10 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whitley v. Robertson Countygreen1 sentence2014In this vein, CR 8.01(1) provides in pleading a claim that “[rjelief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.” The plain language of this provision would seem to encompass the right to assert claims against an employer as the master of a negligent employee under a theory of respondeat superior simultaneously with claims for liability based upon the employer’s own negligence in hiring, training, retaining, or supervising the employee. 10 See also CR 8.05(2) (“A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based | 1 | 1 |
McHaffie Ex Rel. McHaffie v. Bunchgreen2 sentences2014App.2d 791 , 268 N.E.2d 574, 575 (1971); and McHaffie By and Through McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo.1995) (collecting cases applying the preemption rule). 2014App.2d 791 , 268 N.E.2d 574, 575 (1971); and McHaffie By and Through McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo.1995) (collecting cases applying the preemption rule). | 1 | 1 |
Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.green1 sentence2014Decisions applying the preemption rule include Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5459136 (E.D.Ky.2008) (“Once an employer defendant has admitted liability to plaintiff for its employee’s negligence, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish the other theory of liability serves no purpose.”); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Tenn.2000); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D.Miss.1983); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 , 159 S.E.2d 145, 153-54 (1967); 9 Neff v. Davenport Packing Co., 131 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Neff v. Davenport Packing Co.green2 sentences2014Decisions applying the preemption rule include Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5459136 (E.D.Ky.2008) (“Once an employer defendant has admitted liability to plaintiff for its employee’s negligence, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish the other theory of liability serves no purpose.”); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Tenn.2000); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D.Miss.1983); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 , 159 S.E.2d 145, 153-54 (1967); 9 Neff v. Davenport Packing Co., 131 Ill. 2014App.2d 791 , 268 N.E.2d 574, 575 (1971); and McHaffie By and Through McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo.1995) (collecting cases applying the preemption rule). | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Hillgreen2 sentences2014Decisions applying the preemption rule include Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5459136 (E.D.Ky.2008) (“Once an employer defendant has admitted liability to plaintiff for its employee’s negligence, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish the other theory of liability serves no purpose.”); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Tenn.2000); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D.Miss.1983); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 , 159 S.E.2d 145, 153-54 (1967); 9 Neff v. Davenport Packing Co., 131 Ill. 2014Decisions applying the preemption rule include Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5459136 (E.D.Ky.2008) (“Once an employer defendant has admitted liability to plaintiff for its employee’s negligence, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish the other theory of liability serves no purpose.”); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Tenn.2000); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D.Miss.1983); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 , 159 S.E.2d 145, 153-54 (1967); 9 Neff v. Davenport Packing Co., 131 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
James v. Kelly Trucking Co.green2 sentences2014The Supreme Court of South Carolina comprehensively discussed the relative merits of the competing rules in James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d at 329 , and as a result, it rejected the preemption rule, citing in the process several reasons supporting its decision. 2014First, we note that the James court recognized the separate and distinct nature of the two sources of liability: “[j]ust as an employee can act to cause another’s injury ... so can an employer be independently liable in tort.” Id. at 332. | 1 | 1 |
Durben v. American Materials, Inc.green2 sentences2014See, e.g., Durben v. American Materials, Inc., 232 Ga.App. 750 , 503 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1998). 2014See, e.g., Durben v. American Materials, Inc., 232 Ga.App. 750 , 503 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Altongreen1 sentence2014Decisions applying the preemption rule include Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 5459136 (E.D.Ky.2008) (“Once an employer defendant has admitted liability to plaintiff for its employee’s negligence, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish the other theory of liability serves no purpose.”); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Tenn.2000); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D.Miss.1983); Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 , 159 S.E.2d 145, 153-54 (1967); 9 Neff v. Davenport Packing Co., 131 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western RR, Inc.green1 sentence2011“A state-law negligence action is ‘covered’ and therefore preempted if a FRSA regulation ‘substantially subsume[s]’ the subject matter of the suit.” Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., Inc., 560 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.2009), citing CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Charles J. Sanders v. M. D. Aircraft Sales, Inc. And General Electric Credit Corporationgreen1 sentence1979See notes 1 and 4 supra. 7 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences2011Waymire, 218 F.3d 773 (applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 to the interaction of the FELA and the FRSA). 2011Waymire, 218 F.3d 773 (applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 to the interaction of the FELA and the FRSA). | 2 | 2011–2026 |
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting
green
2 sentences2025When determining whether a federal statute’s preemption clause expressly preempts state law, “we focus on the plain wording of the clause,” which necessarily contains “the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 , 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 , 179 L. -11- Ed. 2d 1031 (2011). 2025When determining whether a federal statute’s preemption clause expressly preempts state law, “we focus on the plain wording of the clause,” which necessarily contains “the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 , 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 , 179 L. -11- Ed. 2d 1031 (2011). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
green
2 sentences2025“The non obstante[8] provision of the Supremacy Clause indicates that a court need look no further than the ordinary meaning of federal law.” PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 623 , 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580 , 180 L. 2025“The non obstante[8] provision of the Supremacy Clause indicates that a court need look no further than the ordinary meaning of federal law.” PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 623 , 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580 , 180 L. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Grzyb v. Evans
green
1 sentence2023Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401-402 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hill v. Kentucky Lottery Corp.
green
2 sentences2020In 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered Hill v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., clarifying what it deemed a fundamental “misunderstanding of Grzyb as it relates to the doctrine of preemption.” Hill, 327 S.W.3d at 420 . 2020“Grzyb does not hold that preemption is triggered when the same set of facts that establishes a common law wrongful discharge claim also constitutes a claim under KRS Chapter 344.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Joseph J. Waymire v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company
green
1 sentence2011Waymire, 218 F.3d 773 (applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 to the interaction of the FELA and the FRSA). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Connors
neutral
1 sentence2004Thus, it was held in United States v. Connors, 634 F.Supp. 484 (S.D.Ohio 1985), that the preemption doctrine precluded Ohio from deeming participants in the Foster Grandparent Program employees for purposes of Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Act in direct conflict with a provision of the Domestic Volunteer Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5058 , which created the Foster Grandparents Program. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Gustafson v. City Of Lake Angelus
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 783 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Niehoff v. Surgidev Corp.
green
1 sentence1998The Kentucky Supreme Court stated in that case that it was “highly influenced by the decision of Lohr and the analysis we give it.” Niehoff, supra, at 819 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.