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27 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1964–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Massachusetts Delivery Assoc. v. Coakleygreen2 sentences2016The breadth of the FAAAA’s preemption clause is “purposefully expansive.” Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 769 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2014). 2015The preemptive scope of the act’s preemption clause is “purposefully expansive.” Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 769 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2014). | 2 | 2 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmongreen2 sentences2011Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959); see also Chaulk v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361, 1364 (1st Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 518 U.S. 196 (1996) (“[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to Section(s) 7 or Section(s) 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB if the danger of state interference with national labor policy is to be averted”). 1978The judge found that the nearest public area that the defendant could have used for solicitation was 600 feet away. 4 The Court stated that the preemption doctrine would not be applied "where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act----Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.” 359 U.S. at 243-244 . | 1 | 3 |
Maryland v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2007Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. 1990In reviewing this language I am guided by a primary tenet of Federal preemption analysis, which states that Congress is presumed to "not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). | 1 | 2 |
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.green1 sentence2023See Williamson, 562 U.S. at 335. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Burrusgreen1 sentence2020"The 8 whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890). | 1 | 1 |
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Countygreen1 sentence2013Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, North Carolina, 479 U.S. 130, 148 (1986) (“where, as in this case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute,... as part of the preemption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely”). | 1 | 1 |
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.green1 sentence2011See id. (“Whatever the purpose or purposes of the state law, pre-emption analysis cannot ignore the effect of the challenged state action on the pre-empted field”). | 1 | 1 |
Chaulk Services, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discriminationgreen1 sentence2011Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959); see also Chaulk v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361, 1364 (1st Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 518 U.S. 196 (1996) (“[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to Section(s) 7 or Section(s) 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB if the danger of state interference with national labor policy is to be averted”). | 1 | 1 |
Firoozye v. Earthlink Networkgreen1 sentence2005See Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 . | 1 | 1 |
Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.green1 sentence2005See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 836 F. Supp. at 923 ; Henry v. National Geographic Soc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen1 sentence2005When analyzing the scope of a statute’s preemption clause, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. National Geographic Societygreen1 sentence2005See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 836 F. Supp. at 923 ; Henry v. National Geographic Soc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.green1 sentence2003See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865-868 (2000), in which the 1988 version of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which contained a preemption clause very similar to 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (b)(1), quoted above, was construed to preempt certain tort claims despite a saving clause stating that “Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under [the act] does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 7 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (e). | 1 | 1 |
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendongreen1 sentence1993Turning to the merits of the preemption claim, we note first that “the question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.” Inger-soll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-138 (1990), *91 quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueckgreen1 sentence1993Turning to the merits of the preemption claim, we note first that “the question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.” Inger-soll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-138 (1990), *91 quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austingreen1 sentence1985Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.green2 sentences1984See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). 1984See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Malone v. White Motor Corp.green1 sentence1981Only when Congress has not clearly expressed its intent to preempt State law must a court decide whether the application of the State law would frustrate the purposes of the Federal l^w. 5 See Malone v. *489 White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (plurality opinion), and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Goldstein v. Manganogreen1 sentence1981L. c. 151D, § 11, is not exempted, under general principles of the doctrine of preemption, from the preemptive impact of 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a), we must decide whether § 11 is nonetheless exempted under the saving clause of § 1144(b) (4), which leaves intact “any generally applicable criminal law of a State.” *490 The Commonwealth contends that § 11 is a “generally applicable” law because it punishes all employers, as well as certain corporate officers, who fail to abide by their contractual obligations to make contributions to retirement benefit plans. 7 Such reasoning was adopted by a New York | 1 | 1 |
| Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25green | 1 | 1 |
| Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpentersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n
green
