18 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Campbell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024The court explained that “demonstrating sobriety is a reasonable and necessary part of the safety assessment in this case, especially [since Brody was] born substance exposed, Father’s relationship with Mother who is known to have a severe substance abuse history, and prior DCS concerns of substance abuse.” See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542 , 547–48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a substance] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (quoting City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 2023Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378-79, ¶¶ 26-29 (App. 2010); cf. Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542 , 547-48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a breathalyzer] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2 |
City of Westerville v. Cunninghamgreen1 sentence2024The court explained that “demonstrating sobriety is a reasonable and necessary part of the safety assessment in this case, especially [since Brody was] born substance exposed, Father’s relationship with Mother who is known to have a severe substance abuse history, and prior DCS concerns of substance abuse.” See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542 , 547–48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a substance] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (quoting City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 | 1 | 1 |
Raymond F. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2023Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378-79, ¶¶ 26-29 (App. 2010); cf. Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542 , 547-48 n.3 (1971) (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take [a breathalyzer] test indicates the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 766782green2 sentences2010See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 , 823 (7th Cir.1999) ("Statistical methods could provide a decent answer likely a more accurate answer than is possible when addressing the equivalent causation question in a single person's suit."); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 133 F.Supp.2d at 169 -70 (citing authorities); Robert G. 2010See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 , 823 (7th Cir.1999) (“Statistical methods could provide a decent answer — likely a more accurate answer than is possible when addressing the equivalent causation question in a single person’s suit.”); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 133 F.Supp.2d at 169 -70 (citing authorities); Robert G. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Eppsgreen2 sentences1986In People v. Epps, 182 Cal.App.3d 1102 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 625, 628 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1986), where defendant was charged with murder and the “physical evidence and eyewitness testimony overwhelmingly established appellant as the perpetrator of this brutal and senseless murder,” the court concluded there was no due process violation from the state’s failure to perform a particular test: [T]he evidence was in fact analyzed, the results were helpful to appellant, and it is quite apparent that the trial court gave at least as much weight to the defense witnesses’ extrapolation of the results of analys 1986In People v. Epps, 182 Cal.App.3d 1102 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 625, 628 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1986), where defendant was charged with murder and the “physical evidence and eyewitness testimony overwhelmingly established appellant as the perpetrator of this brutal and senseless murder,” the court concluded there was no due process violation from the state’s failure to perform a particular test: [T]he evidence was in fact analyzed, the results were helpful to appellant, and it is quite apparent that the trial court gave at least as much weight to the defense witnesses’ extrapolation of the results of analys | 1 | 1 |
Oshrin v. Coultergreen2 sentences1985See Oshrin v. Coulter, 142 Ariz. 109 , 688 P.2d 1001 (1984). 1985See Oshrin v. Coulter, 142 Ariz. 109 , 688 P.2d 1001 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences1982See also State v. Brown, 49 Ohio App.2d 104 , 359 N.E.2d 706 (1975), holding that where the defendant offered no evidence tending to establish that he ingested some foreign substance during that time, a failure to observe a defendant continuously for 20 minutes prior to the administration of the test goes to the weight to be accorded the results of the test. 1982See also State v. Brown, 49 Ohio App.2d 104 , 359 N.E.2d 706 (1975), holding that where the defendant offered no evidence tending to establish that he ingested some foreign substance during that time, a failure to observe a defendant continuously for 20 minutes prior to the administration of the test goes to the weight to be accorded the results of the test. | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1971See, e. g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.CtApp.D.C., 1960); State v. Ingram, 67 N.J.Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. 1971Thus, it is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt * * *." [4] See, e.g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.Ct.App.D.C., 1960): State v. Ingram, 67 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Phelps v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA
green
1 sentence2019Phelps, 155 Ariz. at 506 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Hardy
green
1 sentence2018Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327 , 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256 , 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 526 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B.
green
2 sentences2018He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013). ¶ 4 At the suppression hearing, Alsarraf contended that, because Valenzuela did not distinguish between blood and breath tests, it gave Arizonans broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). 2018He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013). ¶ 4 At the suppression hearing, Alsarraf contended that, because Valenzuela did not distinguish between blood and breath tests, it gave Arizonans broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2018Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327 , 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256 , 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 526 (Tex. Crim. 2018Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327 , 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256 , 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 526 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Arizona v. Francisco L Encinas Valenzuela
green
2 sentences2018The investigating officer advised him, "Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance ... to determine alcohol concentration or drug content." Alsarraf agreed, and the officer administered a breath test. *159 ¶ 3 Alsarraf filed a motion to suppress the results of the test, arguing that his agreement to the test had been coerced by the officer's admin per se admonition, quoted above, citing State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299 , 371 P.3d 627 (2016). 2018The investigating officer advised him, "Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance ... to determine alcohol concentration or drug content." Alsarraf agreed, and the officer administered a breath test. *159 ¶ 3 Alsarraf filed a motion to suppress the results of the test, arguing that his agreement to the test had been coerced by the officer's admin per se admonition, quoted above, citing State v. Valenzuela , 239 Ariz. 299 , 371 P.3d 627 (2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Patrick McLeod Nissley
green
