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76 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McClerin v. R-M Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2026In evaluating whether a document is well grounded in fact under Rule 11, the Court “must [determine]: (1) whether the [movant] undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the [movant], after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” Id. at 314 (quoting McClerin v. R-M Indus., Inc., 118 N.C. 2017In determining whether a paper meets the factual certification requirement of Rule 11, the Court must analyze “(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” McClerin v. R-M Industries, Inc., 118 N.C. | 13 | 16 |
In re Thompsongreen2 sentences2025ANDREWS Opinion of the Court determine “(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” In re Thompson, 232 N.C. 2023“In determining factual sufficiency, we must decide ‘(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’” In re Thompson, 232 N.C. | 4 | 4 |
Page v. ROSCOE, LLCgreen2 sentences2009When analyzing the factual sufficiency of a pleading, the court must determine "(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact." Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 128 N.C. 2009Factual Sufficiency Analysis of the factual sufficiency of a complaint requires the court to determine “(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 128 N.C. | 3 | 6 |
Bryson v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2026In evaluating whether a document is well grounded in fact under Rule 11, the Court “must [determine]: (1) whether the [movant] undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the [movant], after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” Id. at 314 (quoting McClerin v. R-M Indus., Inc., 118 N.C. 2012Id. {38} Factual sufficiency inquires whether: (1) the alleged violator undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts; and (2) the alleged violator reasonably believed that his claim was well-grounded in fact after assessing the results of his inquiry. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Callahangreen2 sentences2005"If the evidence is sufficient to reasonably support the conclusion that the substance analyzed is the same as that obtained from defendant, then both the substance and the results of the analysis are admissible." State v. Callahan, 77 N.C.App. 164, 168 , 334 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1985). 2005"If the evidence is sufficient to reasonably support the conclusion that the substance analyzed is the same as that obtained from defendant, then both the substance and the results of the analysis are admissible." State v. Callahan, 77 N.C.App. 164, 168 , 334 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1985). | 2 | 3 |
In Re the Will of Durhamgreen2 sentences2013“In analyzing whether the [filing] meets the factual certification requirement, the court must make the following determinations: (1) whether the [party] undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the [party], after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well-grounded in fact.” In re Will of Durham, 206 N.C. 2013App. 67, 71 , 698 S.E.2d 112, 118 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
MacK v. Mooregreen2 sentences2013If the document is not facially plausible, the trial court must then ask “(1) whether the alleged offender undertook a reasonable inquiry into the law, and (2) whether, based upon the results of the inquiry, [he] formed a reasonable belief that the paper was warranted by existing law, judged as of the time the paper was signed.” Id. 2007App. 87, 91 , 418 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1992) (citing Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 661 , 412 S.E.2d 327, 336 (1992)). {20} If the pleading, motion, or other paper is not facially plausible, “then the second issue is (1) whether the alleged offender undertook a reasonable inquiry into the law, and (2) whether, based upon the results of the inquiry, [the alleged offender] formed a reasonable belief that the paper was warranted by existing law, judged as of the time the paper was signed.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Persis Nova Construction, Inc. v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2011In the present case, the trial court imposed sanctions on the basis that Plaintiffs’ complaint was factually and legally insufficient, but not that it was filed for an improper purpose. *514 When analyzing the factual sufficiency of a complaint, this Court must determine “ ‘(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’ ” Persis Nova Const. Inc. v. Edwards, 195 N.C. 2011App. 55, 61 , 671 S.E.2d 23, 27 (2009) (quoting Page v. Roscoe, LLC, 128 N.C. | 1 | 2 |
Kohler Co., Inc. v. McIvorgreen2 sentences2008In order to determine whether a complaint was well grounded in fact, we analyze the following: “ ‘(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, ' after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’ ” Id. at 402, 628 S.E.2d at 822 *451 (quoting McClerin v. R-M Industries, Inc., 118 N.C. 2007P. 11. {18} In analyzing whether a pleading, motion, or other paper meets the first certification requirement under Rule 11, the Court “must determine: ‘(1) whether the [party] undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the [party], after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’” Kohler Co. v. McIvor, 177 N.C. | 1 | 2 |
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Voglergreen2 sentences2014Id. {86} “Analysis of the factual sufficiency of a complaint requires the court to determine ‘(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’” Id. at 603–04, 568 S.E.2d at 308 (citation omitted). 2014Id. {86} “Analysis of the factual sufficiency of a complaint requires the court to determine ‘(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.’” Id. at 603–04, 568 S.E.2d at 308 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re PPred1 sentence2012App. 423, 426 , 645 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2007), the Court of Appeals noted that N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003 would not be violated when “the hearing on the petitions [to terminate] occurred after [the Court of Appeals’] mandate had issued” unless the results in that hearing were contrary to the result of the Court of Appeals’ mandate. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Coplengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Golds v. Central Express, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hugginsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences1976State v. Powell, 279 N.C. 608 , 184 S.E. 2d 243 (1971) ; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C. 1976State v. Powell, 279 N.C. 608 , 184 S.E. 2d 243 (1971) ; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C. | 5 | 1972–1976 |
