preemption doctrine in California

2008(Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ].) But “[a]s to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 61-62.) Our Supreme Court also addressed this issue in its recent O’Connell case.

2008(Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ].) But “[a]s to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 61-62.) Our Supreme Court also addressed this issue in its recent O’Connell case.

2021Instead, she argues that her claim falls under the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the PPIA’s preemption clause, by citing to cases discussing concurrent jurisdiction under other statutes.7 (See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 434 [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] did not preempt equivalent state labeling laws; only state laws that were “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling and packaging rules were preempted]; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470 [same test under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976]; Quesa

2021To be sure, the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers an additional cause to comply, but the requirements imposed on them under state and federal law do not differ. [The preemption clause] does not preclude States from imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional requirements.’ [Citation.]” (Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 448 , bracketed modification ours.) 18 labels already approved under the PPIA.

2017(Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 ].) The Ellis Act Preempts the City’s Enhanced Relocation Assistance Ordinances A. General Principles of Preemption “ ‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general [state] laws.” [¶] ‘“If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.” [Citations.]’ ” (O’Connell v. City of St

2017(Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 ].) The Ellis Act Preempts the City’s Enhanced Relocation Assistance Ordinances A. General Principles of Preemption “ ‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general [state] laws.” [¶] ‘“If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.” [Citations.]’ ” (O’Connell v. City of St

2021Instead, she argues that her claim falls under the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the PPIA’s preemption clause, by citing to cases discussing concurrent jurisdiction under other statutes.7 (See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 434 [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] did not preempt equivalent state labeling laws; only state laws that were “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling and packaging rules were preempted]; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470 [same test under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976]; Quesa

2021Instead, she argues that her claim falls under the concurrent jurisdiction provision of the PPIA’s preemption clause, by citing to cases discussing concurrent jurisdiction under other statutes. 7 (See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 434 [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA] did not preempt equivalent state labeling laws; only state laws that were “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling and packaging rules were preempted]; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470 [same test under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976]; Ques

2011(Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 484 , quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 517 .) The scope of this preemption clause therefore hinges on an interpretation of what the “subject matter regulated” under section 1681s-2 is.

2009Indeed, one would think that tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strict-liability standard, is less deserving of preservation.”]; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 521 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 407 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ]; see lessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1487 , fit. 5 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ].) Preemption analysis, however, generally begins with a presumption against preemption, that is, “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress

2025Under article XI, section 7 of the 7 California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Thus, in general,“‘[i]f otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.’” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin- Williams).) “‘A conflict exists if the local legislation “‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative i

2025Under article XI, section 7 of the 7 California Constitution, “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” Thus, in general,“‘[i]f otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.’” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897 (Sherwin- Williams).) “‘A conflict exists if the local legislation “‘duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative i

2021Comm’n (1983) 461 U.S. 190, 203-204 [“[i]t is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms”].) “If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.” (Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (2008) 555 U.S. 70, 76 .) Preemption analysis generally begins with a presumption against preemption, that is, “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be supersed

2016(Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 485 [ 135 L.Ed.2d 700 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ]; see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230 [ 91 L.Ed. 1447 , 67 S.Ct. 1146 ].) Where, as here, preemption turns on questions of law such as the meaning of a preemption clause or the ascertainment of congressional intent, our review is de novo.

2017Second, it may interfere with ' "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." ' ( Ibid. , quoting Williams v. Lee (1959) 358 U.S. 217 , 220 [ 79 S.Ct. 269 , 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 , 254].) 'The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.' ( White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra , 448 U.S. at p. 143 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 2583 , 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ].) *871 "The doctrine of preemption applies in a 'special sense' to cases involving

2017Second, it may interfere with ' "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." ' ( Ibid. , quoting Williams v. Lee (1959) 358 U.S. 217 , 220 [ 79 S.Ct. 269 , 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 , 254].) 'The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.' ( White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra , 448 U.S. at p. 143 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 2583 , 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ].) *871 "The doctrine of preemption applies in a 'special sense' to cases involving

