81 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1912–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chambersgreen2 sentences1981Unlike the case of State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 ( 239 SE2d 324 ) (1977), there was no stipulation in this case between the state and the defendant that the results of the test would be admissible. 1981Unlike the case of State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 ( 239 SE2d 324 ) (1977), there was no stipulation in this case between the state and the defendant that the results of the test would be admissible. | 2 | 5 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See also Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62, 63 ( 299 SE2d 134 ) (1983). 1984Accordingly, the results of the test were admissible.’ Smitherman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 322 ( 265 SE2d 119 ).” Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62, 63 (3), supra. Judgment affirmed. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Prestongreen2 sentences2014State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 95-96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008). 2014State v. Preston, 293 Ga. App. 94, 95-96 ( 666 SE2d 417 ) (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Dees v. Logangreen2 sentences2012See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as trier of fact, atrial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his | 2 | 2 |
Cann-Hanson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his 2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his | 2 | 2 |
Steinberg v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his 2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his | 2 | 2 |
Holmes v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Even if, as [defendant] seems to allege, he was [“groggy”] or semi-conscious, and thereby incapable of refusing to consent to the test, the results of the test were nevertheless admissible.” (Citations and indention omitted.) Holmes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 787, 788 ( 350 SE2d 497 ) (1986). 2. 1987Even if, as [defendant] seems to allege, he was [“groggy”] or semi-conscious, and thereby incapable of refusing to consent to the test, the results of the test were nevertheless admissible.” (Citations and indention omitted.) Holmes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 787, 788 ( 350 SE2d 497 ) (1986). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences1994OCGA § 40-5-55 (b); Rogers v. State, [ 180 Ga. App. 310 ( 348 SE2d 888 ) (1986)]; Rogers v. State, 163 Ga. App. 641, 643 (1) ( 295 SE2d 140 ) (1982).” Holmes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 787, 788 (1) ( 350 SE2d 497 ) (1986). 1994OCGA § 40-5-55 (b); Rogers v. State, [ 180 Ga. App. 310 ( 348 SE2d 888 ) (1986)]; Rogers v. State, 163 Ga. App. 641, 643 (1) ( 295 SE2d 140 ) (1982).” Holmes v. State, 180 Ga. App. 787, 788 (1) ( 350 SE2d 497 ) (1986). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnstongreen2 sentences1989State v. Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 73 ( 286 SE2d 47 ) (1981). 1981Here we are confronted with the results of a test which was allegedly conducted in violation of statutorily and judicially mandated rights. [Cit.]” State v. Johnston, 160 Ga. App. 71, 73 (1981). | 2 | 2 |
Smitherman v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Accordingly, the results of the test were admissible.’ Smitherman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 322 ( 265 SE2d 119 ).” Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62, 63 (3), supra. Judgment affirmed. 1984Accordingly, the results of the test were admissible.’ Smitherman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 322 ( 265 SE2d 119 ).” Stewart v. State, 165 Ga. App. 62, 63 (3), supra. Judgment affirmed. | 1 | 4 |
Hann v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as trier of fact, atrial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 2012Given our rejection of Harkleroad’s arguments that the results of the tests performed on her should have been suppressed, there is no merit to her claim that the 12 See Hann v. State, 292 Ga. App. 719, 721 (2) ( 665 SE2d 731 ) (2008) (as triert of fact, a trial court did not clearly err when it credited officer’s version of events leading up to administration of HGN test and thus when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the test). 13 See Steinberg v. State, 286 Ga. App. 417, 420 (2) ( 650 SE2d 268 ) (2007) (officer’s training, defendant’s admission to ingesting alcohol, his | 1 | 2 |
Zepp v. Brannengreen2 sentences2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre 2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre | 1 | 1 |
State v. Randallgreen2 sentences2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre 2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre | 1 | 1 |
State v. Randallgreen2 sentences2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre 2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre | 1 | 1 |
