results test in Michigan

2017This Court can consider the following factors in deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after there was mention of a polygraph examination: (1) whether defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster the witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted. [People v Yatooma, 85 Mich App 236, 240 ; 271 NW2d 184 (1978).]

2017This Court can consider the following factors in deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after there was mention of a polygraph examination: (1) whether defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster the witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted. [People v Yatooma, 85 Mich App 236, 240 ; 271 NW2d 184 (1978).]

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2001Previously, to determine if reversal is required, this Court has analyzed a number of factors, including (1) whether defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster a witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted.” [People v Kiczenski, 118 Mich App 341, 346-347 ; 324 NW2d 614 (1982), quoting Rocha, supra at 9 .] A panel of this Court considered these factors

2001Previously, to determine if reversal is required, this Court has analyzed a number of factors, including (1) whether defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster a witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted.” [People v Kiczenski, 118 Mich App 341, 346-347 ; 324 NW2d 614 (1982), quoting Rocha, supra at 9 .] A panel of this Court considered these factors

2014To determine whether a -1- defendant was prejudiced by an improper reference to polygraph evidence, this Court considers the following factors: (1) whether defendant objected to and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster a witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted. [Nash, 244 Mich App at 98 , quoting People v Kiczenski, 118 Mich App 341, 347 ; 324 NW2d 614 (1982), quo

2014To determine whether a -1- defendant was prejudiced by an improper reference to polygraph evidence, this Court considers the following factors: (1) whether defendant objected to and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2) whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster a witness’s credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than merely the fact that a test had been conducted. [Nash, 244 Mich App at 98 , quoting People v Kiczenski, 118 Mich App 341, 347 ; 324 NW2d 614 (1982), quo

2017Moreover, with regard to defendant’s claim that trial counsel failed to allow him to testify, “the ultimate decision whether to testify at trial remains with the defendant.” People v Bonilla-Machado, 489 Mich 412, 419 ; 803 NW2d 217 (2011).

2017Moreover, with regard to defendant’s claim that trial counsel failed to allow him to testify, “the ultimate decision whether to testify at trial remains with the defendant.” People v Bonilla-Machado, 489 Mich 412, 419 ; 803 NW2d 217 (2011).

2017Ray, 431 Mich at 265 ; People v Yatooma, 85 Mich App 236, 241 ; 271 NW2d 184 (1978).

2017Ray, 431 Mich at 265 ; People v Yatooma, 85 Mich App 236, 241 ; 271 NW2d 184 (1978).

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2024As noted in People v Frechette, 380 Mich 64, 72 ; 155 NW2d 830 (1968): The jury having been told by the expert witness about the accuracy of the operation of the polygraph and been informed that defendant had taken a test, and having been told that the expert did have an opinion as to whether defendant was lying, and then been refused the information as to the results of his test, the jury may have been improperly influenced. [Id.] As succinctly stated in People v Rodgers, 66 Mich App 658, 660 ; 239 NW2d 701 (1976), “[t]he Supreme Court of this state has consistently held that neither the fact

2023Giving the statute a different meaning and application based on the type of error at stake makes a mockery of the core interpretive rule that “the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute’s application.” 41 In doing so, the majority opinion has flouted the general standard that the Legislature has imposed here, almost entirely because a majority of this Court does not like the results that standard would produce. 42 40 People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 41 United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 522-523 ; 128 S Ct 2020 ; 170 L Ed 2d 912 (2008) (plurality

2023Giving the statute a different meaning and application based on the type of error at stake makes a mockery of the core interpretive rule that “the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute’s application.” 41 In doing so, the majority opinion has flouted the general standard that the Legislature has imposed here, almost entirely because a majority of this Court does not like the results that standard would produce. 42 40 People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 41 United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 522-523 ; 128 S Ct 2020 ; 170 L Ed 2d 912 (2008) (plurality

2023Giving the statute a different meaning and application based on the type of error at stake makes a mockery of the core interpretive rule that “the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute’s application.” 41 In doing so, the majority opinion has flouted the general standard that the Legislature has imposed here, almost entirely because a majority of this Court does not like the results that standard would produce. 42 40 People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 41 United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 522-523 ; 128 S Ct 2020 ; 170 L Ed 2d 912 (2008) (plurality

2023Giving the statute a different meaning and application based on the type of error at stake makes a mockery of the core interpretive rule that “the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute’s application.” 41 In doing so, the majority opinion has flouted the general standard that the Legislature has imposed here, almost entirely because a majority of this Court does not like the results that standard would produce. 42 40 People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). 41 United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 522-523 ; 128 S Ct 2020 ; 170 L Ed 2d 912 (2008) (plurality

2016Cf. id. at 515 .

2016Rao, 491 Mich at 284-286 .

2015People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 299 ; 423 NW2d 645 (1988).

2015People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 299 ; 423 NW2d 645 (1988).

2014At the close of proofs, the trial court and the parties’ lawyers discussed whether this Court’s decision in People v Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468 ; 807 NW2d 56 (2011), governed the result.

2014At the close of proofs, the trial court and the parties’ lawyers discussed whether this Court’s decision in People v Barbarich, 291 Mich App 468 ; 807 NW2d 56 (2011), governed the result.

2006The defendant shall he advised of his right to the test provided for in this subsection.” [Koval, supra at 455-456 .] Several Court of Appeals opinions decided after Koval have held or recognized that dismissal is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test.

2006The defendant shall be advised of his right to the test provided for in this subsection." [ Koval, supra at 455-456 , 124 N.W.2d 274 .] [9] Several Court of Appeals opinions decided after Koval have held or recognized that dismissal is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the right to a reasonable opportunity for an independent chemical test.

2001“Evidence of polygraph examinations may not be used to show a witness’ credibility.” People v Mechigian, 168 Mich App 609, 613 ; 425 NW2d 199 (1988). *101 Fifth, although the witness’ response to the prosecutor’s question only referenced taking the polygraph test and not the results of the test, it can hardly be said that the result was not implied.

2001“Evidence of polygraph examinations may not be used to show a witness’ credibility.” People v Mechigian, 168 Mich App 609, 613 ; 425 NW2d 199 (1988). *101 Fifth, although the witness’ response to the prosecutor’s question only referenced taking the polygraph test and not the results of the test, it can hardly be said that the result was not implied.

2001The medical facility or person performing the chemical analysis shall disclose the results of the analysis to a prosecuting attorney who requests the results for use in a criminal prosecutionf.] Our Supreme Court recently ruled that “only persons who have been arrested fall within the purview of the implied consent statute.” Borchard-Ruhland, supra at 285 , citing MCL 257.625c and 257.625a(6)(b).

2001The medical facility or person performing the chemical analysis shall disclose the results of the analysis to a prosecuting attorney who requests the results for use in a criminal prosecution[.] Our Supreme Court recently ruled that "only persons who have been arrested fall within the purview of the implied consent statute." Borchard-Ruhland, supra at 285 , 597 N.W.2d 1 , citing M.C.L. §§ 257.625c and 257.625a(6)(b).

1999Id.

1999Id.

1999Kozar, supra at 507 .

1999Kozar, supra at 507 , 221 N.W.2d 170 .

1995Id. at 35-36 .

1995Id. at 35-36 .