1982A city which adopted such ‘home rule’ amendments thereby gained exemption, with respect to its municipal affairs, from the ‘conflict with general laws’ restrictions of section 11 of article XI. [¶] As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). [Citations.]” “Because the various sections of article XI fail to d

1982A city which adopted such ‘home rule’ amendments thereby gained exemption, with respect to its municipal affairs, from the ‘conflict with general laws’ restrictions of section 11 of article XI. [¶] As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine). [Citations.]” “Because the various sections of article XI fail to d

1984When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” (359 U.S. at pp. 242-245 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 781-783].) The limits of Garmon's preemption rule were further explored in Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 338 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 ].

1984When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” (359 U.S. at pp. 242-245 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 781-783].) The limits of Garmon's preemption rule were further explored in Farmer v. Carpenters (1977) 430 U.S. 290 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 338 , 97 S.Ct. 1056 ].

1994The statutory words "relate to" were used by Congress "in their broad sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption language that would have made the clause `applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.'" ( Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 138 [ 112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483 ].) Thus, a state law "relates to" a benefit plan "`"if it has a connection with, or reference to such a plan."'" ( Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 47 [ 95 L.Ed.2d at p. 48 ].) "`Because of the breadth of the preemption clause and the broad remedial purpose of ERISA, "state

1994The statutory words "relate to" were used by Congress "in their broad sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption language that would have made the clause `applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA.'" ( Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 138 [ 112 L.Ed.2d at p. 483 ].) Thus, a state law "relates to" a benefit plan "`"if it has a connection with, or reference to such a plan."'" ( Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 47 [ 95 L.Ed.2d at p. 48 ].) "`Because of the breadth of the preemption clause and the broad remedial purpose of ERISA, "state

2022(Ibid.) The Supreme Court stated it did “not read the ADA’s preemption clause . . . to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.” (Wolens, at p. 228.) In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364 [ 128 S.Ct. 989 , 169 L.Ed.2d 933 ] (Rowe) the United States Supreme Court applied its analysis of the ADA’s preemption provision in Morales to interpret a similar preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, c

2022(Ibid.) The Supreme Court stated it did “not read the ADA’s preemption clause . . . to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.” (Wolens, at p. 228.) In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Assn. (2008) 552 U.S. 364 [ 128 S.Ct. 989 , 169 L.Ed.2d 933 ] (Rowe) the United States Supreme Court applied its analysis of the ADA’s preemption provision in Morales to interpret a similar preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, c

2016In light of the full text of the preemption clause, and of the ADA’s purpose to leave largely to the airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation services, [the court] conclude[d] that [the ADA] preempts plaintiffs’ claims under the [Illinois] Consumer Fraud Act.” 10 (Wolens, supra, at pp. 227-228 , fn. omitted; see also Rowe, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 371 , citing with approval Wolens, supra, at pp. 226-228 .) *899 And, in Ginsberg, supra, 572 U.S. _ [ 134 S.Ct. 1422 ], the high court again cons

2016In light of the full text of the preemption clause, and of the ADA’s purpose to leave largely to the airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation services, [the court] conclude[d] that [the ADA] preempts plaintiffs’ claims under the [Illinois] Consumer Fraud Act.” 10 (Wolens, supra, at pp. 227-228 , fn. omitted; see also Rowe, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 371 , citing with approval Wolens, supra, at pp. 226-228 .) *899 And, in Ginsberg, supra, 572 U.S. _ [ 134 S.Ct. 1422 ], the high court again cons

2003(Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 490 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ].) The purpose of ERISA’s preemption clause—to promote national uniform administration of employee benefit plans and avert the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state or local regulations—is paramount in determining whether a state law has a connection with an ERISA plan.

2003(Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 490 , 103 S.Ct. 2890 ].) The purpose of ERISA’s preemption clause—to promote national uniform administration of employee benefit plans and avert the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state or local regulations—is paramount in determining whether a state law has a connection with an ERISA plan.

