23 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fasching v. Backesgreen1 sentence2017Consequently, the exclusionary rule formulated under the fourth and fourteenth amendments was inapplicable in this license revocation proceeding.” 436 N.W.2d at 252 (footnotes omitted). [¶ 16] In Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 325-26 (N.D. 1990), we followed Holte and held that where there was no evidence an Intoxilyzer test was improperly administered, the results of the test were properly admitted into evidence in a civil administrative hearing despite a claim the driver was denied her statutory right to an attorney. [¶ 17] We have recognized the minimal due process required in an admin | 1 | 1 |
Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Commissionergreen1 sentence2017Consequently, the exclusionary rule formulated under the fourth and fourteenth amendments was inapplicable in this license revocation proceeding.” 436 N.W.2d at 252 (footnotes omitted). [¶ 16] In Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 325-26 (N.D. 1990), we followed Holte and held that where there was no evidence an Intoxilyzer test was improperly administered, the results of the test were properly admitted into evidence in a civil administrative hearing despite a claim the driver was denied her statutory right to an attorney. [¶ 17] We have recognized the minimal due process required in an admin | 1 | 1 |
Holen v. Hjellegreen1 sentence2017Holen v. Hjelle, 396 N.W.2d 290, 294 (N.D. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Schlosser v. North Dakota Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D.1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D.1988)). 2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D.1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D.1988)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jordheimgreen2 sentences2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D.1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D.1988)). 2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D.1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D.1988)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schwalkgreen2 sentences2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp. , 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim , 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D. 1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk , 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D. 1988)). 2013See Schlosser v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 9 , 775 N.W.2d 695 ; State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 881 (N.D.1993). “[Section 39-20-07] purposely eases the burden of the prosecution in laying an evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report.” Jordheim , at 881 (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 322 (N.D.1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Keepseagle v. Backesgreen2 sentences2002See Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 315 . [¶ 13] Our definition of performance, however, does not equate the performance of a chemical test with the admissibility of the results of the test. 2002See Keepseagle, 454 N.W.2d at 315 . [¶ 13] Our definition of performance, however, does not equate the performance of a chemical test with the admissibility of the results of the test. | 1 | 1 |
City of Fargo v. Ruethergreen1 sentence2000See also City of Fargo v. Ruether 490 N.W.2d 481 , 483 *165 (N.D.1992) (stating the only permissible evidentiary use of the screening test is to aid in determining probable cause for ah arrest). [¶ 14] It was pivotal to the majority’s analysis in Kuntz that the results of this test could later could be used to convict Kuntz of a crime. | 1 | 1 |
Salter v. Hjellegreen1 sentence1993See Frost v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 487 N.W.2d 6, 8 (N.D.1992); Salter v. Hjelle, 415 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Frost v. North Dakota Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence1993See Frost v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 487 N.W.2d 6, 8 (N.D.1992); Salter v. Hjelle, 415 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Commissionergreen1 sentence1988See Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Com’r, 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hartmangreen1 sentence1985Relying on State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418 (S.D.1982) and State v. Hartman 256 N.W.2d 131, 135 (S.D.1977), Vetsch asserts that such a test can go to the jury, other than for a statutory presumption, only if admitted through a qualified expert. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aamodt v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2005We concluded the statutory provision in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3) requiring that the arresting officer’s certified report “must show that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while in violation of section 39-08-01, or equivalent ordinance,” is “a basic and mandatory provision and therefore the Department had no authority to suspend Aamodt’s driving privileges.” Id. at ¶ 26. [¶ 11] Essentially, Jorgensen urges that the provision in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3), specifying that when a driver has been tested for 2005We concluded the statutory provision in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3) requiring that the arresting officer’s certified report “must show that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while in violation of section 39-08-01, or equivalent ordinance,” is “a basic and mandatory provision and therefore the Department had no authority to suspend Aamodt’s driving privileges.” Id. at ¶ 26. [¶ 11] Essentially, Jorgensen urges that the provision in N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3), specifying that when a driver has been tested for | 2 | 2005–2025 |
State v. Berger
green
2 sentences2012In re R.P., 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger, 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶ 12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. 2012In re R.P., 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger, 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶ 12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Turner v. R.P.
