The company contended that a preemption clause similar to the ADA’s blocked the owner’s claims because they “related to” the “service of a[] motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” Id. at 264–66 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1)).

2014The Supreme Court noted that the FAAAA’s preemption clause “prohibits enforcement of state laws ‘related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.’” Id. at 1778 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1)).

2013See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ; Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 200-01 (holding that the preemption doctrine is broad in scope and should be applied to any state law cause of action that applies to conduct arguably covered by the Act).

2013See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 ; Kaufman, 274 F.3d at 200–01 (holding that the preemption doctrine is broad in scope and should be applied to any state law cause of action that applies to conduct arguably covered by the Act).

2012See generally Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 (Congress’s purpose is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285 (11th Cir.2012) (noting courts must first examine Congress’s intent); Comcast Cable of Plano, 315 S.W.3d at 677 (“A preemption analysis is an inquiry into congressional intent.”).

2012See generally Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 (Congress’s purpose is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1285 (11th Cir.2012) (noting courts must first examine Congress’s intent); Comcast Cable of Plano, 315 S.W.3d at 677 (“A preemption analysis is an inquiry into congressional intent.”).

2007Id. at 189-92 . *532 Similarly, in Hook , the court held that Hook’s unsafe workplace claim was “totally independent from the existence and administration of’ the ERISA plan. 38 F.3d at 784 .

1996Preemption of a state law claim exists if “(1) the claim addresses areas of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan, and (2) the claim directly affects the relationship among the traditional ERISA entities (i.e., plan administrators/fiduciaries and plan participants/beneficiaries).” Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir.1994); Memorial Hosp.