2016Rather, [plaintiffs] must demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.’ ” (Arcadia Unified School Dist. v. State Dept. of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 267 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 , 825 P.2d 438 ].) 12 Preemption analysis “consists of four questions, which in order of increasing difficulty may be listed as follows: (1) Does the ordinance duplicate any state law? (2) Does the ordinance contradict any state law? (3) Does the ordinance enter into a field of regulation which the state has expressly reserved to i

2016Rather, [plaintiffs] must demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.’ ” (Arcadia Unified School Dist. v. State Dept. of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 267 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 , 825 P.2d 438 ].) 12 Preemption analysis “consists of four questions, which in order of increasing difficulty may be listed as follows: (1) Does the ordinance duplicate any state law? (2) Does the ordinance contradict any state law? (3) Does the ordinance enter into a field of regulation which the state has expressly reserved to i

2021Comm’n (1983) 461 U.S. 190, 203-204 [“[i]t is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms”].) “If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.” (Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (2008) 555 U.S. 70, 76 .) Preemption analysis generally begins with a presumption against preemption, that is, “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be supersed

2009Indeed, one would think that tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or strict-liability standard, is less deserving of preservation.”]; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 521 [ 120 L.Ed.2d 407 , 112 S.Ct. 2608 ]; see lessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1487 , fit. 5 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 ].) Preemption analysis, however, generally begins with a presumption against preemption, that is, “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress

2010(El Rancho, at p. 961.) We noted that some four years earlier this court in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 12 , had “embraced the preemption doctrine developed by the federal courts under the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. [NLRA]),” and “that the principles defining the preemptive reach of the NLRA are generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB’s preemptive jurisdiction under EERA.” (El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953 .) Accordingly, citing San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 775 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ], we applied to

2010(El Rancho, at p. 961.) We noted that some four years earlier this court in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 12 , had “embraced the preemption doctrine developed by the federal courts under the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. [NLRA]),” and “that the principles defining the preemptive reach of the NLRA are generally applicable in determining the scope of PERB’s preemptive jurisdiction under EERA.” (El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953 .) Accordingly, citing San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 [ 3 L.Ed.2d 775 , 79 S.Ct. 773 ], we applied to

2021(Quesada, at p. 308; Jankey v. Lee (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 .) “Where, as here, preemption turns on questions of law such as the meaning of a preemption clause or the ascertainment of congressional intent, our review is de novo.” (Roberts, at p. 142; accord, People v. Superior Court (Cal Cartage Transportation Express, LLC) (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 619 , 627; see Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 [“federal preemption presents a pure question of law”].) C.

2020(See, e.g., Roberts v. United Healthcare Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 142 [“Where, as here, preemption turns on questions of law such as the meaning of a preemption clause or the ascertainment of congressional intent, our review is de novo. [Citations.]”]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 [“federal preemption presents a pure question of law. [Citation.]”].) Also, “[w]hen a motion in limine ‘results in the entire elimination of a cause of action or a defense, we treat it as a demurrer to the evidence and review the motion de novo . . . .’ [Citation.]” (L

2013We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the demurrer, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.” (Tanen v. Southwest Airlines Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162 .) The ADA provides in relevant part that “a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .” ( 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (b)(1).) As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Sanchez, supra, 590 F.3d 1027 , this preemption

2013(Sanchez, at p. 1030.) The Sanchez court observed: “From these cases we know that Congress enacted the ADA to deregulate domestic air transport, and included the preemption clause ‘to ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.’ Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 .

2021Comm’n (1983) 461 U.S. 190, 203-204 [“[i]t is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms”].) “If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains.” (Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (2008) 555 U.S. 70, 76 .) Preemption analysis generally begins with a presumption against preemption, that is, “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be supersed

2020(See, e.g., Roberts v. United Healthcare Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 132, 142 [“Where, as here, preemption turns on questions of law such as the meaning of a preemption clause or the ascertainment of congressional intent, our review is de novo. [Citations.]”]; Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1089, fn. 10 [“federal preemption presents a pure question of law. [Citation.]”].) Also, “[w]hen a motion in limine ‘results in the entire elimination of a cause of action or a defense, we treat it as a demurrer to the evidence and review the motion de novo . . . .’ [Citation.]” (L