Barber v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2016Co., 98 N.C.App. 203 , 208, 390 S.E.2d 341 , 344 (1990) (under Rule 803(6), safety specialist for defendant-employer was qualified to authenticate and introduce the results of a test performed by a private laboratory because "he was familiar with the system used by his company in obtaining tests and filing the results with his office"), reversed on other grounds on reh'g, 101 N.C.App. 564 , 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991). 2016Co., 98 N.C.App. 203 , 208, 390 S.E.2d 341 , 344 (1990) (under Rule 803(6), safety specialist for defendant-employer was qualified to authenticate and introduce the results of a test performed by a private laboratory because "he was familiar with the system used by his company in obtaining tests and filing the results with his office"), reversed on other grounds on reh'g, 101 N.C.App. 564 , 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991). | 3 | 2008–2016 |
Barber v. Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2016Co., 98 N.C.App. 203 , 208, 390 S.E.2d 341 , 344 (1990) (under Rule 803(6), safety specialist for defendant-employer was qualified to authenticate and introduce the results of a test performed by a private laboratory because "he was familiar with the system used by his company in obtaining tests and filing the results with his office"), reversed on other grounds on reh'g, 101 N.C.App. 564 , 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991). 2016Co., 98 N.C.App. 203 , 208, 390 S.E.2d 341 , 344 (1990) (under Rule 803(6), safety specialist for defendant-employer was qualified to authenticate and introduce the results of a test performed by a private laboratory because "he was familiar with the system used by his company in obtaining tests and filing the results with his office"), reversed on other grounds on reh'g, 101 N.C.App. 564 , 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991). | 3 | 2008–2016 |
Peters v. Pennington
green
2 sentences2015When the factual sufficiency of a pleading or paper is challenged, "a court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact." Id. (internal citations omitted). 2014In determining factual sufficiency, we must decide “(1) whether the plaintiff undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the plaintiff, after reviewing the results of his inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). | 3 | 2013–2015 |
Polygenex International, Inc. v. Polyzen, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Whether a motion is legally sufficient requires this Corut to look at “the facial plausibility of the pleading and only then, if the pleading is implausible under existing law, to the issue of whether to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the complaint was warranted by the existing law.” Polygenex Int’l, Inc. v. Polyzen, Inc., 133 N.C. 2013Whether a motion is legally sufficient requires this Court to look at “the facial plausibility of the pleading and only then, if the pleading is implausible under existing law, to the issue of whether to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the complaint was warranted by the existing law.” Polygenex Int'l, Inc. v. Polyzen, Inc., 133 N.C. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Higgins v. Patton
green
2 sentences2010App. 640, 644 , 456 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1995) (citing Higgins v. Patton, 102 N.C. 1995Higgins v. Patton, 102 N.C. | 2 | 1995–2010 |
Twaddell v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2006App. 640, 644 , 456 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1995). “[I]n determining compliance with Rule 11, courts should avoid hindsight and resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.” Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. 2004App. 640, 644 , 456 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1995). “ ‘[I]n determining compliance with Rule 11, “courts should avoid hindsight and resolve all doubts in favor of the signer.” ’ ” Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
State v. Cooke
green
2 sentences1983G.S. 20-139.1; State v. Cooke, 270 N.C. 644 , 155 S.E. 2d 165 (1967). 1983G.S. 20-139.1; State v. Cooke, 270 N.C. 644 , 155 S.E. 2d 165 (1967). | 2 | 1971–1983 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2019In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the fact that heroin is defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) "in terms of its chemical composition." In defendant's view, the use of a definition like that set out in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) implies, given the logic utilized in Ward , 364 N.C. at 143 -44 , 694 S.E.2d at 744 , "the necessity of performing a chemical analysis to accurately identify controlled substances before the criminal penalties in [Section] 90-95 are imposed." Similarly, defendant contends that State v. Llamas-Hernandez , 189 N.C. 2019In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the fact that heroin is defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) "in terms of its chemical composition." In defendant's view, the use of a definition like that set out in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) implies, given the logic utilized in Ward , 364 N.C. at 143 -44 , 694 S.E.2d at 744 , "the necessity of performing a chemical analysis to accurately identify controlled substances before the criminal penalties in [Section] 90-95 are imposed." Similarly, defendant contends that State v. Llamas-Hernandez , 189 N.C. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Llamas-Hernandez
green
2 sentences2019In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the fact that heroin is defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) "in terms of its chemical composition." In defendant's view, the use of a definition like that set out in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) implies, given the logic utilized in Ward , 364 N.C. at 143 -44 , 694 S.E.2d at 744 , "the necessity of performing a chemical analysis to accurately identify controlled substances before the criminal penalties in [Section] 90-95 are imposed." Similarly, defendant contends that State v. Llamas-Hernandez , 189 N.C. 2019In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the fact that heroin is defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) “in terms of its chemical composition.” In defendant’s view, the use of a definition like that set out in N.C.G.S. § 90-89(2)(j) implies, given the logic utilized in Ward, 364 N.C. at 143–44, 694 S.E.2d at 744 , “the necessity of performing a chemical analysis to accurately identify controlled substances before the criminal penalties in [Section] 90-95 are imposed.” Similarly, defendant contends that State v. Llamas-Hernandez, 189 N.C. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Nobles
