preemption clause in Connecticut

1995The preemption clause "was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, supra, 498 U.S. at 142 .

1994The preemption clause "was intended to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the CT Page 12217-Q administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, supra, 498 U.S. at 142 .

2024We conclude that the two tiered system of liability that the plaintiff envisions—claims under CUTSA for misap- propriation of trade secrets and common-law claims for misuse of other confidential information—is incon- sistent with the preemption clause in § 35-57 (a).46 46 We acknowledge the plaintiff’s concern that this construction of the statute ‘‘essentially creates a system in which information is classified only as a protected ‘trade secret’ or unprotected ‘general . . . knowledge.’ ’’ Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 777 , 904 A.2d 652 (2006).

2024We conclude that the two tiered system of liability that the plaintiff envisions—claims under CUTSA for misap- propriation of trade secrets and common-law claims for misuse of other confidential information—is incon- sistent with the preemption clause in § 35-57 (a).46 46 We acknowledge the plaintiff’s concern that this construction of the statute ‘‘essentially creates a system in which information is classified only as a protected ‘trade secret’ or unprotected ‘general . . . knowledge.’ ’’ Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 N.H. 764, 777 , 904 A.2d 652 (2006).

2022The trial court properly decided that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s determination that the plaintiff charged an illegal fee for the release of the vehicle and that the commissioner’s decision was not contrary to law: it was undisputed that the plaintiff performed a nonconsensual tow when it transported the disabled vehicle from the scene of the accident to its place of business because the tow was performed at the request of a police officer, and the agreement to provide a more expeditious retrieval of the vehicle from the plaintiff’s storage yard did not transfo

2016We have refused to read the preemption clause ... with an uncritical literalism, else for all practical purposes [preemption] would never run its course ... [a]nd ... cautioned that [49 U.S.C.] § 14501 [c][1] does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner." [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 , 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (construing 'related to' language in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and concluding that "[t]he ordi

2016We have refused to read the preemption clause ... with an uncritical literalism, else for all practical purposes [preemption] would never run its course ... [a]nd ... cautioned that [49 U.S.C.] § 14501 [c][1] does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner." [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.] ); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 , 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (construing 'related to' language in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and concluding that "[t]he ordi

2009In the present case, however, our Supreme Court’s holding in Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 465 , indicates that the preemption clause at issue does not deprive our courts of jurisdiction. 4 Our conclusion that the preemption provision of the MDA does not deprive our courts of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 , 116 S. Ct. 1568 , 134 L.

2009In the present case, however, our Supreme Court’s holding in Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 465 , indicates that the preemption clause at issue does not deprive our courts of jurisdiction. 4 Our conclusion that the preemption provision of the MDA does not deprive our courts of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 , 116 S. Ct. 1568 , 134 L.

2009In the present case, however, our Supreme Court’s holding in Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 465 , indicates that the preemption clause at issue does not deprive our courts of jurisdiction. 4 Our conclusion that the preemption provision of the MDA does not deprive our courts of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 , 116 S. Ct. 1568 , 134 L.

2009In the present case, however, our Supreme Court’s holding in Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 465 , indicates that the preemption clause at issue does not deprive our courts of jurisdiction. 4 Our conclusion that the preemption provision of the MDA does not deprive our courts of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 , 116 S. Ct. 1568 , 134 L.

2009In the present case, however, our Supreme Court’s holding in Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, supra, 289 Conn. 465 , indicates that the preemption clause at issue does not deprive our courts of jurisdiction. 4 Our conclusion that the preemption provision of the MDA does not deprive our courts of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1167 , 116 S. Ct. 1568 , 134 L.

2001Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 , 114 S. Ct. 2068 , 129 L.

2001Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 , 114 S. Ct. 2068 , 129 L.

2000Amsat Cable v. Cablevision of Connecticut , 6 F.3d 867 , 875 (2d Cir. 1993) adopts this rule as follows: In Cable Television Ass'n of N.Y., Inc. v. Finneran , 954 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1992), we set forth the applicable preemption standard: "Where there are persuasive indicia that Congress intended exclusive federal regulation of the sphere in question, then the state act cannot stand.

2000Absent such an intent, the state rule will only fall if it actually conflicts with the federal law." Accord: Eastern Telecom Corp. v. Borough of East Conemaugh , 872 F.2d 30 , 34 (3rd Cir. 1989); Housatonic Cable Vision Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control , 622 F. Sup. 798 , 806 (D.

2000Amsat Cable v. Cablevision of Connecticut , 6 F.3d 867 , 875 (2d Cir. 1993) adopts this rule as follows: In Cable Television Ass'n of N.Y., Inc. v. Finneran , 954 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1992), we set forth the applicable preemption standard: "Where there are persuasive indicia that Congress intended exclusive federal regulation of the sphere in question, then the state act cannot stand.

2000As one federal Court of Appeals has stated, "Congress, in passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during goodfaith negotiations of Tribal-State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them with immunity whenever it serves their purpose." Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson , 124 F.3d 1050 , 1056 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 , 118 S.Ct. 2319 , 141 L.Ed.2d 694 (1998).

2000As one federal Court of Appeals has stated, "Congress, in passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during goodfaith negotiations of Tribal-State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them with immunity whenever it serves their purpose." Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson , 124 F.3d 1050 , 1056 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 , 118 S.Ct. 2319 , 141 L.Ed.2d 694 (1998).

2000As one federal Court of Appeals has stated, "Congress, in passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during goodfaith negotiations of Tribal-State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them with immunity whenever it serves their purpose." Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson , 124 F.3d 1050 , 1056 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 , 118 S.Ct. 2319 , 141 L.Ed.2d 694 (1998).

2000As one federal Court of Appeals has stated, "Congress, in passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during goodfaith negotiations of Tribal-State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them with immunity whenever it serves their purpose." Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson , 124 F.3d 1050 , 1056 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 , 118 S.Ct. 2319 , 141 L.Ed.2d 694 (1998).

1996Specifically, the defendant argues that under both Garmon preemption; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); and Machinists preemption; Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); this court is prohibited from considering claims that arise under the collective bargaining agreement.

1996Specifically, the defendant argues that under both Garmon preemption; San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); and Machinists preemption; Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); this court is prohibited from considering claims that arise under the collective bargaining agreement.

1995Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 , 147 (2nd Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA does not preempt Connecticut's escheat law.) ERISA contains a broad preemption clause. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132 .

1995Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 , 56 (1987) who said: "The uniformity of decision which the act is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws." In deed as Justice Souter notes at page 706 of New York Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins.: "The basic thrust of the preemption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans." The question really becomes what type of litigation based on stat

1990An Indian tribe’s “powers of self-government . . . involve only the relations among members of [the] tribe.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 , 98 S. Ct. 1079 , 55 L.

1990An Indian tribe’s “powers of self-government . . . involve only the relations among members of [the] tribe.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 , 98 S. Ct. 1079 , 55 L.