results test in Connecticut

1991Under § 14-227b (f), the statute in question here, the General Assembly has prescribed the issues to be decided in the administrative hearing: “The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating li

1991Under § 14-227b (f), the statute in question here, the General Assembly has prescribed the issues to be decided in the administrative hearing: “The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating li

2015Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim, rul- ing that the presence, at trial, of the person who per- formed the breath test and the expert who explained the results of that test, together with the uncontested admission of a document certifying the machine as an evidential breath test instrument, satisfied the require- ments of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New Mex- ico, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L.

2015Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim, rul- ing that the presence, at trial, of the person who per- formed the breath test and the expert who explained the results of that test, together with the uncontested admission of a document certifying the machine as an evidential breath test instrument, satisfied the require- ments of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New Mex- ico, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2705 , 180 L.

2017Section 14-227b(g) provides in relevant part: "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol conten

2017Section 14-227b(g) provides in relevant part: "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol conten

2016The report shall set forth the grounds for the officer's belief that there was probable cause to arrest such person for a violation of subsection (a) of [§ ] 14-227a and shall state that such person ... submitted to such [sobriety] test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol content...." In Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507 , 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987), our Supreme Court held that the "evident purpose [of § 14-227b (c) ] is to provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that

2016The report shall set forth the grounds for the officer's belief that there was probable cause to arrest such person for a violation of subsection (a) of [§ ] 14-227a and shall state that such person ... submitted to such [sobriety] test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol content...." In Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507 , 518, 529 A.2d 177 (1987), our Supreme Court held that the "evident purpose [of § 14-227b (c) ] is to provide sufficient indicia of reliability so that

2014United Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 30 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002).

2014United Technologies Corp. v. East Windsor, 262 Conn. 11, 30 , 807 A.2d 955 (2002).

2000The police officer shall make a notation upon the records of the police department that he informed the person that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended if he refused to submit to such test or if he submitted to such test and the results of such test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was tenhundredlhs of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.” General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. . . .” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 43

2000The police officer shall make a notation upon the records of the police department that he informed the person that his license or nonresident operating privilege may be suspended if he refused to submit to such test or if he submitted to such test and the results of such test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in his blood was tenhundredlhs of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.” General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. . . .” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 43

1962A prima facie case of guilt is made out “where the evidence indicates to a reasonable person such a strong probability of guilt that a denial or an explanation by the defendant is reasonably called for.” State v. Nelson, 139 Conn. 124, 127 .

1962A prima facie case of guilt is made out "where the evidence indicates to a reasonable person such a strong probability of guilt that a denial or an explanation by the defendant is reasonably called for." State v. Nelson, 139 Conn. 124 , *Page 242 127.

2025The results of this inquiry are ultimately based on Connecticut’s own ‘‘laboratory of democracy.’’ This inquiry requires this court to consider, subjectively, whether a defendant ‘‘demonstrate[s] an intent ‘to preserve [something] as private,’ and free from knowing exposure to the view of others’’; State v. Houghtaling, 326 Conn. 330, 348 , 163 A.3d 563 (2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 949 , 138 S. Ct. 1593 , 200 L.

2025The results of this inquiry are ultimately based on Connecticut’s own ‘‘laboratory of democracy.’’ This inquiry requires this court to consider, subjectively, whether a defendant ‘‘demonstrate[s] an intent ‘to preserve [something] as private,’ and free from knowing exposure to the view of others’’; State v. Houghtaling, 326 Conn. 330, 348 , 163 A.3d 563 (2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 949 , 138 S. Ct. 1593 , 200 L.

2025The results of this inquiry are ultimately based on Connecticut’s own ‘‘laboratory of democracy.’’ This inquiry requires this court to consider, subjectively, whether a defendant ‘‘demonstrate[s] an intent ‘to preserve [something] as private,’ and free from knowing exposure to the view of others’’; State v. Houghtaling, 326 Conn. 330, 348 , 163 A.3d 563 (2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 949 , 138 S. Ct. 1593 , 200 L.

2018"It is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test." State v. Seekins , 123 Conn. App. 220 , 229, 1 A.3d 1089 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010).

2018"It is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test." State v. Seekins , 123 Conn. App. 220 , 229, 1 A.3d 1089 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010).

