results test in Kentucky

2025The person has the right to have a test or tests of his or her blood performed by a person of his or her choosing described in KRS 189A.103 within a reasonable time of his or her arrest at the expense of the person arrested; and KRS 189A.105 (2021), 2019 Ky. Acts ch. 103, § 9, eff. 7-1-20 (current version amended effective June 29, 2023). -3- recognized right of refusal as evidence of guilt of DUI was improper under Deno v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 753 (Ky. 2005).

2022In Lainhart, supra, the Court specifically held that failure to make the requisite findings pursuant to KRS 439.3106 constituted error under “current law” and that there was a “substantial possibility” that the results of the hearing voiding Lainhart’s diversion agreement would have been different without that error and, therefore, the trial court’s failure to make findings resulted in “manifest injustice.” 534 S.W.3d at 238 .

2022In Lainhart, supra, the Court specifically held that failure to make the requisite findings pursuant to KRS 439.3106 constituted error under “current law” and that there was a “substantial possibility” that the results of the hearing voiding Lainhart’s diversion agreement would have been different without that error and, therefore, the trial court’s failure to make findings resulted in “manifest injustice.” 534 S.W.3d at 238 .

2012But outside that context, such as for the purpose of establishing probable cause for an arrest, the court held that “a trial court may consider the pass/fail determination of the PBT.” Id.

2001Douglas objected to the risk assessment placed on him by these tests and a hearing was held at which defense counsel objected that the reports were not admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

2001Douglas objected to the risk assessment placed on him by these tests and a hearing was held at which defense counsel objected that the reports were not admissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

1994Appellants have attempted to make various constitutional claims attacking this Court’s decision in Howard v. Salyer, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 420 (1985), and in particular, that portion which reiterated the continued viability of the Cammack Act whereby a countywide vote in favor of prohibition may not be reconsidered by another political subdivision within the county for three years except for cities of the first four classes.

1990United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

1990United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

1972Vanhoose v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 37 , 98 S.W.2d 49 (1936). 2 Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the instruction was improper, and we continue to adhere to the principles announced in Botnick v. Commonwealth, supra; Mabe v. Commonwealth, supra; and Jones v. Commonwealth, supra. But see 48 C.J.S.

1972Vanhoose v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 37 , 98 S.W.2d 49 (1936). 2 Nevertheless, it is our opinion that the instruction was improper, and we continue to adhere to the principles announced in Botnick v. Commonwealth, supra; Mabe v. Commonwealth, supra; and Jones v. Commonwealth, supra. But see 48 C.J.S.

1972R.C. 4511.191, the implied consent statute, evidences a bold legislative effort to procure a chemical test of body fluid or breath from those suspected of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. * * * Furthermore, the General Assembly has provided a means of producing scientifically reliable evidence bearing on the innocence or guilt, without which the trial of those alleged to have been driving under the influence of alcohol often tends to be turned on emotional rather than factual considerations.” The Commonwealth also relies on Kay v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958),

1972R.C. 4511.191, the implied consent statute, evidences a bold legislative effort to procure a chemical test of body fluid or breath from those suspected of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. * * * Furthermore, the General Assembly has provided a means of producing scientifically reliable evidence bearing on the innocence or guilt, without which the trial of those alleged to have been driving under the influence of alcohol often tends to be turned on emotional rather than factual considerations.” The Commonwealth also relies on Kay v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958),

1972R.C. 4511.191, the implied consent statute, evidences a bold legislative effort to procure a chemical test of body fluid or breath from those suspected of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. * * * Furthermore, the General Assembly has provided a means of producing scientifically reliable evidence bearing on the innocence or guilt, without which the trial of those alleged to have been driving under the influence of alcohol often tends to be turned on emotional rather than factual considerations.” The Commonwealth also relies on Kay v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958),

1972R.C. 4511.191, the implied consent statute, evidences a bold legislative effort to procure a chemical test of body fluid or breath from those suspected of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. * * * Furthermore, the General Assembly has provided a means of producing scientifically reliable evidence bearing on the innocence or guilt, without which the trial of those alleged to have been driving under the influence of alcohol often tends to be turned on emotional rather than factual considerations.” The Commonwealth also relies on Kay v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958),

1972Cf. People v. Jansen, 130 Ill.App.2d 365 , 264 N.E.2d 862 (1970).

1972Cf. People v. Jansen, 130 Ill.App.2d 365 , 264 N.E.2d 862 (1970).

1971Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner’s testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.” Id., 384 U.S. at 765, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d at 916-917.

1969In Soard v. Rogers’ Administrator, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 525 , this court held admissible in a civil negligence case the results of an analysis of a blood sample taken from the dead body of an automobile driver, showing high alcoholic content.

1967Dugan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 333 S.W.2d 755 ; Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 865 .

1967Dugan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 333 S.W.2d 755 ; Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 865 .

1960In Colbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 825 , this Court held inadmissible the results of a particular polygraph lie detector test, on the ground that there was not a sufficient showing of reliability and accuracy.

1957In that case, People v. Hou-ser, 85 Cal.App.2d 686 , 193 P.2d 937 , the defendant not only stipulated in writing that the results of the test could be admitted in evidence, but also that the operator of the lie detector was a qualified expert.

1957In that case, People v. Hou-ser, 85 Cal.App.2d 686 , 193 P.2d 937 , the defendant not only stipulated in writing that the results of the test could be admitted in evidence, but also that the operator of the lie detector was a qualified expert.