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7 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Geiergreen2 sentences2007Most importantly, the analyst who conducted the DNA test "recorded her observations regarding the DNA samples, her preparation of the samples for analysis, and the results of that analysis as she was actually performing those tasks." Id. at 580 , 161 P.3d at 139 . 2007Most importantly, the analyst who conducted the DNA test “recorded her observations regarding the DNA samples, her preparation of the samples for analysis, and the results of that analysis as she was actually performing those tasks.” Id. at 139. | 1 | 1 |
Appeal of Rainvillegreen2 sentences2000While his initial evaluation did not contain an explicit explanation for his deviation from the preferred model, his subsequent letter, coupled with his initial report, “provide[d] a full medical evaluation, analysis of . . . medical findings with respect to the [respondent’s] life activities, and comparison of the results of analysis with the impairment criteria.” Appeal of Rainville, 143 N.H. 624, 632 , 732 A.2d 406, 413 (1999). 2000While his initial evaluation did not contain an explicit explanation for his deviation from the preferred model, his subsequent letter, coupled with his initial report, “provide[d] a full medical evaluation, analysis of . . . medical findings with respect to the [respondent’s] life activities, and comparison of the results of analysis with the impairment criteria.” Appeal of Rainville, 143 N.H. 624, 632 , 732 A.2d 406, 413 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences1987We have stated previously that, “[T]he ultimate standard for judging a due process claim ... is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Martin, 125 N.H. 672, 676 , 484 A.2d 1176, 1179 (1984); see Appeal of Public Serv. 1987We have stated previously that, “[T]he ultimate standard for judging a due process claim ... is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Martin, 125 N.H. 672, 676 , 484 A.2d 1176, 1179 (1984); see Appeal of Public Serv. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wonggreen2 sentences1985See State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 627-28 , 486 A.2d 262, 273-74 (1984). 1985See State v. Wong, 125 N.H. 610, 627-28 , 486 A.2d 262, 273-74 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Omiya v. Castor
green
1 sentence2025At the outset, the Turner Group’s report, which was submitted to the defendants on May 12, 2022, represented that its purpose was “to provide . . . the results of our initial preliminary investigation on the impact from flooding on the [defendants’] property as a result of [the Project].” Based upon its “preliminary investigation,” the Turner Group found that the defendants’ property “will likely see a slightly higher flood level and longer duration of flooding as a result of [the Project].” (Emphasis added.) However, the report also provides that a two-dimensional river model “needs to be fin | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Groulx
green
2 sentences1970In State v. Groulx, 109 N.H. 281 , 249 A.2d 690 it was held that, although a provision in section 69-i that “No chemical tests authorized by 69-a shall be considered as evidence . . . unless such test is performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the public health officer of the state” was mandatory in requiring the exclusion of evidence of tests not shown to have been performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the health officer, it did not require the exclusion of evidence of a test of blood drawn by a registered nurse even though that same section provides that “Only a duly 1970In State v. Groulx, 109 N.H. 281 , 249 A.2d 690 it was held that, although a provision in section 69-i that “No chemical tests authorized by 69-a shall be considered as evidence . . . unless such test is performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the public health officer of the state” was mandatory in requiring the exclusion of evidence of tests not shown to have been performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the health officer, it did not require the exclusion of evidence of a test of blood drawn by a registered nurse even though that same section provides that “Only a duly | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State v. Slater
green
2 sentences1970In State v. Groulx, 109 N.H. 281 , 249 A.2d 690 it was held that, although a provision in section 69-i that “No chemical tests authorized by 69-a shall be considered as evidence . . . unless such test is performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the public health officer of the state” was mandatory in requiring the exclusion of evidence of tests not shown to have been performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the health officer, it did not require the exclusion of evidence of a test of blood drawn by a registered nurse even though that same section provides that “Only a duly 1970In State v. Groulx, 109 N.H. 281 , 249 A.2d 690 it was held that, although a provision in section 69-i that “No chemical tests authorized by 69-a shall be considered as evidence . . . unless such test is performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the public health officer of the state” was mandatory in requiring the exclusion of evidence of tests not shown to have been performed in accordance with methods prescribed by the health officer, it did not require the exclusion of evidence of a test of blood drawn by a registered nurse even though that same section provides that “Only a duly | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Frye v. United States
red
1 sentence1969In the language of the defendant’s brief and argument, his contention is that it was error to receive the results of the analysis “without requiring that the State establish a foundation for conclusions as to the significance of trace elements of particles,” by showing the frequency with which they occur in the same relative combinations in the “general population of particles.” The parties are in agreement that in order for the results of scientific tests to be admissible in evidence, the scientific principle involved “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence1969In the language of the defendant’s brief and argument, his contention is that it was error to receive the results of the analysis “without requiring that the State establish a foundation for conclusions as to the significance of trace elements of particles,” by showing the frequency with which they occur in the same relative combinations in the “general population of particles.” The parties are in agreement that in order for the results of scientific tests to be admissible in evidence, the scientific principle involved “must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.