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32 Florida opinions name it 5 courts 1953–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maher v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2022See Knight v. State, 154 So. 3d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“When an officer unlawfully asserts official authority, either expressly or administered at the request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person was driving or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. 4 The qualifications of this employee to administer the breath test are not an issue in this appeal. 4 implicitly, to gain access to evidence, that evidence must be suppressed.”). 2022See Knight v. State, 154 So. 3d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“When an officer unlawfully asserts official authority, either expressly or implicitly, to gain access to evidence, that evidence must be suppressed.”). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Id. at 770 . 1994In Miller v. State, 597 So.2d 767, 770 (Fla.1991), the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in removing from the jury’s consideration the question of whether the results of a test conducted 1 ½ hours after the defendant was stopped were probative of the level of alcohol in his body before he was stopped. | 1 | 3 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen1 sentence2025See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 666 (2011) (“New Mexico could have avoided any Confrontation Clause problem by asking [the substitute expert] to retest the sample and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or observe.”). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. American Airlines, Inc.green1 sentence2018See Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 18 (determining the chief purpose of the relevant amendment by analyzing its "main effect"); Smith , 606 So.2d at 620 (striking an amendment where the ballot language "[told] the voter nothing about the actual change to be effected"). | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2018See Armstrong , 773 So.2d at 18 (determining the chief purpose of the relevant amendment by analyzing its "main effect"); Smith , 606 So.2d at 620 (striking an amendment where the ballot language "[told] the voter nothing about the actual change to be effected"). | 1 | 1 |
Noel Plank v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2016It does not appear to me - 14 - that this circuit judge predicated convening the summary proceeding on first obtaining the results of a court-ordered alcohol test or that he premised the guilty adjudication or sentence on the results of that test,3 unlike the circuit judge in Plank, who very clearly did both. 190 So. 3d at 597 (noting that, after receiving complaints about prospective juror's apparent intoxication, defendant was ordered to take a breathalyzer test outside of court, following which, "an hour later . . . the trial judge held a contempt hearing"). | 1 | 1 |
Lennart S. Koo v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2016Koo is entitled to this minimal degree of due process before the State can take away a decade of his life. - 12 - Id. at 698-99 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
DHSMV v. Allistongreen1 sentence2005See Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Alliston, 813 So.2d 141 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), rev. denied, 835 So.2d 269 (Fla.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Duest v. Stategreen1 sentence2001The Court will now direct counsel to direct the witness' attention to the results of the analysis from the debris that had been located on the knife. [13] See generally Duest v. State, 462 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) ("[A] mistrial is appropriate only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial."). [14] See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999) ("This Court's case law states that a trial court' ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review."). [15] See DuBoise v. State, 520 So.2d 260, 264-65 (Fla.1988) ("Th | 1 | 1 |
DuBoise v. Stategreen1 sentence2001The Court will now direct counsel to direct the witness' attention to the results of the analysis from the debris that had been located on the knife. [13] See generally Duest v. State, 462 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) ("[A] mistrial is appropriate only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial."). [14] See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999) ("This Court's case law states that a trial court' ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review."). [15] See DuBoise v. State, 520 So.2d 260, 264-65 (Fla.1988) ("Th | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin v. Stategreen1 sentence2001The Court will now direct counsel to direct the witness' attention to the results of the analysis from the debris that had been located on the knife. [13] See generally Duest v. State, 462 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) ("[A] mistrial is appropriate only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial."). [14] See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999) ("This Court's case law states that a trial court' ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review."). [15] See DuBoise v. State, 520 So.2d 260, 264-65 (Fla.1988) ("Th | 1 | 1 |
Dorman v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Dorman v. State, 492 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); White, 492 So.2d at 1164 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barrettgreen1 sentence1996See State v. Barrett, 508 So.2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So.2d 299 (Fla.1987). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Varosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmitt v. State
green
2 sentences1997Schmitt I, 590 So.2d at 409 . 1996Schmitt I, 590 So.2d at 409 . | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Aulet v. Castro
neutral
1 sentence2017The statute does not require a DNA test accompanying the petition be the first test taken by a petitioner. 2 DOR relies on Aulet v. Castro, 44 So.3d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), to reach a contrary conclusion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
GEN. ACC. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.