2 sentences2018Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327 , 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256 , 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 526 (Tex. Crim. 2018Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 148, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ; State v. Nissley , 241 Ariz. 327 , 331, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 1256 , 1260 (2017). ¶ 8 In blood-alcohol cases, the Fourth Amendment may be implicated at three stages: "(1) the physical intrusion into [the] body to draw blood, (2) the exercise of control over and the testing of the blood sample, and (3) obtaining the results of the test." State v. Hardy , 963 S.W.2d 516 , 526 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2018He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013). ¶ 4 At the suppression hearing, Alsarraf contended that, because Valenzuela did not distinguish between blood and breath tests, it gave Arizonans broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). 2018He also claimed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because his arrest occurred after the decision in State v. Butler , 232 Ariz. 84 , 302 P.3d 609 (2013). ¶ 4 At the suppression hearing, Alsarraf contended that, because Valenzuela did not distinguish between blood and breath tests, it gave Arizonans broader protection than the Fourth Amendment under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Arizona v. David J. Waller
green
2 sentences2018Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 We review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing "in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling, deferring to the court's determination of facts and witness credibility but reviewing de novo its legal conclusions." State v. Waller , 235 Ariz. 479 , ¶ 5, 333 P.3d 806 , 810 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). 2018Factual and Procedural Background ¶ 2 We review the evidence presented at the suppression hearing "in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling, deferring to the court's determination of facts and witness credibility but reviewing de novo its legal conclusions." State v. Waller , 235 Ariz. 479 , ¶ 5, 333 P.3d 806 , 810 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re the Marriage of Worcester
green
2 sentences2015Mother was not entitled to make an untimely withdrawal of her acknowledgment of paternity on the basis of a mistake of fact as to who the biological father was. ¶7 Choate asserts that under In re Marriage of Worcester, 192 Ariz. 24 , 960 P.2d 624 (1998), the trial court erred in dismissing his paternity case. 3 CHOATE v. COCHRAN Decision of the Court We agree. 2015Mother was not entitled to make an untimely withdrawal of her acknowledgment of paternity on the basis of a mistake of fact as to who the biological father was. ¶7 Choate asserts that under In re Marriage of Worcester, 192 Ariz. 24 , 960 P.2d 624 (1998), the trial court erred in dismissing his paternity case. 3 CHOATE v. COCHRAN Decision of the Court We agree. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 , 823 (7th Cir.1999) ("Statistical methods could provide a decent answer likely a more accurate answer than is possible when addressing the equivalent causation question in a single person's suit."); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 133 F.Supp.2d at 169 -70 (citing authorities); Robert G. 2010See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 , 823 (7th Cir.1999) (“Statistical methods could provide a decent answer — likely a more accurate answer than is possible when addressing the equivalent causation question in a single person’s suit.”); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 133 F.Supp.2d at 169 -70 (citing authorities); Robert G. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Branch v. Wilkinson
green
2 sentences1985Id. at 663 , 256 N.W.2d at 316 . 1985Id. at 663 , 256 N.W.2d at 316 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Dorsey
green
2 sentences1977The Supreme Court of New Mexico based its opinion in State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184 , 539 P.2d 204 (1975) on the recently enacted New Mexico Rules of Evidence and a stipulation by the parties that: (1) the polygraph operator was qualified, (2) the testing procedure was reliable and (3) the tests made on the subject were valid. 1977The Supreme Court of New Mexico based its opinion in State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184 , 539 P.2d 204 (1975) on the recently enacted New Mexico Rules of Evidence and a stipulation by the parties that: (1) the polygraph operator was qualified, (2) the testing procedure was reliable and (3) the tests made on the subject were valid. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Morrow
green
2 sentences1977See e. g., Rules 24.2(a)(2) and 32.1(e)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; State v. Morrow, 111 Ariz. 268 , 528 P.2d 612 (1974). 1977See e. g., Rules 24.2(a)(2) and 32.1(e)(1), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; State v. Morrow, 111 Ariz. 268 , 528 P.2d 612 (1974). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenile
green
2 sentences1977In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421 , 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974), the court ruled that a defendant requesting a polygraph examination must bind himself in advance to the results of the test and that the trial court must use great care in deciding whether to admit such evidence. 1977In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421 , 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974), the court ruled that a defendant requesting a polygraph examination must bind himself in advance to the results of the test and that the trial court must use great care in deciding whether to admit such evidence. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Ingram
green
2 sentences1971See, e. g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.CtApp.D.C., 1960); State v. Ingram, 67 N.J.Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. 1971Thus, it is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test and his consciousness of guilt * * *." [4] See, e.g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.Ct.App.D.C., 1960): State v. Ingram, 67 N.J. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Duckworth v. State
green
2 sentences1971See, e. g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.CtApp.D.C., 1960); State v. Ingram, 67 N.J.Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. 1971Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Severson
green
2 sentences1971See, e. g., Stuart v. District of Columbia, 157 A.2d 294 (Munic.CtApp.D.C., 1960); State v. Ingram, 67 N.J.Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. 1971Super. 21 , 169 A.2d 860 (1961); State v. Severson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (S.Ct.N.D., 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1103 (Crim. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Stone v. Earp
green
2 sentences1962The next case in this area was Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606 , 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951). 1962The next case in this area was Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606 , 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
People v. Houser
green
2 sentences1962In affirming Houser’s conviction for a lewd and lascivious act the court remarked that: “It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an expert and that as to the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to indicate that he was not telling the truth. * * * ” 85 Cal.App.2d at 695 , 193 P.2d at 942 . 1962In affirming Houser’s conviction for a lewd and lascivious act the court remarked that: “It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an expert and that as to the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to indicate that he was not telling the truth. * * * ” 85 Cal.App.2d at 695 , 193 P.2d at 942 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
State v. Harold
green
2 sentences1953We have heretofore held in State v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210 , 246 P.2d 178 , that the act in question is constitutional and it is not necessary to go into that matter again. 1953We have heretofore held in State v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210 , 246 P.2d 178 , that the act in question is constitutional and it is not necessary to go into that matter again. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville
green
2 sentences1931The leading case on the question, Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 , 43 L. 1931The leading case on the question, Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131 , 43 L. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.