circumstances analysis in Illinois

2004At the time Officer Wasson asked defendant to hand him the bottle of beer, a reasonable innocent person in defendant’s position would not have felt ‘free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436 , 115 L.

2004At the time Officer Wasson asked defendant to hand him the bottle of beer, a reasonable innocent person in defendant’s position would not have felt ‘free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436 , 115 L.

1992(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149 , 368 N.E.2d 882 .) A reasoned judgment as to the appropriate sentence in a given case must be based upon the particular circumstances and factors of that case, including “the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of [the] commission, the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, age, and criminal history.” (People v. Bradford (1989), 187 Ill.

1992(People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149 , 368 N.E.2d 882 .) A reasoned judgment as to the appropriate sentence in a given case must be based upon the particular circumstances and factors of that case, including “the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of [the] commission, the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, age, and criminal history.” (People v. Bradford (1989), 187 Ill.

1979It is well established that a driver’s failure to take the perfect alternative is not contributory negligence. ‘[A] party having given another reasonable cause for alarm cannot complain that the person so alarmed has not exercised cool presence of mind ° ° »/ ° ° ° [Plaintiff] had to act in a sudden emergency, and his act is not to be viewed in the light of after events but judged under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.” Skala v. Lehon (1930), 258 Ill.

1942Plaintiff was faced with a sudden emergency and whether she stepped in the wrong direction just before she was struck, her “act is not to be viewed in the light of after events but judged under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.” Skala v. Lehon, 258 Ill.

1993App. 3d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 360 , explained: “ ‘ “[A] party having given another reasonable cause for alarm cannot complain that the person so alarmed has not exercised cool presence of mind ***.” *** [Plaintiff] had to act in a sudden emergency, and his act is not to be viewed in the light of after events but judged under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.’ ” Lesperance, 79 Ill.

1993App. 3d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 360 , explained: “ ‘ “[A] party having given another reasonable cause for alarm cannot complain that the person so alarmed has not exercised cool presence of mind ***.” *** [Plaintiff] had to act in a sudden emergency, and his act is not to be viewed in the light of after events but judged under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.’ ” Lesperance, 79 Ill.

1992App. 252, 258 , quoting Wesley City Coal Co. v. Healer (1876), 84 Ill. 126, 129 .) Courts, therefore, do not view a party’s acts with hindsight, but under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.

1987App. 252, 258 , quoting Wesley City Coal Co. v. Healer (1876), 84 Ill. 126, 129 .) Courts, therefore, do not view a party’s acts with hindsight, but under all the circumstances by the standard of what a prudent person would have been likely to do under the same circumstances.

2018In discussing the alleged forfeiture, we stated that it was “not necessary *** to determine whether the State has waived the [exclusionary rule] argument” or “consider whether the alleged waiver must be excused under the circumstances at bar.” Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d at 11 .

2017In discussing the alleged forfeiture, we stated that it was "not necessary *** to determine whether the State has waived the [exclusionary rule] argument" or "consider whether the alleged waiver must be excused under the circumstances at bar." Carrera , 203 Ill. 2d at 11 , 270 Ill.Dec. 440 , 783 N.E.2d 15 .

2016App. 3d 53, 82 , 894 N.E.2d 896, 924 (2008)). - 30 - ¶ 116 While being careful to avoid the false superiority of hindsight (People v. Mabry, 398 Ill.

2016App. 3d 53, 82 , 894 N.E.2d 896, 924 (2008)). - 30 - ¶ 113 While being careful to avoid the false superiority of hindsight (People v. Mabry, 398 Ill.

2009The State must allege the circumstances of that exception on the face of the indictment (Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 505-06 ; People v. Steinmann, 57 Ill.

2009The State must allege the circumstances of that exception on the face of the indictment (Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 505-06 ; People v. Steinmann, 57 Ill.

2009The State must allege the circumstances of that exception on the face of the indictment (Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 505-06 ; People v. Steinmann, 57 Ill.

2009The State must allege the circumstances of that exception on the face of the indictment (Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 505-06 ; People v. Steinmann, 57 Ill.

2007Although the right to testify is a fundamental right belonging to the defendant ( Whiting 365 Ill.App.3d at 407 , 302 Ill.Dec. 510 , 849 N.E.2d 125 ), our supreme court has expressly distinguished the waiver of that right from a jury waiver and a voluntary guilty plea.

2007Although the right to testify is a fundamental right belonging to the defendant (Whiting, 365 Ill.

2006I note that the court itself laid the foundation for a decision on the issue in its thorough discussion of the Juvenile Court Act and the attributes of criminal proceedings in In re A.G., 195 Ill.2d at 313 , 253 Ill.Dec. 911 , 746 N.E.2d 732 .

2006I note that the court itself laid the foundation for a decision on the issue in its thorough discussion of the Juvenile Court Act and the attributes of criminal proceedings in In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 313 .

2006The warrant check converted the stop from a routine traffic stop into an investigation of past wrongdoing by [the] defendant." Harris, 207 Ill.2d at 528 , 280 Ill.Dec. 294 , 802 N.E.2d at 228 .

2006The warrant check converted the stop from a routine traffic stop into an investigation of past wrongdoing by [the] defendant." Harris, 207 Ill.2d at 528 , 280 Ill.Dec. 294 , 802 N.E.2d at 228 .

2004Lovelace , 251 Ill.

2004Lovelace, 251 Ill.

2004Thereafter, the Kincade court noted that while other circuits and states were divided on the issue of whether to employ a "special needs” analysis ( Kincade , slip op. at __), its own 1995 decision in Rise v. Oregon , 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), upheld the constitutionality of a state DNA collection statute by applying a pure totality of the circumstances analysis.

2004Thereafter, the Kincade court noted that while other circuits and states were divided on the issue of whether to employ a “special needs” analysis (Kincade, 379 F.3d at 830-31 ), its own 1995 decision in Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), upheld the constitutionality of a state DNA collection statute by applying a pure totality of the circumstances analysis.

2004Klaeren II , 202 Ill. 2d at 185 .

2004Klaeren II, 202 Ill. 2d at 185 .

2003In that case, the Supreme Court listed the circumstances under which the doctrine of res judicata should be relaxed in the context of a civil case: "(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff may split his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; (2) the court in the first action expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action; (3) the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his claim because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in the first action; (4) the judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with

2003In that case, the supreme court listed the circumstances under which the doctrine of res judicata should be relaxed in the context of a civil case: “(1) the parties have agreed in terms or in effect that plaintiff may split his claim or the defendant has acquiesced therein; (2) the court in the first action expressly reserved the plaintiffs right to maintain the second action; (3) the plaintiff was unable to obtain relief on his claim because of a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in the first action; (4) the judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with

2003The State, in support of its argument that petitioner's claims are barred by waiver and res judicata, relies on People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 365 , 107 Ill.Dec. 677 , 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987), and People v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346 , 180 Ill.Dec. 109 , 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).

2003The State, in support of its argument that petitioner's claims are barred by waiver and res judicata, relies on People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 365 , 107 Ill.Dec. 677 , 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987), and People v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346 , 180 Ill.Dec. 109 , 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992).