Keenan v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The court also determined that, under our decision in Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (436 SE2d 475) (1993), Ammons’s refusal to perform the preliminary breath test could be admitted into evidence and that her refusal to perform field sobriety tests did not implicate her rights against self- incrimination under the Georgia Constitution because she was not in custody at the time of the refusal, citing Keenan and Long v. State, 271 Ga. App. 565, 567-569 (2) (610 SE2d 74) (2004). 2022The court also determined that, under our decision in Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (436 SE2d 475) (1993), Ammons’s refusal to perform the preliminary breath test could be admitted into evidence and that her refusal to perform field sobriety tests did not implicate her rights against self- incrimination under the Georgia Constitution because she was not in custody at the time of the refusal, citing Keenan and Long v. State, 271 Ga. App. 565, 567-569 (2) (610 SE2d 74) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Stategreen2 sentences2022The court also determined that, under our decision in Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (436 SE2d 475) (1993), Ammons’s refusal to perform the preliminary breath test could be admitted into evidence and that her refusal to perform field sobriety tests did not implicate her rights against self- incrimination under the Georgia Constitution because she was not in custody at the time of the refusal, citing Keenan and Long v. State, 271 Ga. App. 565, 567-569 (2) (610 SE2d 74) (2004). 2022The court also determined that, under our decision in Keenan v. State, 263 Ga. 569, 571-572 (2) (436 SE2d 475) (1993), Ammons’s refusal to perform the preliminary breath test could be admitted into evidence and that her refusal to perform field sobriety tests did not implicate her rights against self- incrimination under the Georgia Constitution because she was not in custody at the time of the refusal, citing Keenan and Long v. State, 271 Ga. App. 565, 567-569 (2) (610 SE2d 74) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Blake v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Compare Blake v. State, 304 Ga. 747, 751 (2) ( 822 SE2d 207 ) (2018) (mistrial warranted where juror consulted with a police detective about the meanings of malice murder and felony murder, and she “shared that information with the rest of the jury, which discussed it during deliberations”); Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 614 (2) ( 592 SE2d 415 ) (2004) (reasonable probability existed that juror’s conduct contributed to the defendant’s conviction where the juror measured the dimensions of her own bed to supplement the testimony of the state’s expert witness, she “conveyed the results of her te 2021Compare Blake v. State, 304 Ga. 747, 751 (2) ( 822 SE2d 207 ) (2018) (mistrial warranted where juror consulted with a police detective about the meanings of malice murder and felony murder, and she “shared that information with the rest of the jury, which discussed it during deliberations”); Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 614 (2) ( 592 SE2d 415 ) (2004) (reasonable probability existed that juror’s conduct contributed to the defendant’s conviction where the juror measured the dimensions of her own bed to supplement the testimony of the state’s expert witness, she “conveyed the results of her te | 1 | 1 |
Hammock v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Compare Blake v. State, 304 Ga. 747, 751 (2) ( 822 SE2d 207 ) (2018) (mistrial warranted where juror consulted with a police detective about the meanings of malice murder and felony murder, and she “shared that information with the rest of the jury, which discussed it during deliberations”); Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 614 (2) ( 592 SE2d 415 ) (2004) (reasonable probability existed that juror’s conduct contributed to the defendant’s conviction where the juror measured the dimensions of her own bed to supplement the testimony of the state’s expert witness, she “conveyed the results of her te 2021Compare Blake v. State, 304 Ga. 747, 751 (2) ( 822 SE2d 207 ) (2018) (mistrial warranted where juror consulted with a police detective about the meanings of malice murder and felony murder, and she “shared that information with the rest of the jury, which discussed it during deliberations”); Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 614 (2) ( 592 SE2d 415 ) (2004) (reasonable probability existed that juror’s conduct contributed to the defendant’s conviction where the juror measured the dimensions of her own bed to supplement the testimony of the state’s expert witness, she “conveyed the results of her te | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence2020(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, __ Ga. __ (2) (a) ( 847 SE2d 347, 353 (2) (a)) (2020). | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Cox v. State, 395 P2d 954, 956-963 (Okla. | 1 | 1 |
Fielding v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Fielding v. State , 278 Ga. 309 , 311 (3), 602 S.E.2d 597 (2004) ("If, after qualifying a witness as an expert but without a formal tender, counsel proceeds to ask for expert opinion evidence, the trial court has tacitly or impliedly accepted the witness as an expert.") (Emphasis supplied.) Although the trial court made a statement from the bench regarding the officer's credibility, the court did not address the officer's ability to testify to his conclusion that Walsh's glasses did not impact the results of the test. 2018See Fielding v. State , 278 Ga. 309 , 311 (3), 602 S.E.2d 597 (2004) ("If, after qualifying a witness as an expert but without a formal tender, counsel proceeds to ask for expert opinion evidence, the trial court has tacitly or impliedly accepted the witness as an expert.") (Emphasis supplied.) Although the trial court made a statement from the bench regarding the officer's credibility, the court did not address the officer's ability to testify to his conclusion that Walsh's glasses did not impact the results of the test. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scheffergreen2 sentences2016“A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 313 (II) (B) ( 118 SCt 1261 , 140 LE2d 413) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original) (Thomas, J., joined by three justices). 2016“A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 313 (II) (B) ( 118 SCt 1261 , 140 LE2d 413) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original) (Thomas, J., joined by three justices). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda 2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda | 1 | 1 |