green
2 sentences2017The State must demonstrate it “attempted in good faith to contact the potential witness, that it attempted in good faith to inquire into her willingness and availability to testify, and that it presented the results of this inquiry to the trial court.” Nobles, 357 N.C. at 441 , 584 S.E.2d at 772 . 2017The State must demonstrate it “attempted in good faith to contact the potential witness, that it attempted in good faith to inquire into her willingness and availability to testify, and that it presented the results of this inquiry to the trial court.” Nobles, 357 N.C. at 441 , 584 S.E.2d at 772 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. RONALD LEE ROACH
green
1 sentence2017Furthermore, although there was evidence of appreciable impairment that also supported the jury verdict in Roach , this Court held that "[i]t is prejudicial error for the court to allow the arresting officer who administered a chemical analysis to testify as to the results of that analysis, even when there was other sufficient evidence in the record to support a guilty verdict." Id . at 162, 548 S.E.2d at 844 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2015Gen.Stat. § 20-139.1(a) provides that "a person's alcohol concentration ... as shown by a chemical analysis is admissible" in a prosecution for an implied-consent offense, and our Supreme Court has recognized that the results of such analysis are "crucial to a conviction." State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361 , 374, 323 S.E.2d 316 , 323 (1984). 2015Gen.Stat. § 20-139.1(a) provides that "a person's alcohol concentration ... as shown by a chemical analysis is admissible" in a prosecution for an implied-consent offense, and our Supreme Court has recognized that the results of such analysis are "crucial to a conviction." State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361 , 374, 323 S.E.2d 316 , 323 (1984). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ward v. Jett Properties, LLC
green
1 sentence2013“Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate where the offending party either failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law or did not reasonably believe the paper was warranted by existing law.” Ward v. Jett Props., LLC, 191 N.C. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Spears v. STANKEVICH
neutral
1 sentence2008App. 140, 157 , 944 A.2d 1167, 1177 , cert. denied, 405 Md. 65 , 949 A.2d 653 (2008). *15 The NPM adjustment cannot be divorced from the question whether a state diligently enforced its escrow statute.- As the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted: “The parties do not point to, and the Court is not aware of, any provisions in the MSA other than those regarding the NPM Adjustment, where the diligent enforcement of a Qualifying Statute has any relevance. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
JUNGO v. State
green
1 sentence2008App. 140, 157 , 944 A.2d 1167, 1177 , cert. denied, 405 Md. 65 , 949 A.2d 653 (2008). *15 The NPM adjustment cannot be divorced from the question whether a state diligently enforced its escrow statute.- As the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted: “The parties do not point to, and the Court is not aware of, any provisions in the MSA other than those regarding the NPM Adjustment, where the diligent enforcement of a Qualifying Statute has any relevance. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Philip Morris Inc.
green
2 sentences2008The sixth step of that calculation states that “the NPM Adjustment shall be applied to the results of clause ‘Fifth’ pursuant to subsections IX(d)(l) and (d)(2) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The subsection further provides that “[i]n the event that a particular adjustment, reduction or offset referred to in a clause below does not apply to the payment being calculated, the result of the clause in question shall be deemed to be equal to the result of the immediately preceding clause.” Thus, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals explained, “[t]his clause requires the independent auditor, as the 2008App. 140, 157 , 944 A.2d 1167, 1177 , cert. denied, 405 Md. 65 , 949 A.2d 653 (2008). *15 The NPM adjustment cannot be divorced from the question whether a state diligently enforced its escrow statute.- As the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted: “The parties do not point to, and the Court is not aware of, any provisions in the MSA other than those regarding the NPM Adjustment, where the diligent enforcement of a Qualifying Statute has any relevance. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Walker
green
1 sentence2006State v. Walker, 170 N.C. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Valle v. Cockrell, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division
green
1 sentence2005App. at 58 , 530 S.E.2d at 320 (emphasis supplied); quoted in State v. Pearson, 356 N.C. 22, 36 , 566 S.E.2d 50, 58 , reh’g denied, 356 N.C. 177 , 569 S.E.2d 271 (2003), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1121 , 154 L. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Thomas v. Watkins, Warden green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Fleming green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Pearson green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Pearson neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Stauffer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| DePasquale v. O'RAHILLY green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Nicholson v. Killens green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Silhan green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Bryson v. Sullivan green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Fuller green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Karbas green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Carpenter Foundation, Inc. v. Wilmington Trust Company green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Freeland neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Commonwealth v. Sweet green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Seders v. Powell, Comr. of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Jensen green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Wester v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Robbins green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Douglas v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.