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31 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Aguayo v. U.S. Bankgreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶29 In a preemption analysis, the reviewing court must “read a statute or regulation in its entirety” and when applied, as occurs here, the court must “consider both the express preemption and savings clauses together.” Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). 2025Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶29 In a preemption analysis, the reviewing court must “read a statute or regulation in its entirety” and when applied, as occurs here, the court must “consider both the express preemption and savings clauses together.” Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). | 2 | 2 |
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeauxgreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶29 In a preemption analysis, the reviewing court must “read a statute or regulation in its entirety” and when applied, as occurs here, the court must “consider both the express preemption and savings clauses together.” Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). 2025Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶29 In a preemption analysis, the reviewing court must “read a statute or regulation in its entirety” and when applied, as occurs here, the court must “consider both the express preemption and savings clauses together.” Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). | 2 | 2 |
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen2 sentences2011See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (in the context of a preemption analysis under another federal statute, recognizing the "historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety"). ¶ 91. 2003The preemption clause there was similar to the one here, and provided, as material: *510 "[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement— (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." Id., 518 U.S. at 481-482 . | 2 | 2 |
Gross v. Hoffmangreen2 sentences2006See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300 , 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (only dispositive issues need be addressed). 2006See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300 , 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (only dispositive issues need be addressed). | 2 | 2 |
Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of NMgreen2 sentences1992In each case, the court must conduct a "particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698, 1707 (1989) (quoting Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)). 1992First, I agree with the majority's reading of White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), and Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982). | 1 | 2 |
Ledger v. City of Waupaca Board of Appealsgreen1 sentence2024See Ledger, 146 Wis. 2d at 262-66 . | 1 | 1 |
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklingreen1 sentence2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
unempl.ins.rep. (Cch) P 22,142 in Re Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc., Debtor. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Commissiongreen1 sentence2015See Hollytex, 73 F.3d at 1522-23 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blalockgreen2 sentences2003See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300 , 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed); State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703 , 442 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1989) (cases should be decided on the "narrowest possible ground"). 2003See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300 , 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed); State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703 , 442 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1989) (cases should be decided on the "narrowest possible ground"). | 1 | 1 |
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green1 sentence1996See generally id. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 584519green2 sentences1994Pursuant to the preemption doctrine, federal law supersedes state law in three general situations: "[W]here Congress explicitly preempts state law, where preemption is implied because Congress has occupied the entire field and where preemption is implied because there is an actual conflict between' federal and state law." Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1992). 1994Id. at 780 . | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Village of Hales Cornersgreen2 sentences1994VI, cl. 2, provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 4 While federal court decisions, other than United States Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law, are not binding on us, Thompson v. Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 307 , 340 N.W.2d 704, 713 (1983), we may 1994VI, cl. 2, provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 4 While federal court decisions, other than United States Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law, are not binding on us, Thompson v. Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 307 , 340 N.W.2d 704, 713 (1983), we may | 1 | 1 |
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences1992Under the preemption analysis developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in federal Indian law cases, we must avoid rigidly applying "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty . . .." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 . " [Questions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of preemption that have developed in other areas of the law . . .." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989). 1992In sum, "the relevant preemption test is a flexible one sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal interests involved." Cotton, 109 S. Ct. at 1711 . | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54green1 sentence1992The focus of a preemption inquiry is whether "Congress has explicitly mandated the pre-emption of state law or has adequately indicated an intent to occupy the field of regulation, thereby displacing all state laws on the same subject." Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 500-01 (1984) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 389201green | 1 | 1 |
| Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n of Pa.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hines v. Davidowitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Commission
green