2018"It is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test." State v. Seekins , 123 Conn. App. 220 , 229, 1 A.3d 1089 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010).

2018"It is reasonable to infer that a refusal to take such a test indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test." State v. Seekins , 123 Conn. App. 220 , 229, 1 A.3d 1089 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 927 , 5 A.3d 487 (2010).

2017Section 14-227b(g) provides in relevant part: "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol conten

2017Section 14-227b(g) provides in relevant part: "The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol conten

2016Id.

2014Blood samples are not considered testimonial because, beyond providing the blood, a person’s actions or statements are ‘‘irrele- vant to the results of the test, which depend on [labora- tory] analysis and on that alone.’’ Id.

2014Buccal swab evidence, like ‘‘blood test evidence, although an incrimi- nating product of compulsion, was neither [the defen- dant’s] testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the [defendant] . . . .’’ Id.

2012Within that time, the person appealing shall also serve a copy of the appeal on each party fisted in the final decision at the address shown in the decision, provided failure to make such service within forty-five days on parties other than the agency that rendered the final decision shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal . . . .” 4 The court proceeded to analyze the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, however, “[o]nce it becomes clear that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the [action], any further discussion of the'merits is pure dicta. ” (Internal

2012Within that time, the person appealing shall also serve a copy of the appeal on each party fisted in the final decision at the address shown in the decision, provided failure to make such service within forty-five days on parties other than the agency that rendered the final decision shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal . . . .” 4 The court proceeded to analyze the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, however, “[o]nce it becomes clear that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the [action], any further discussion of the'merits is pure dicta. ” (Internal

2011NOTES [1] The trial court concluded that the defendant's request for the results of the blood alcohol test, in and of itself, did not tend to show consciousness of guilt but that her knowledge of the results of the test, coupled with her transfer of the property several days later, was probative. [2] The defendant argues that the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de novo, citing State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007), for support.

2011NOTES [1] The trial court concluded that the defendant's request for the results of the blood alcohol test, in and of itself, did not tend to show consciousness of guilt but that her knowledge of the results of the test, coupled with her transfer of the property several days later, was probative. [2] The defendant argues that the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de novo, citing State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007), for support.

2010Id.; see also State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1980); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543 , 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 , 88 S. Ct. 43 , 19 L.

2010Id.; see also State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1980); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543 , 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 , 88 S. Ct. 43 , 19 L.

2010Id.; see also State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1980); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543 , 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 , 88 S. Ct. 43 , 19 L.

2010Id.; see also State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1980); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543 , 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 , 88 S. Ct. 43 , 19 L.

2010Id.; see also State v. Albright, 98 Wis. 2d 663 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. App. 1980); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543 , 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 , 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 , 88 S. Ct. 43 , 19 L.

2003Utz, 201 Conn. 190 , 192-94 (1986).

2002General Statutes § 14-227b (g) provides in relevant part: “The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while such person’s ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the

2002General Statutes § 14-227b (g) provides in relevant part: “The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while such person’s ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the

1999The report shall set forth the grounds for the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to arrest such person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor, and shall state that such person had refused to submit to such test or analysis when requested by such police officer to do so or that such person submitted to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis in

1998The plaintiff claims that State v. Nokes, supra, 42 Conn. App. 10 , and State v. Korhn, supra, 41 Conn. App. 874 , are distinguishable because in those cases the defendant did not rebut the presumption with “substantial contrary evidence.” Section 14-227b-20 (a) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “The hearing officer shall make a determination of the facts at the hearing on the basis of all the relevant evidence presented at the hearing.

1998This claim challenges the hearing officer’s determination of the first of the four hearing issues set forth in § 14-227b: “Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor . . . .” See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1984); People v. Schmidt, 124 Misc. 2d 102 , 478 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y.

1998This claim challenges the hearing officer’s determination of the first of the four hearing issues set forth in § 14-227b: “Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor . . . .” See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1984); People v. Schmidt, 124 Misc. 2d 102 , 478 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y.

1998This claim challenges the hearing officer’s determination of the first of the four hearing issues set forth in § 14-227b: “Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor . . . .” See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1976); State v. Bock, 357 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1984); People v. Schmidt, 124 Misc. 2d 102 , 478 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y.