preemption doctrine in Michigan

1988The preemption doctrine at issue in this case was set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959).

1988The preemption doctrine at issue in this case was set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959).

1990Moreover, in Sears, Roebuck & Co v Carpenters, 436 US 180, 197 ; 98 S Ct 1745 ; 56 L Ed 2d 209 (1978), the United States Supreme Court announced the following focus for a preemption analysis: The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.

1990Moreover, in Sears, Roebuck & Co v Carpenters, 436 US 180, 197 ; 98 S Ct 1745 ; 56 L Ed 2d 209 (1978), the United States Supreme Court announced the following focus for a preemption analysis: The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.

2022The statement in Ryan v Brunswick Corp, 454 Mich 20, 27 (1997), that “[w]here the principles of federal preemption apply, state courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction” was disavowed, and Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, 289 Mich App 132 (2010), was overruled to the extent it suggested that all types of federal preemption may deprive a state court of subject-matter jurisdiction; the preemption doctrine does not deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims involving federal preemption unless Congress has given exclusive jurisdiction to a fede

2022The statement in Ryan v Brunswick Corp, 454 Mich 20, 27 (1997), that “[w]here the principles of federal preemption apply, state courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction” was disavowed, and Packowski v United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951, 289 Mich App 132 (2010), was overruled to the extent it suggested that all types of federal preemption may deprive a state court of subject-matter jurisdiction; the preemption doctrine does not deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims involving federal preemption unless Congress has given exclusive jurisdiction to a fede

2014An activity that is the subject matter of the litigation at hand is “arguably subject” to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 if it “is not plainly contrary to [the NLRA’s] language and . . . has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board.”9 The majority relies on Belknap, Inc v Hale for the proposition that conduct is “arguably prohibited” by the NLRA when “the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the Board.”10 While this is a correct 5 29 USC 157. 6 29 USC 158. 7 Garmon, 359 US at 245 . 8 Local 100, Unit

1996According to Davis , when faced with a preemption claim, the court must first "decide whether there is an arguable case for preemption; if there is, it must defer to the Board, and only if the Board decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation.” Id. at 397 .

2004Moreover, in Walker supra at 713 , 552 N.W.2d 679 , this Court noted that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), through its regulations, interpreted the preemption clause of the MDA to be inapplicable to state requirements of general applicability, which this Court determined to include state common-law claims.

2004Moreover, in Walker supra at 713 , this Court noted that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), through its regulations, interpreted the preemption clause of the MDA to be inapplicable to state requirements of general applicability, which this Court determined to include state common-law claims.

2004Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982); see also, e.g., Abela v. Gen.

2004Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982); see also, e.g., Abela v. Gen.

2025That the phrase ‘[a]ny other law’ sweeps broadly suggests that the Legislature meant to include common law in addition to 18 Sprietsma, 537 US 51 . 19 46 USC 4306. 20 Sprietsma, 537 US at 63 , quoting Gustafson v Alloyd Co, Inc, 513 US 561, 575 ; 115 S Ct 1061 ; 131 L Ed 2d 1 (1995). 7 legislative enactments.” 21 The language at issue in this case is not nearly as “sweeping” as the phrase “[a]ny other law” and certainly has more discreteness as it enumerates more particular types of positive law than, for instance, “a law or regulation,” which is the very language Sprietsma held did not encomp

2025That the phrase ‘[a]ny other law’ sweeps broadly suggests that the Legislature meant to include common law in addition to 18 Sprietsma, 537 US 51 . 19 46 USC 4306. 20 Sprietsma, 537 US at 63 , quoting Gustafson v Alloyd Co, Inc, 513 US 561, 575 ; 115 S Ct 1061 ; 131 L Ed 2d 1 (1995). 7 legislative enactments.” 21 The language at issue in this case is not nearly as “sweeping” as the phrase “[a]ny other law” and certainly has more discreteness as it enumerates more particular types of positive law than, for instance, “a law or regulation,” which is the very language Sprietsma held did not encomp

2025That the phrase ‘[a]ny other law’ sweeps broadly suggests that the Legislature meant to include common law in addition to 18 Sprietsma, 537 US 51 . 19 46 USC 4306. 20 Sprietsma, 537 US at 63 , quoting Gustafson v Alloyd Co, Inc, 513 US 561, 575 ; 115 S Ct 1061 ; 131 L Ed 2d 1 (1995). 7 legislative enactments.” 21 The language at issue in this case is not nearly as “sweeping” as the phrase “[a]ny other law” and certainly has more discreteness as it enumerates more particular types of positive law than, for instance, “a law or regulation,” which is the very language Sprietsma held did not encomp