2 sentences2012We refer to the four-factor preemption test as the "Anchor test" because it first appeared, in its modern form, in Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 120 Wis. 2d 391 , 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984). 2012We refer to the four-factor preemption test as the "Anchor test" because it first appeared, in its modern form, in Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 120 Wis. 2d 391 , 355 N.W.2d 234 (1984). | 3 | 1996–2012 |
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County
green
2 sentences2025Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45 , 271 Wis. 2d 633 , 681 N.W.2d 110 . 10 A preemption inquiry generally begins with the question of whether the federal law fully occupied the field with its actions. 2025Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45 , 271 Wis. 2d 633 , 681 N.W.2d 110 . 10 A preemption inquiry generally begins with the question of whether the federal law fully occupied the field with its actions. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek
green
2 sentences2010American Transmission Co. v. Dane County, 2009 WI App 126, ¶ 9 , 321 Wis. 2d 138 , 772 N.W.2d 731 (citing DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 657 , 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996)). 2010American Transmission Co. v. Dane County, 2009 WI App 126, ¶ 9 , 321 Wis. 2d 138 , 772 N.W.2d 731 (citing DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 657 , 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996)). | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 65-68 . 2003Furthermore, insofar as the preemption doctrine implicates a federal need for uniformity of regulation, see Sprietsma, 123 S. Ct. at 523 , the federal inspection scheme here eschews uniformity in favor of non-uniform plant-by-plant Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point plans developed by the plant operators themselves. | 2 | 2003–2009 |
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
green
2 sentences1992Under the preemption analysis developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in federal Indian law cases, we must avoid rigidly applying "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty . . .." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 . " [Questions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of preemption that have developed in other areas of the law . . .." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989). 1992We do not agree. [7-9] Under the preemption analysis developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in federal Indian law cases, we must avoid rigidly applying "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty...." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 145 . "[Q]uestions of pre-emption in this area are not resolved by reference to standards of preemption that have developed in other areas of the law ...." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989). | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Rice v. Rehner
green
2 sentences1988The court of appeals utilized the preemption analysis articulated in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), and State v. Webster, 114 Wis. 2d 418, 338 N.W.2d 474 (1983), in reaching its conclusion. 1986Id. at 725 . *433 Applying the second stage of the preemption analysis, the Rice Court found no federal preemption because the federal statute allowing tribal liquor regulation also allowed concurrent state regulation. | 2 | 1986–1988 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
1 sentence2014On the contrary, in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), the case the majority opinion cites for the "specific, individual hazard" exception, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that preemption of an excessive speed claim under the Federal Railroad Safety Act "does not bar suit for breach of related tort law duties .... " 8 A "specific, individual hazard" is not to be confused with the preemption exception in § 20106(a)(2)(A) for an "essentially local safety or security hazard." 9 ¶ 64. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2011The Machinists doctrine "protects against state interference with policies implicated by the structure of the [NLRA] itself, by preempting state law and state causes of action concerning conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 749 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
American Transmission Co. v. Dane County
green
2 sentences2010American Transmission Co. v. Dane County, 2009 WI App 126, ¶ 9 , 321 Wis. 2d 138 , 772 N.W.2d 731 (citing DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 657 , 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996)). 2010American Transmission Co. v. Dane County, 2009 WI App 126, ¶ 9 , 321 Wis. 2d 138 , 772 N.W.2d 731 (citing DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek, 200 Wis. 2d 642, 657 , 547 N.W.2d 770 (1996)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009The third question is whether the preemption analysis of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 999 , 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008), applies to claims against the Marquis 7230 defibrillator, even though supplemental premarket approval [4] was given to a later *399 defibrillator. 2009The third question is whether the preemption analysis of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., _ U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008), applies to claims against the Marquis 7230 defibrillator, even though supplemental premarket approval 4 was given to a later defibrillator. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 525-27 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Felder v. Casey
green
1 sentence2005Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Boggs v. Boggs
green
1 sentence2000The majority found it unnecessary to "inquire whether the statutory phrase 'relate to' provides further and additional support for the preemption claim." Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
DeRosso Landfill Co. v. City of Oak Creek
green
1 sentence1996DeRosso, 191 Wis. 2d at 64-65 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC
green
1 sentence1990Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives o | 1 | 1990–1990 |
MacKey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1989While ERISA preempts states from interfering with such collection efforts, see Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2185 , it does not preempt states from creating general creditors' rights that may be utilized to effect collections of obligations by all creditors, including a creditor possessing an ERISA claim that has been reduced to a judgment. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Webster green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Fox v. City of Racine green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.