green
1 sentence2009Such relief may be appropriate, see General Accident Insurance Company v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation, 483 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), depending upon the results of the analysis required by this opinion. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cox v. State
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 712 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Hoskins v. State
green
1 sentence2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
White v. State
green
1 sentence2000See Dorman v. State, 492 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); White, 492 So.2d at 1164 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1992In State v. Taylor, 132 N.H. 314 , 566 A.2d 172 (1989), the court held that where the police obtain a blood-alcohol sample within a reasonable period of time after driving occurs, the results of the test may be admitted as prima facie evidence of intoxication without the necessity of extrapolation and that the jury may give the test results whatever weight it wishes. 1992In State v. Taylor, 132 N.H. 314 , 566 A.2d 172 (1989), the court held that where the police obtain a blood-alcohol sample within a reasonable period of time after driving occurs, the results of the test may be admitted as prima facie evidence of intoxication without the necessity of extrapolation and that the jury may give the test results whatever weight it wishes. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Harlaux v. Harlaux
green
1 sentence1991Id. (jury “can convict on the basis of other incriminatory evi-dence_”) (citation omitted); Coney v. State, 258 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA) (“The weight to be given the results of the test ... was for the jury.”), cert. denied, 262 So.2d 448 (Fla.1972). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Coney v. State
green
1 sentence1991Id. (jury “can convict on the basis of other incriminatory evi-dence_”) (citation omitted); Coney v. State, 258 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA) (“The weight to be given the results of the test ... was for the jury.”), cert. denied, 262 So.2d 448 (Fla.1972). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Division of Adult Corrections v. Willits
neutral
1 sentence1991Id. (jury “can convict on the basis of other incriminatory evi-dence_”) (citation omitted); Coney v. State, 258 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA) (“The weight to be given the results of the test ... was for the jury.”), cert. denied, 262 So.2d 448 (Fla.1972). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cortina v. Cortina
green
1 sentence1990In Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1957), the trial court amended a final judgment by revoking that portion requiring payment of support. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1988Thus, both the Sambrine decision and Smith v State, 378 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1979), cited by the Sambrine Court, simply hold that a person so accused may, under the so-called “implied consent law” of this State, refuse to submit to a blood alcohol test and thus have his driver’s license automatically suspended and that if a blood alcohol test is administered over the defendant’s refusal to submit thereto, the results of such test cannot be used in evidence against such accused person. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Hoch
green
1 sentence1988Before the trial court, the State cited and relied upon State v Hoch, 500 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) which holds clearly that in an “implied consent” case, such as the one sub judice, the accused person does not have the right to confer with counsel before taking a blood alcohol test, but only has the right to refuse to take the test and suffer the resulting suspension of his driver’s license. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Stevens v. State
green
1 sentence1987Initially, this Court would observe that the Supreme Court in a strikingly similar case, Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 1982) held that a trial judge has the discretion as to whether to admit in evidence the results of a test or experiment. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Bender
green
1 sentence1986In State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 , the Supreme Court of Florida said: “The tests results (breath test), are admissible in evidence only upon compliance with the statutory provisions and administrative rules enacted by its authority (cases cited) ... a defendant may in any proceedings attack the reliability of the testing procedures, the qualifications of the operator and the standards establishing the zones of intoxicant levels.” Chapter 10 D-42 of the Rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services set forth all the requirements necessary before a breath testing machine can be | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Pardo v. State
green
1 sentence1984Pardo v. State, 429 So.2d 1313 ; State v. Gunn, 408 So.2d 647 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Gunn
green
1 sentence1984Pardo v. State, 429 So.2d 1313 ; State v. Gunn, 408 So.2d 647 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Cunningham green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State v. Coffey green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Cooper v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Moody v. State neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| The PEOPLE v. Flowers green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| The PEOPLE v. Sammons green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Kaminski v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Mullin v. Genesee County Electric Light, Power & Gas Co. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.