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61 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1949–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shammas v. Shammasgreen2 sentences2020Furthermore, the movant must show that "the fact of the falsity of the testimony 'could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence in time to offset it at the trial or that [f]or other good reason the failure to use diligence is in all the circumstances not a bar to relief.'" Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952)). 2017Regarding her claim of fraud upon the court, the law provides: a party seeking to be relieved from the judgment must show that the fact of the falsity of the testimony could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence in time to offset it at the trial or that for other good reason the failure to use diligence is in all the circumstances not a bar to relief. [Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952).] Here, defendant had over a decade to bring the alleged fraud to the court's attention, and in fact litigated numerous issues before the trial court, and in one instance, an appeal before th | 4 | 5 |
State v. Stovallgreen2 sentences2025It "is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police- citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 363 (2002) (explaining the trial court considers an officer's training and experience in its totality of the circumstances analysis). 2025"Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 363 (2002) (explaining the trial court considers an officer's training a | 3 | 3 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2019Courts analyze the reliability of a CI's tip under a "totality of the circumstances test." State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998). 2018Courts analyze the reliability of a confidential informant's tip under a "totality of the circumstances test." State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Privottgreen2 sentences2025It "is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police- citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 363 (2002) (explaining the trial court considers an officer's training and experience in its totality of the circumstances analysis). 2025"Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 528 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 363 (2002) (explaining the trial court considers an officer's training a | 2 | 2 |
Kpmg LLP v. Cocchigreen2 sentences2025Johnson's claims against Everyrealm and its executives all arise from his employment at Everyrealm and are clearly properly joined in a common lawsuit. [657 F. Supp. 3d at 562 n.23.] Relying on this footnote and KPMG LLP, 565 U.S. at 19, 22, the court concluded, as noted, McDermott's counts four through fourteen did not satisfy the "related to" language of the EFAA, 9 U.S.C. § 402 (a), because it was not "inextricably intertwined with the allegations of sexual harassment" in her count two, unlike her gender discrimination and constructive discharge causes of action. 2025Johnson's claims against Everyrealm and its executives all arise from his employment at Everyrealm and are clearly properly joined in a common lawsuit. [657 F. Supp. 3d at 562 n.23.] Relying on this footnote and KPMG LLP, 565 U.S. at 19, 22, the court concluded, as noted, McDermott's counts four through fourteen did not satisfy the "related to" language of the EFAA, 9 U.S.C. § 402 (a), because it was not "inextricably intertwined with the allegations of sexual harassment" in her count two, unlike her gender discrimination and constructive discharge causes of action. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Czachorgreen2 sentences2017"The test for plain error is whether under the circumstances the error possessed a clear capacity for producing an unjust result, that is, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 402 (1980) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 2017Under this deferential standard, this court disregards any error or omission "unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]" R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 402 (1980) (explaining "[t]he test for plain error is whether under the circumstances the error possessed a clear capacity for 2 Defendant also filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred by not granting defendant's motion for a new trial after the passenger recanted his testimony p | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025Although evidence concerning "the high- crime reputation an area" is permitted to be considered as part of the "totality of the circumstances test" in determining probable cause, see State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004), citing State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 217 (2002), the court's finding that this general knowledge that the convenience store parking lot is a high crime area somehow equates to specific knowledge that defendant's vehicle contained CDS was foreseeable misapplies the established legal principles of Witt and Smart. 2007In sum, the third prong required that the judge consider the factual circumstances in the context of the definition of probable cause provided by the Court in State v. Johnson : "Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action there is a `well grounded' suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed." It requires nothing more than "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has | 1 | 2 |
Franz v. Raymond Eisenhardt & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2005In its decision in Pukowsky v. Caruso, the Appellate Division utilized the twelve part “totality of the circumstances test” established in Franz v. Raymond Eisenhardt & Sons, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 521, 528 (D.N.J.1990) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Mfg. 1998On appeal, plaintiff urges that the twelvepart "totality of the circumstances test" established in Franz, supra, 732 F.Supp. at 528 , should be applied in this case. | 1 | 2 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1991The Court rejected any procedural requirement, such as that the interview be taped, or that the statement be the product of nonleading questions, substituting a "totality of the circumstances test." The Court specifically excluded from consideration on the question of trustworthiness any extrinsic evidence tending to prove or disprove that sexual assault had taken place. 497 U.S. at ___ -___, 110 S.Ct. at 3149-3150 , 111 L.Ed. 2d at 656-657 . *514 Concerning the case before it, the Court noted that the trial court had been influenced by extrinsic evidence, whereas the Idaho Supreme Court had p 1991The Court rejected any procedural requirement, such as that the interview be taped, or that the statement be the product of nonleading questions, substituting a "totality of the circumstances test." The Court specifically excluded from consideration on the question of trustworthiness any extrinsic evidence tending to prove or disprove that sexual assault had taken place. 497 U.S. at ___ -___, 110 S.Ct. at 3149-3150 , 111 L.Ed. 2d at 656-657 . *514 Concerning the case before it, the Court noted that the trial court had been influenced by extrinsic evidence, whereas the Idaho Supreme Court had p | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mooregreen1 sentence2025Although evidence concerning "the high- crime reputation an area" is permitted to be considered as part of the "totality of the circumstances test" in determining probable cause, see State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004), citing State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 217 (2002), the court's finding that this general knowledge that the convenience store parking lot is a high crime area somehow equates to specific knowledge that defendant's vehicle contained CDS was foreseeable misapplies the established legal principles of Witt and Smart. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Agursgreen1 sentence2024United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1976); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-81 ; Carter, 85 N.J. at 312 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bagleygreen1 sentence2024United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1976); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-81 ; Carter, 85 N.J. at 312 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nashgreen1 sentence2019R. 3:22-4(a)(1) to (3); see also Nash, 212 N.J. at 546-47 (describing the circumstances under which the bar will not be enforced by a court). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zuticgreen1 sentence2019"An informant's 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' are two highly relevant factors under the totality of the circumstances." State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 110 (1998) (citing Smith, 155 N.J. at 93 ). | 1 | 1 |
