preemption clause in Ohio

1998A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce.” *185 The preemption clause of the FRSA expressly preempts any state “law, rule, regulation, order or standard relating to railroad safety.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 396 .

1998A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce.” *185 The preemption clause of the FRSA expressly preempts any state “law, rule, regulation, order or standard relating to railroad safety.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. at 1737 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 396 .

2026“Preemption analysis is guided by the presumption that a federal statute does not displace local law ‘unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.’” U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2013), 12 quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

2025A “requirement” is “a rule of law that must be obeyed.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005).

2026“Preemption analysis is guided by the presumption that a federal statute does not displace local law ‘unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest.’” U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Manufacturing Co. LLC v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2013), 12 quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

2025Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428, 436 (2d Cir. 2013). i. TCA’s preservation clause reserves states’ role in regulating the sale of tobacco products {¶51} The TCA preservation clause leaves state, local, and tribal governments free to impose and enforce requirements that are more demanding than the TCA: Except as provided in [the preemption clause], nothing in this subchapter . . . shall be construed to limit the authority of . . . a State . . . to enact, adopt, promulgate, and enforce any law, rule, regulation, or other measure with respect to tobacco products that is in addition to, or m

2018Generally, Section 106 of the Copyright Act protects an owner's right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display a copyrighted work, and to prepare derivative works based on a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. 106. {¶ 11} Because we have already held that First World's unregistered architectural drawings fell within the subject matter of copyright law, the only issue is the equivalency prong of the analysis. "[T]o survive a preemption challenge based on equivalency of protected rights, the state law claim must contain an extra element" that "distinguish[es] the claim from a claim in copyright" a

2002See State v. Perry , supra, at 43, 697 N.E.2d 624 .

1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”).

1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”).

1993However, the Shaw court also indicated that the preemption clause does not apply to all state laws; specifically, the court stated that some laws “may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that a law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Id. at 100 , 103 S.Ct. at 2901 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 503, fn. 21 .

1993However, the Shaw court also indicated that the preemption clause does not apply to all state laws; specifically, the court stated that some laws “may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that a law ‘relates to’ the plan.” Id. at 100 , 103 S.Ct. at 2901 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 503, fn. 21 .

2014Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F.Supp. 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

2013Id. at 222 .

1994See In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260 , 626 N.E.2d at 90 . {¶ 13} In Moss v. Parks Corp. (C.A.4, 1993), 985 F.2d 736, 739 , the court set forth the history behind the FHSA's preemption clause: "The FHSA was enacted in 1960.

1994See In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260 , 626 N.E.2d at 90 . {¶ 13} In Moss v. Parks Corp. (C.A.4, 1993), 985 F.2d 736, 739 , the court set forth the history behind the FHSA's preemption clause: "The FHSA was enacted in 1960.

1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). {¶ 33} However, following Cipollone, and subsequent to our decisions in In re Miamisburg and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court decide

1997See, also, Jenkins, 69 Ohio St.3d at 545 , 634 N.E.2d at 1001 (“If a federal statute contains an express preemption clause, matters beyond the reach of the express clause are not preempted. * * * Since the FHSA [Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Section 1261 et seq., Title 15, U.S.Code] contains a preemption clause, we examine the text of that clause to determine if Congress intended for appellee’s claims to be preempted in the context of the FHSA.”). {¶ 33} However, following Cipollone, and subsequent to our decisions in In re Miamisburg and its progeny, the United States Supreme Court decide

1994See In re Miamisburg, 68 Ohio St.3d at 260 , 626 N.E.2d at 90 . {¶ 13} In Moss v. Parks Corp. (C.A.4, 1993), 985 F.2d 736, 739 , the court set forth the history behind the FHSA's preemption clause: "The FHSA was enacted in 1960.

1994In Moss v. Parks Corp. (C.A.4, 1993), 985 F.2d 736, 739 , the court set forth the history behind the FHSA’s preemption clause: “The FHSA was enacted in 1960.

2025Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).

2025But that does not end the inquiry because “neither an express pre-emption provision nor a saving clause ‘bars the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Commt., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001), quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 . 20 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 5.

2025But that does not end the inquiry because “neither an express pre-emption provision nor a saving clause ‘bars the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Commt., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001), quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 . 20 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 5.

2025Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987). {¶49} A court’s preemption analysis is, fundamentally, a matter of statutory construction.

2025Nicholson v. Davis Auto Performance, 2024-Ohio-205, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). {¶21} R.C. 1345.02(A) states, “No supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.

2025See Assurance Wireless USA, L.P. v. Reynolds, 100 F.4th 1024 , (9th Cir. 2024).

2021However, “[i]t has ‘long been settled’ that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state law.” (Emphasis added.) State v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2020-Ohio-2665 , 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), appeal allowed, 159 Ohio St.3d 1486 , 2020-Ohio-4232 , 151 N.E.3d 635 , ¶ 13, quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 , 134 S.Ct. 2077 , 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014); Minton at 69 (“[I]n considering issues arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts must start with the 1.

2021However, “[i]t has ‘long been settled’ that a preemption analysis begins with the presumption that federal statutes do not preempt state law.” (Emphasis added.) State v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2020-Ohio-2665 , 154 N.E.3d 327, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.), appeal allowed, 159 Ohio St.3d 1486 , 2020-Ohio-4232 , 151 N.E.3d 635 , ¶ 13, quoting Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 , 134 S.Ct. 2077 , 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014); Minton at 69 (“[I]n considering issues arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts must start with the 1.