Mayberry v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda 2016Parfenuk contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the lie detector test and to admit testimony regarding the results of the test. 3 “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination; absent a clear abuse of discretion, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.” Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 229 (4) ( 692 SE2d 820 ) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted); see, e.g., Mayberry v. *98 State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 507 (2) ( 687 SE2d 893 ) (2009) (trial court’s decision regarding whether defenda | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bethelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Durden v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sirmans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Overton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buckley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peeples v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stapleton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Poston v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tousleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Singhgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nikitin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gulley v. State
green
2 sentences2014Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999). 2014Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337 (16) ( 519 SE2d 655 ) (1999). | 2 | 2002–2014 |
State v. Warmack
green
2 sentences2000Id. 1999“Once the arresting officer designates the test, the statute provides no authority for making another selection when the officer becomes dissatisfied with the results of the State test.” Id. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Green v. State
green
2 sentences1993For example, in cases involving the enforcement of a probationer’s consent to submit to urinalysis, the appellate courts of Georgia have ruled that the results of such a test are admissible if the test was conducted either as a routine incident of probation supervision (Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438 ( 298 SE2d 482 ) (1983)) or was based upon reasonable grounds for suspecting criminal activity (Green v. State, 194 Ga. App. 343 ( 390 SE2d 285 ) (1990)). 1993For example, in cases involving the enforcement of a probationer’s consent to submit to urinalysis, the appellate courts of Georgia have ruled that the results of such a test are admissible if the test was conducted either as a routine incident of probation supervision (Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438 ( 298 SE2d 482 ) (1983)) or was based upon reasonable grounds for suspecting criminal activity (Green v. State, 194 Ga. App. 343 ( 390 SE2d 285 ) (1990)). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Olevik v. State
green
2 sentences2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre 2024Thus, Williams did not address whether a refusal to submit to a blood test is admissible evidence. 8 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017). 9 Id. at 231 (2) (a). a constitutional right to refuse to consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the warrant requirement.”10 But significantly, the defendant in Olevik only refused to submit to the breath test, arguing that the results of the test, not the refusal, were inadmissible.11 So, arguably, any discussion of blood testing in Olevik could be considered non-binding dicta.12 Finally, in Randall v. State,13 although the Supre | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2020Although we defer to the trial court’s 3 Notably, the forensic nurse explained the significance of the negative results of the sexual assault exam, attributing them to the delay between the rape and the exam; and she opined that the results did not rule out the possibility that the victim had been penetrated. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 6 findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. 2020Although we defer to the trial court’s 3 Notably, the forensic nurse explained the significance of the negative results of the sexual assault exam, attributing them to the delay between the rape and the exam; and she opined that the results did not rule out the possibility that the victim had been penetrated. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 6 findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
The State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and this protection extends to the "compelled withdrawal of blood, breath, and other bodily substances." State v. Williams , 337 Ga. App. 791 , 795, 788 S.E.2d 860 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2018The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and this protection extends to the "compelled withdrawal of blood, breath, and other bodily substances." State v. Williams , 337 Ga. App. 791 , 795, 788 S.E.2d 860 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Tucker v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Martin v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cronkite v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Al-Amin v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Doggett v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| White v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Minor v. State green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Kuptz v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Rogers v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Carr v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Newberry v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Richardson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Buttersworth v. Swint green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Sullenger v. Setco Northwest, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Davis v. Tirrell green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.