New Concepts for Living v. Hackensackgreen1 sentence2017Equitable relief under the doctrine “cannot be exercised or withheld rigidly, but [is] always subject to the guiding principles of fundamental fairness.” New Concepts For Living, Inc. v. City of Hackensack, 376 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Timothy Adkins (073803)green1 sentence2017State v. Adkins, 221 N.J. 300, 317 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Freshwater Wetlands Rulesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Selective Insurance Co. of America v. Rothmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mull v. Zeta Consumer Productsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Groceman v. United States Department of Justicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roy Padgett v. James E. Donaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boling v. Romergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Knightsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Murraygreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomas Cameron Kincadegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Paul G. Sczubelekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kamorudeen Adekunle, United States of America v. Saheed Mashagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gomez v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schneider v. Simonini
green
2 sentences2003This flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a "`fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 361 , 749 A. 2d 336 (quoting Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). 2003This flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a "`fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 361 , 749 A. 2d 336 (quoting Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). | 3 | 2002–2003 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2003This flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a "`fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 361 , 749 A. 2d 336 (quoting Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). 2003This flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a "`fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 361 , 749 A. 2d 336 (quoting Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). | 3 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Presha
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 317 , 748 A. 2d 1108 . 2004Id. at 317 , 748 A. 2d 1108 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Novembrino
green
2 sentences2003Ed. 2d 527, 543-44 (1983)); Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 122 , 519 A. 2d 820 (adopting totality of the circumstances test). 2003Ed. 2d 527, 543-44 (1983)); Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 122 , 519 A. 2d 820 (adopting totality of the circumstances test). | 2 | 1997–2003 |
Thorpe v. Redevelopment Authority of Allentown
green
2 sentences2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 544 ), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001). 2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 168 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Caso v. Florida
green
2 sentences2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 544 ), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001). 2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 168 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
McLeod v. California
green
2 sentences2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 544 ), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001). 2002The flexible, practical totality of the circumstances standard has been adopted because probable cause is a “ ‘fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Schneider v. Simonini, 168 N.J. 336, 361 , 749 A.2d 336 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S.Ct. 1083 , 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d at 544 ). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
D'Annunzio v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
green
1 sentence2026Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110 (2007), stating that Pukowsky's twelve-factor totality of the circumstances test still applied to cases brought under the LAD. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sam Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC (072742)
green
1 sentence2026Hargrove, 220 N.J. at 315-16 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Atwood
green
1 sentence2025A-3265-22 13 In State v. Smith, 251 N.J. at 252, the Court considered "whether a purported violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74[10] based on tinted windows justified an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle." The Court held "that reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle's front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car." Id. at 253.11 Here, the suppression hearing record establishes no error in the trial court's finding that Soulias had "articulable and reasonable suspicio | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Carter
green
1 sentence2024United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1976); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-81 ; Carter, 85 N.J. at 312 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Pavlicka v. Pavlicka
green
1 sentence2020Furthermore, the movant must show that "the fact of the falsity of the testimony 'could not have been discovered by reasonable diligence in time to offset it at the trial or that [f]or other good reason the failure to use diligence is in all the circumstances not a bar to relief.'" Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 280 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 507-08 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of New Jersey v. Timothy Adkins green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Missouri v. McNeely green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act Rules green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Diaz-Bridges green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Nyhammer green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Aleru v. Gonzales, Attorney General green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Eliakim v. Florida green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| cluster 422044 green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Padilla v. Hanft neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Maxwell v. Illinois green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Jones v. Murray green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Waltz green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Carroll v. United States green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Bruzzese green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Texas v. Brown green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Royster green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Morton green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Sloan green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Sharpless green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| United States v. Ronald T. Clipper green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Harvey green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Caraballo v. LaVallee green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.