1984“The animating force behind the doctrine of labor law preemption has been the recognition that nothing could more fully serve to defeat the *712 purposes of the Act than to permit state and federal courts, without any limitation, to exercise jurisdiction over activities that are subject to regulation by the National Labor Relations Board.” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180, 218 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 209, 238 , 98 S.Ct. 1745 ] (Brennan, J., dis.) In one of the earliest expressions of the preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court noted the rationale underlying it: “Congress did not mer

1984“The animating force behind the doctrine of labor law preemption has been the recognition that nothing could more fully serve to defeat the *712 purposes of the Act than to permit state and federal courts, without any limitation, to exercise jurisdiction over activities that are subject to regulation by the National Labor Relations Board.” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180, 218 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 209, 238 , 98 S.Ct. 1745 ] (Brennan, J., dis.) In one of the earliest expressions of the preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court noted the rationale underlying it: “Congress did not mer

2017Second, it may interfere with ' "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." ' ( Ibid. , quoting Williams v. Lee (1959) 358 U.S. 217 , 220 [ 79 S.Ct. 269 , 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 , 254].) 'The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.' ( White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra , 448 U.S. at p. 143 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 2583 , 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ].) *871 "The doctrine of preemption applies in a 'special sense' to cases involving

2017Second, it may interfere with ' "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." ' ( Ibid. , quoting Williams v. Lee (1959) 358 U.S. 217 , 220 [ 79 S.Ct. 269 , 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 , 254].) 'The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.' ( White Mountain Apache Tribe, supra , 448 U.S. at p. 143 [ 100 S.Ct. at p. 2583 , 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 672 ].) *871 "The doctrine of preemption applies in a 'special sense' to cases involving

2023However, as Justice Liu observed in his concurring opinion in City of Riverside, the demands/prohibits language “should not be misunderstood to improperly limit the scope of the preemption inquiry.” (City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 763 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) As Justice Liu also noted in his concurring opinion, other statements in our City of Riverside opinion “make[] clear” that “state law may preempt local law when local law prohibits not only what a state statute ‘demands’ but also what the statute permits or authorizes.” (Ibid., italics added, citing maj. opn.’s discussion of

2013XI, § 7.) “The first step in a preemption analysis is to determine whether the local regulation explicitly conflicts with any provision of state law. [Citation.]” (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 291 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 707 P.2d 840 ].) “Local legislation in conflict with general law is void.

2021Implied Preemption for Infringement on Tribal Sovereignty Finally, plaintiffs argue that separate and distinct from the preemption analysis under Bracker, the taxes at issue here “strike so deeply at the heart of Indian independence and self-governance that it is preempted for that reason alone, without any balancing required,” citing principally to Williams, supra, 358 U.S. 217 , in support of this argument.

2021Implied Preemption for Infringement on Tribal Sovereignty Finally, plaintiffs argue that separate and distinct from the preemption analysis under Bracker, the taxes at issue here “strike so deeply at the heart of Indian independence and self-governance that it is preempted for that reason alone, without any balancing required,” citing principally to Williams, supra, 358 U.S. 217 , in support of this argument.

2014Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476 , 484–485.) Preemption analysis “consists of four questions, which in order of increasing difficulty may be listed as follows: (1) Does the ordinance duplicate any state law? (2) Does the ordinance contradict any state law? (3) Does the ordinance enter into a field 9 of regulation which the state has expressly reserved to itself? (4) Does the ordinance enter into a field of regulation from which the state has implicitly excluded all other regulatory authority? [Citations.]” (Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at

1993Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 485 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 683 P.2d 1150 ].) The Supreme Court has sometimes characterized the preemption analysis as a three-step process: (1) Does the local regulation explicitly contradict any provision of state law? (2) Does it duplicate state law? (3) If the local regulation is neither contradictory nor duplicative, does state law impliedly preempt the field of regulation?