2 sentences2015Finally, in Rowe, supra, the Supreme Court considered whether a certain statute enacted by the state of Maine entitled “An Act to Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors” was preempted by the preemption clause contained in the FAAAA ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1)). 2015Finally, in Rowe, supra, the Supreme Court considered whether a certain statute enacted by the state of Maine entitled “An Act to Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco Products and to Prevent the Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors” was preempted by the preemption clause contained in the FAAAA ( 49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)(1)). | 2 | 2010–2015 |
Florida East Coast Railway Company v. City Of West Palm Beach
green
1 sentence2023Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1331 , quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1286 (6th ed. 21"[T]ransportation" is expansively defined to include, in relevant part, "(A) a . . . vehicle, . . . warehouse, . . . property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and (B) services related to that movement." 49 U.S.C. § 10102 (9). 22"As the agency authorized by Congress to administer the [ICCTA], the [STB] is 'uniquely qualified to determine whether [S]tate law . . . should be pre | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Green Mountain Railroad Corporation v. State Of Vermont
green
1 sentence2023Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1331 , quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1286 (6th ed. 21"[T]ransportation" is expansively defined to include, in relevant part, "(A) a . . . vehicle, . . . warehouse, . . . property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and (B) services related to that movement." 49 U.S.C. § 10102 (9). 22"As the agency authorized by Congress to administer the [ICCTA], the [STB] is 'uniquely qualified to determine whether [S]tate law . . . should be pre | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Next, although a change in governing law may sometimes warrant relief under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), *430 365 Mass. 829 (1974), see Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. , 47 Mass.App.Ct. 322 , 326-327, 712 N.E.2d 1200 (1999) (amendment of statute), and may apply to cases appealable or on appeal at the time the law is changed, see Lindor v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc. , 80 Mass.App.Ct. 909 , 909-910, 956 N.E.2d 1247 (2011) (judicial change of common-law rule), this case involves no such change in law. 2018Next, although a change in governing law may sometimes warrant relief under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), *430 365 Mass. 829 (1974), see Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. , 47 Mass.App.Ct. 322 , 326-327, 712 N.E.2d 1200 (1999) (amendment of statute), and may apply to cases appealable or on appeal at the time the law is changed, see Lindor v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc. , 80 Mass.App.Ct. 909 , 909-910, 956 N.E.2d 1247 (2011) (judicial change of common-law rule), this case involves no such change in law. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lindor v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Next, although a change in governing law may sometimes warrant relief under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), *430 365 Mass. 829 (1974), see Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. , 47 Mass.App.Ct. 322 , 326-327, 712 N.E.2d 1200 (1999) (amendment of statute), and may apply to cases appealable or on appeal at the time the law is changed, see Lindor v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc. , 80 Mass.App.Ct. 909 , 909-910, 956 N.E.2d 1247 (2011) (judicial change of common-law rule), this case involves no such change in law. 2018Next, although a change in governing law may sometimes warrant relief under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), *430 365 Mass. 829 (1974), see Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc. , 47 Mass.App.Ct. 322 , 326-327, 712 N.E.2d 1200 (1999) (amendment of statute), and may apply to cases appealable or on appeal at the time the law is changed, see Lindor v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc. , 80 Mass.App.Ct. 909 , 909-910, 956 N.E.2d 1247 (2011) (judicial change of common-law rule), this case involves no such change in law. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Vitello
green
2 sentences2013In Vitello, supra at 245 , we considered whether other provisions of the Massachusetts wiretap statute were preempted by Title III. 12 In our decision, we explicitly noted that the “preemption analysis . . . should be distinguished from the issue of the validity of a warrant issued pursuant to a State statute found in certain particulars to be in conflict with Title III and therefore partially preempted.” Vitello, supra at 248 . 2013In Vitello, supra at 245 , we considered whether other provisions of the Massachusetts wiretap statute were preempted by Title III. 12 In our decision, we explicitly noted that the “preemption analysis . . . should be distinguished from the issue of the validity of a warrant issued pursuant to a State statute found in certain particulars to be in conflict with Title III and therefore partially preempted.” Vitello, supra at 248 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Barry v. Dymo Graphic Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds of Boston, 415 Mass. 87 (1993), and Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830 (1985), where we concluded that a preemption claim under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chestnut-Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds
green
1 sentence1999Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds of Boston, 415 Mass. 87 (1993), and Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830 (1985), where we concluded that a preemption claim under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Taylor
red
1 sentence1997Second, the cases providing support for the Secretary’s contention do so on the basis of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, supra But the only issue before the Court in Metropolitan Life was whether §502(a), and the doctrine of complete preemption, produced a federal question that supported removal to a federal court even if the asserted federal question did not appear in the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones
green
1 sentence1985We therefore see no reason to reconsider the defendants’ preemption claim and conclude that our decision in Tosti I, supra at 723 , remains controlling. 2. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114 green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Vaca v. Sipes green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
red
1 sentence1978Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.