green
2 sentences2012In re R.P., 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger, 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶ 12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. 2012In re R.P. , 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger , 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
In the Interest of Rp
green
2 sentences2012In re R.P., 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger, 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶ 12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. 2012In re R.P. , 2008 ND 39, ¶ 11 , 745 N.W.2d 642 ; State v. Berger , 2001 ND 44, ¶¶ 14-15 , 623 N.W.2d 25 . [¶12] We conclude the district court did not err in denying Lee’s motion to suppress the results of the test. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Shulze v. Satran
green
2 sentences1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison's Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations." In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defend 1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison’s Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations.” In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D.1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defenda | 2 | 1986–1989 |
Varnson v. Satran
green
2 sentences1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison's Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations." In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defend 1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison’s Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations.” In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D.1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defenda | 2 | 1986–1989 |
Jorgensen v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2007Jorgensen, 2005 ND 80, ¶ 13 , 695 N.W.2d 212 . 2007Jorgensen, 2005 ND 80, ¶ 13 , 695 N.W.2d 212 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hanson v. Hanson
green
2 sentences2005Hanson v. Hanson, 2003 ND 20, ¶ 11 , 656 N.W.2d 656 . 2005Hanson v. Hanson, 2003 ND 20, ¶ 11 , 656 N.W.2d 656 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Larsen v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2005II [¶ 7] Jorgensen has raised the following issue on appeal: The Department lacked jurisdiction to suspend Jorgensen’s driving privileges because the Report and Notice did not indicate any test results, as required by N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3), a basic and mandatory provision which requires the officer to “forward to the director a certified written report ... showing] that ... the results of the test show that the person had an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight.” Jorgensen stated in his brief that only a question of law is involved: “The facts in t 2005II [¶ 7] Jorgensen has raised the following issue on appeal: The Department lacked jurisdiction to suspend Jorgensen’s driving privileges because the Report and Notice did not indicate any test results, as required by N.D.C.C. § 39-20-03.1(3), a basic and mandatory provision which requires the officer to “forward to the director a certified written report ... showing] that ... the results of the test show that the person had an alcohol concentration of at least eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight.” Jorgensen stated in his brief that only a question of law is involved: “The facts in t | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ding v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
1 sentence2005Here, like in Aamodt , the information required to be included in the officer’s report was never included in the report, unlike the case in Ding, 484 N.W.2d 496 , where the required information was included before the report was sent to the department or provided to the driver. [¶ 13] Section 39-20-03.1, N.D.C.C., reflects a legislative intent to remove drunk drivers from the roads without slanting the law too much toward the Department’s convenience. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences1996Disagreeing, this court determined the results "may be sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to convict a defendant" of the non-per se DUI offenses, and concluded the results of the test "were properly admitted into evidence." Id. 1996Disagreeing, this court determined the results “may be sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to convict a defendant” of the non-per se DUI offenses, and concluded the results of the test “were properly admitted into evidence.” Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Newnam
green
2 sentences1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison's Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations." In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defend 1989In Shulze v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 531 (N.D.1985), and Varnson v. Satran, 368 N.W.2d 533 (N.D.1985), we further held that it was not a violation of due process to allow a prison inmate to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination and for the prison’s Adjustment Committee and Parole Board to consider the results of the test, along with other evidence, in disciplinary proceedings and parole-release determinations.” In State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D.1987), we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of polygraph examinations, where the defenda | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Placek
green
1 sentence1988State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36 (N.D.1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kobilansky v. Liffrig
green
1 sentence1987NDCC § 39-20-05(4); Kobilansky v. Liffrig, 358 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Robert J. Brown v. John F. Darcy, A/K/A Jack Darcy, an Individual Ducommun, Inc., a Corporation
green
1 sentence1986For a recent discussion of the admissibility of unstipulated polygraph evidence in a civil trial, see Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1986). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Bunnell
green
1 sentence1985Relying on State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418 (S.D.1982) and State v. Hartman 256 N.W.2d 131, 135 (S.D.1977), Vetsch asserts that such a test can go to the jury, other than for a statutory presumption, only if admitted through a qualified expert. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1984In State v. Anderson, supra, 336 N.W.2d at 637 , the State asserted that “it is essential to show that Anderson was intoxicated when the accident occurred because Anderson is an older woman with an apparent history of unusual behavior which may evoke jury sympathy and make it difficult to prove she acted recklessly.” [Emphasis added.] The State further argued that it would be extremely difficult to prove Anderson was intoxicated without the results of the analysis of the blood and urine samples. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Larson
green
1 sentence1983The test ampoule in Larson, supra, Was potentially relevant and material because it is an essential part of the Breathalyzer test which gives rise under Section 39-20-07, N.D.C.C., to a presumption of intoxication depending upon the results of the test. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Schmerber v. California green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Wade green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Gilbert v. California green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| United States v. Mara green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Cupp v. Murphy green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| United States v. Dionisio green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| United Development Corp. v. State Highway Department green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.