2025That the phrase ‘[a]ny other law’ sweeps broadly suggests that the Legislature meant to include common law in addition to 18 Sprietsma, 537 US 51 . 19 46 USC 4306. 20 Sprietsma, 537 US at 63 , quoting Gustafson v Alloyd Co, Inc, 513 US 561, 575 ; 115 S Ct 1061 ; 131 L Ed 2d 1 (1995). 7 legislative enactments.” 21 The language at issue in this case is not nearly as “sweeping” as the phrase “[a]ny other law” and certainly has more discreteness as it enumerates more particular types of positive law than, for instance, “a law or regulation,” which is the very language Sprietsma held did not encomp

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2023Plaintiff relies on language in Pompey v Gen Motors Corp, 385 Mich 537 , 552 n 14; 189 NW2d 243 (1971), stating that a “statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate,” but our Supreme Court later explained in Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180 , 192 n 19; 735 NW2d 628 (2007), that the statement in Pompey regarding adequacy was dictum and “that this principle, which has never since been cited in any majority opinion of this Court, appears inconsistent with subsequent caselaw.” The Supreme Court in Lash cited caselaw issued after Pompey, including White v Chrysler

2019Further, 29 USC 1144(b)(2)(B) sets out the “deemer” clause under which employee benefit plans themselves may not be deemed insurance companies for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate” insurance companies or insurance contracts. [American Med Security, Inc, 235 Mich App at 305 .] -5- Our Supreme Court has previously addressed whether MCL 500.3109a was preempted by the ERISA.

2017Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, this case is not “an ideal target” for the preemption analysis set forth in People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 ; 257 NW2d 902 (1977)—that test presupposes that a “lower-level governmental entity” has enacted or seeks to enact a regulation in an area of law that the Legislature has regulated.

2017Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s argument on appeal, this case is not “an ideal target” for the preemption analysis set forth in People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 ; 257 NW2d 902 (1977)—that test presupposes that a “lower-level governmental entity” has enacted or seeks to enact a regulation in an area of law that the Legislature has regulated.

2014An activity that is the subject matter of the litigation at hand is “arguably subject” to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 if it “is not plainly contrary to [the NLRA’s] language and . . . has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board.”9 The majority relies on Belknap, Inc v Hale for the proposition that conduct is “arguably prohibited” by the NLRA when “the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the Board.”10 While this is a correct 5 29 USC 157. 6 29 USC 158. 7 Garmon, 359 US at 245 . 8 Local 100, Unit

2014An activity that is the subject matter of the litigation at hand is “arguably subject” to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 if it “is not plainly contrary to [the NLRA’s] language and . . . has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board.”9 The majority relies on Belknap, Inc v Hale for the proposition that conduct is “arguably prohibited” by the NLRA when “the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the Board.”10 While this is a correct 5 29 USC 157. 6 29 USC 158. 7 Garmon, 359 US at 245 . 8 Local 100, Unit

2014As noted by the majority, the Court has excepted from the NLRB’s exclusive purview causes of action for IIED,42 threats of violence,43 trespass,44 39 Id. at 304. 40 Sears, Roebuck & Co v San Diego Co Dist Council of Carpenters, 436 US 180, 197 ; 98 S Ct 1745 ; 56 L Ed 2d 209 (1978). 41 Id. 42 Farmer, 430 US at 302 . 13 malicious interference with a lawful occupation,45 and malicious libel.46 Beyond this, the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and other state courts have consistently held that one type of wrongful-discharge case is not preempted—wrongful discharge for claiming workers’ compen

2014An activity that is the subject matter of the litigation at hand is “arguably subject” to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 if it “is not plainly contrary to [the NLRA’s] language and . . . has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board.”9 The majority relies on Belknap, Inc v Hale for the proposition that conduct is “arguably prohibited” by the NLRA when “the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the Board.”10 While this is a correct 5 29 USC 157. 6 29 USC 158. 7 Garmon, 359 US at 245 . 8 Local 100, Unit

2014An activity that is the subject matter of the litigation at hand is “arguably subject” to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 if it “is not plainly contrary to [the NLRA’s] language and . . . has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board.”9 The majority relies on Belknap, Inc v Hale for the proposition that conduct is “arguably prohibited” by the NLRA when “the controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the Board.”10 While this is a correct 5 29 USC 157. 6 29 USC 158. 7 Garmon, 359 US at 245 . 8 Local 100, Unit

2012Id. at 357 .

2010Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 276 ; 521 NW2d 518 (1994).

2010Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 276 ; 521 NW2d 518 (1994).

2010Even if the Ohio Act were held not to fall within the class of state laws preempted [by those provisions], preemption would still be appropriate here because the Ohio Act does not fit into any of the categories that [the regulation] excludes from preemption, and the Ohio Act has more than an “incidental effect” ... on State Farm Bank’s mortgage lending operations. [Reardon, 539 F3d at 347-348 .] Construing the virtually identical language of the OCC regulation at issue here, we come to the same conclusion.