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27 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1924–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Sheagreen2 sentences1983See Commonwealth v. Shea, 356 Mass. 358, 361 (1969). 4. 1980See Commonwealth v. Shea, 356 Mass. 358, 361 (1969); State v. Parson, 226 Kan. 491, 495 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.green1 sentence2024See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 483 Mass. 131, 137 (2019) (Doe No. 23656) ("Doe is not entitled to a guarantee that SORB will reach the 2 As noted by SORB, Dr. Sorrentino's reliance on the Stable-2007 risk-assessment tool was problematic in that the results of the test were primarily based on Doe's self-reporting. | 1 | 1 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51 , 59 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 930 (2013), citing Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 666, 674 ("In part IV of the Supreme Court's Bullcoming opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg observed that the [S]tate could have avoided a Sixth Amendment violation when it realized that the original scientist was unavailable to testify 'by asking [the testifying analyst] to retest the sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.' . . . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sotogreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51 , 59 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 930 (2013), citing Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 666, 674 ("In part IV of the Supreme Court's Bullcoming opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg observed that the [S]tate could have avoided a Sixth Amendment violation when it realized that the original scientist was unavailable to testify 'by asking [the testifying analyst] to retest the sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.' . . . | 1 | 1 |
Tooley v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51 , 59 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 930 (2013), citing Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 666, 674 ("In part IV of the Supreme Court's Bullcoming opinion, joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg observed that the [S]tate could have avoided a Sixth Amendment violation when it realized that the original scientist was unavailable to testify 'by asking [the testifying analyst] to retest the sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.' . . . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sandsgreen1 sentence2017See id. at 188 . 5 There are a number of other FSTs, such as the “Romberg balance test,” in which the subject stands with heels and toes together and arms at the side of the *780 body and tips his or her head back slightly and estimates the passage of thirty seconds, and the “finger to nose test,” which are less frequently used in the context of alcohol impairment. 6 See St 2016, c. 334, “The Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana Act.” 7 The judge noted several of these studies in his findings on remand from this court. | 1 | 1 |
Bottomley v. Division of Administrative Law Appealsgreen1 sentence2014See Bottomley v. Division of Administrative Law Appeals, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 657 (“Where reasonably possible, no portion of the language of a regulation should be treated as surplusage”). | 1 | 1 |
Pointer v. Texasgreen1 sentence2013The defendant’s primary argument here is a challenge under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), to the expert testimony here of a chemist at the State police crime laboratory comparing the results of an analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) taken from the defendant prepared by the State police crime laboratory with an analysis of DNA found on the eyeglasses prepared by Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark), a commercial DNA testing facility in Dallas, | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sabouringreen1 sentence2005Commonwealth v. Sabourin, 48 Mass.App.Ct. 505, 506 (2000) “(CJonsent to take the test impliedly contemplates the taking of a valid test." In Sabourin , because police were not able to conduct a valid breath test due a machine malfunction, the defendant was transported to a nearby police station where a proper functioning breathalyzer was available. | 1 | 1 |
In re Shumangreen1 sentence2003Ill, § 70F, provides, in relevant part: “No health care facility . . . and no physician or health care provider shall (1) test any person for the presence of the HTLV-III antibody or antigen without first obtaining his written informed consent; (2) disclose the results of such test to any person other than the subject thereof without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent; or (3) identify the subject of such tests to any person without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent.” In seeking a suspension, bar counsel relies on the following cases: see Matter of Shuma | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Conleygreen1 sentence2003See id. | 1 | 1 |
Mississippi Bar v. Landgreen1 sentence2003See also Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell, 659 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1995) (imposing thirty-day suspension for failing to disclose material facts to opposing counsel during discovery); Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 909-910 (Miss. 1994) (imposing one-year suspension on attorney who deliberately concealed evidence with intent to deprive opposing counsel and client from pursuing claim). | 1 | 1 |
In THE MATTER OF McCARTHYgreen1 sentence2003Ill, § 70F, provides, in relevant part: “No health care facility . . . and no physician or health care provider shall (1) test any person for the presence of the HTLV-III antibody or antigen without first obtaining his written informed consent; (2) disclose the results of such test to any person other than the subject thereof without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent; or (3) identify the subject of such tests to any person without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent.” In seeking a suspension, bar counsel relies on the following cases: see Matter of Shuma | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrellgreen1 sentence2003See also Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell, 659 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1995) (imposing thirty-day suspension for failing to disclose material facts to opposing counsel during discovery); Mississippi Bar v. Land, 653 So. 2d 899, 909-910 (Miss. 1994) (imposing one-year suspension on attorney who deliberately concealed evidence with intent to deprive opposing counsel and client from pursuing claim). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Neitlichgreen1 sentence2003Ill, § 70F, provides, in relevant part: “No health care facility . . . and no physician or health care provider shall (1) test any person for the presence of the HTLV-III antibody or antigen without first obtaining his written informed consent; (2) disclose the results of such test to any person other than the subject thereof without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent; or (3) identify the subject of such tests to any person without first obtaining the subject’s written informed consent.” In seeking a suspension, bar counsel relies on the following cases: see Matter of Shuma | 1 | 1 |
Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffattgreen1 sentence1998Compare Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 406 (1888). (c) North parking lot. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Youth Services v. a Juvenilegreen1 sentence1998See Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531 (1986) (expert may base an opinion on “facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pynegreen1 sentence1997Compare Commonwealth v. Pyne, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 40 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Alanogreen1 sentence1995Commonwealth v. Alano, 388 Mass. 871, 874-875 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parsongreen1 sentence1980See Commonwealth v. Shea, 356 Mass. 358, 361 (1969); State v. Parson, 226 Kan. 491, 495 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Watsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Scott
green
1 sentence2024P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).2 The motion was supported by an affidavit in which the defendant averred that he "was told that the 2 "An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty is treated as a guilty plea for the purposes of a motion for a new trial." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 , 337 n.1 (2014). 5 Commonwealth would only need the results of the test to convict [him] and that [he] was 'per se' guilty because of the test results." According to the defendant, had he known that the breathalyzer test results could not be used against him at trial, " | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Dube
green
1 sentence2001Additionally, the defendant asserts that, by subpoenaing the test results, the Commonwealth violated “multiple privileges.” Because we do not recognize a statutory patient-physician testimonial privilege in Massachusetts, 5 Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 570 , 572 n.3 (1992), the only conceivably applicable privilege is the attorney-client privilege. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Burns v. Sawyer
green
1 sentence1992Burns v. Sawyer, 34 Mass. App. Dec. 67 (1965). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Stathopoulos
green
1 sentence1988The officer who had performed the test expressed the opinions (on cross examination) that the .07 reading was inconsistent with the irrational behavior which the defendant had exhibited in the police station and that the defendant had been under the influence of a combination of alcohol and ‘something else.’ [ 1 ] Such of the pills as had not been *455 consumed in the course of the chemical analysis, together with a certificate of the results of the analysis, were admitted in evidence, supposedly for the limited purpose of explaining the defendant’s conduct in the police station.” Commonwealth | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Bagley
green
1 sentence1987Therefore, even if we were to adopt the approach set forth in Bagley, supra, we would conclude that the defendant is entitled to relief. 7 The judge found that defense counsel admitted being informed by Officer Hubert’s testimony at the probable cause hearing that, while no laboratory report had yet been received, the results of a test for blood on the knife had come back negative. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth vs. a Juvenile
green
1 sentence1987It may also be that test results might now be less conclusive than the results of a test taken within one year of the alleged offense (see Commonwealth v. A Juvenile [No. 1], 370 Mass. 450 , 452 n.2 [1976]). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Commonwealth v. Connolly
green
1 sentence1986The judge explained to the jury at the outset of the case, in some preliminary instructions which he gave prior to the prosecutor’s opening statement, that “[a] person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor if at the time of his consumption and as a result of his consumption of alcoholic beverages, his ability to operate a motor vehicle safely has been reduced, diminished.” That remark was grounded on the holding in Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169 (1985), which had been decided some two months prior to the trial of this case. 4 There the court held: “[I]n a prosecution for opera | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Gilbert v. California
green
1 sentence1980Later cases applied the Schmerber reasoning to uphold the forcing of voice exemplars (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [1967]), handwriting samples (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [1967]), fingerprints (Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278 [10th Cir. 1973]), and other things. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Schmerber v. California green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence1980Later cases applied the Schmerber reasoning to uphold the forcing of voice exemplars (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [1967]), handwriting samples (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [1967]), fingerprints (Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278 [10th Cir. 1973]), and other things. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Kermit Snow v. State of Oklahoma, And/or Park J. Anderson, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary
green
1 sentence1980Later cases applied the Schmerber reasoning to uphold the forcing of voice exemplars (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [1967]), handwriting samples (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [1967]), fingerprints (Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278 [10th Cir. 1973]), and other things. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Patterson green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Dearth v. Hide & Leather National Bank neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Crocker v. Dillon green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Pennsylvania Railroad v. United States Railroad Labor Board green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.