results test in Louisiana

2016Dr. Vigen testified that the victim’s IQ -was “Sixty-three.” The letter, on the other hand, contained not only the victim’s overall IQ, but also the scores of all the. sub-tests, and gave the jury a basis for believing that Dr. Vigen’s testimony was credible. ■ Finally, the defense was not able to cross-examine the “declarant” at all, as she was not present at trial, and “questioning one witness about another’s testimonial statements [does not] provide[ ] a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.” Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 662 , 131 S.Ct. at 2716 .

2011Nevertheless, the Court noted the State “could have avoided any Confrontation Clause problem by asking [Mr.] Razatos to retest the sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.” Id. at 2718 .

2009The Parish further argues the records were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Judd v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 95-1052 (La.11/27/95), 663 So.2d 690 .

2007In State v. Armstrong, 561 So.2d 883, 887 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), writ denied, 568 So.2d 1077 (La.1990), this court found the HGN test meets the standard of admissibility and, with a proper foundation, may be admitted as evidence of intoxication.

2003It is immaterial what the results of that test were because the evidence should have never been admitted. |fiThe facts of this case are analogous to those in Lastrapes v. Willis, 93-1417 (La.App. 3d Cir.4/6/94), 635 So.2d 1281 .

2001We find that procedure consistent with our holding in State v. Tanner, 457 So.2d 1172 (La.1984), an analogous case in which a defendant sought to raise an objection to the admissibility of chemical test results by way of a motion to suppress.

2000In Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 339-340 , 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1970) the Minnesota Supreme Court stated "[w]here a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve; (3) the precautionary measures which should be observed; and (4) warns of the dangers which are inherent in its use, a doctor's deviation from such recommendations is prima facie evidence of negligence if there is competent medical testimony that his patient's injury or death resulted from the doctor's fail

2000The state subsequently took writs, and this Court reversed the trial court and ordered the defense to turn over the results of the testing from its expert. [12] State v. Cosey, 95-0039 (La.3/30/95), 652 So.2d 993 .

1994In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court defined the minimum procedures due prior to the discharge of a tenured public employee.

1994In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court defined the minimum procedures due prior to the discharge of a tenured public employee.

1993It is clear under these circumstances that the state had not deliberately kept the evidence back "for the purpose of deceiving and obtaining undue advantage over the defendant." State v. Hills, supra .

1990Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305 , 307 n. 4 (La.1986). [7] The parties entered a stipulation in which they agreed to allow the trial court to consider several medical reports written by the parties' experts. [8] Ketoacidosis is a condition in which excessive amounts of ketones accumulate in the blood and urine.

1986State v. Catanese, supra; State v. Humphrey, supra; State v. Pendergist, 444 So.2d 306 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

1986State v. Catanese, supra; State v. Humphrey, supra; State v. Pendergist, 444 So.2d 306 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

1985The court found that the blood test evidence should have been excluded under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:661 C(2) which expressly provided that if the warning procedure is not complied with, "the results of the test or any reference to it is inadmissible into evidence in any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical contend of a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." See also State v. Singer, 457 So.2d 690 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984) and State v.

1985In State v. Downer, supra, although the defendant was advised that the results of the test would be used against him at trial, no warning at all was given as to the effect that the test results would have at the trial.

1985Not mentioned in Chapman but also of interest is State v. Sylvester, 400 So.2d 640 (La.1981).

1985This omission was used by the defendant in an assignment of error which was discussed by the Louisiana Supreme Court as follows: Finally, defendant contends that he could not make a knowing and intelligent decision on submitting to the test because the form did not advise him of the consequences of submission, namely, that the results of the test could be used as evidence against him. [Underscoring added]. [Spence, 418 So.2d at 587 ], The court then held that the statute did not require such a warning and such a warning was not constitutionally required by the right against self-incrimination.

1985The court found that the blood test evidence should have been excluded under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:661 C(2) which expressly provided that if the warning procedure is not complied with, "the results of the test or any reference to it is inadmissible into evidence in any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical contend of a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages." See also State v. Singer, 457 So.2d 690 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984) and State v.

1983In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, he stated: “Furthermore, once we lay aside the unreliability rationale, there seems to be absolutely no sensible reason to exclude the results of polygraph tests conducted under reliable circumstances, with the stipulation of both the state and the defendant that the results of the test can be admitted in evidence on the trial on the merits.” Catanese, supra, Tate, J., dissenting at p. 984. [Emphasis ours] Also of interest is the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Manale v. Department of Police, 376 So.2d 607 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979).

1983In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, he stated: “Furthermore, once we lay aside the unreliability rationale, there seems to be absolutely no sensible reason to exclude the results of polygraph tests conducted under reliable circumstances, with the stipulation of both the state and the defendant that the results of the test can be admitted in evidence on the trial on the merits.” Catanese, supra, Tate, J., dissenting at p. 984. [Emphasis ours] Also of interest is the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Manale v. Department of Police, 376 So.2d 607 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979).

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher

1975See: State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. 1969), holding *123 that statutory scheme is a substitute for common law predicate and that if statute is strictly followed other expert evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of the test is unnecessary; State v. Sinclair, 474 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1971) and Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110 , 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), holding that the state may introduce evidence of the test results only after meeting requirements of the statute; State v. Caviness, 7 N.C.App. 541 , 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970), holding that it is error to allow the introduction of the evidence wher