circumstances test in Texas

2022“The Code Construction Act applies and, among other things, permits our consideration of the object sought to be attained, the circumstances under which the rule was enacted, 13 and the consequences of a particular construction.” Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 359 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citing TEX.

2016See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.002 (a)(4), 311.023(1) — (3),(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); see also Huston, 359 S.W.3d at 681 ; BASF Fina Petrochemicals Ltd.

2015See id.

2015See id.

1999In analyzing appellant’s second point of error, the majority makes the same mistake the Court of Criminal Appeals in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), chided the Austin Court of Appeals for having made, to-wit: Although the Court of Appeals claimed to have applied the “totality of the circumstances test,” after reviewing the opinion we find that the Court actually examined each fact independently and found that none of the facts standing alone were sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause.

1998In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we will make a de novo review under the "totality of the circumstances test." See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87, 89, 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).

1995Appellant urges that probable cause to believe that the enumerated items could be found in his residence was not shown because the affidavit does not state that BWT had been in appellant's residence, that the sexual assaults against BWT took place there, that BWT had seen any of the enumerated items, or that any of the enumerated items had been used in the commission of the assaults. (2) In reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit, we use "totality of the circumstances analysis." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Bower v. State , 769 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Tex. Crim.

1991See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (totality of the circumstances analysis applies to determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant); Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988) (the totality of the circumstances approach applies to warrantless arrests and searches, and the duty of the reviewing court is to look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there exists a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed

1995App. 1989); Eisenhauer v. State , 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Crim.

1991See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (totality of the circumstances analysis applies to determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant); Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 , 109 S.Ct. 127 , 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988) (the totality of the circumstances approach applies to warrantless arrests and searches, and the duty of the reviewing court is to look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there exists a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed

2022See Perez, 429 S.W.3d at 644 n.19 (stating court would not reach whether a hearing was required under Hobbs because request for hearing was not properly presented).

2022See Perez, 429 S.W.3d at 644 n.19 (stating court would not reach whether a hearing was required under Hobbs because request for hearing was not properly presented).

2009See id. at 146 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 .

2009See id. at 146 .

2003United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1st Cir.2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo.1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood, 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H.2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

2003United States v. Esquilin , 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1 st Cir. 2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo. 1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood , 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H. 2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

2003United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1st Cir.2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo.1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood, 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H.2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

2003United States v. Esquilin , 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1 st Cir. 2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo. 1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood , 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H. 2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

2003See also Davis v. United States, 724 A.2d 1163, 1169-1170 (D.C.App.1998), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 , 120 S.Ct. 805 , 145 L.Ed.2d 678 (2000)(recognizing that Elstad did not require break between statements).

2003See also Davis v. United States , 724 A.2d 1163, 1169-1170 (D.C.

2003United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1st Cir.2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo.1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood, 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H.2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

2003United States v. Esquilin , 208 F.3d 315, 319-321 (1 st Cir. 2000)(time lapse between interrogations relevant only if initial statement is actually coerced); People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo. 1990)(continuous interrogation subject to Elstad analysis); State v. Fleetwood , 824 A.2d 1061, 1066-1070 (N.H. 2003)(analyzing federal cases in applying more protective state counterpart to Miranda rule; under totality of the circumstances test, no violation where suspect was given an opportunity to take a break after Miranda warnings were administered but she did not do so).

1998Johnson v. State, 933 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex.App.—Waco 1996, pet. ref'd). *359 Hence, the weight and credibility of the evidence of promiscuous conduct should be determined by the jury, not by the trial court.

1997Johnson v. State , 933 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. App.--Waco 1996, pet. ref'd).

2003We will make that evaluation “in light of [the case’s] unique circumstances and the offense charged,” by reviewing all of the evidence and applying a “totality of the circumstances test.” Id. at 196 .

2003We will make that evaluation "in light of [the case's] unique circumstances and the offense charged," by reviewing all of the evidence and applying a "totality of the circumstances test." Id. at 196 .

2004“A competency complaint under the circumstances here does not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant’s guilt[J but rather asserts reversible (but not jurisdictional) trial court error in the process of adjudication.” Henderson, 132 S.W.3d at 114 .

2004"A competency complaint under the circumstances here does not challenge the trial court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a defendant's guilt[,] but rather asserts reversible (but not jurisdictional) trial court error in the process of adjudication." Henderson , 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 2752, at *6 .

2024Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 795–96.

2021See Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 796 (“[A] proper determination of a claim’s availability on appeal should not involve peering behind the procedural-default curtain to look at the particular circumstances of the claim within the case at hand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2000The Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever terms are used to describe the “elusive concept” of what cause is sufficient to authorize a Terry stop, “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (using “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether informant’s anonymous tip supplied reasonable suspicion for stop

2000The Supreme Court has emphasized that whatever terms are used to describe the “elusive concept” of what cause is sufficient to authorize a Terry stop, “the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (using “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether informant’s anonymous tip supplied reasonable suspicion for stop

1995Appellant urges that probable cause to believe that the enumerated items could be found in his residence was not shown because the affidavit does not state that BWT had been in appellant's residence, that the sexual assaults against BWT took place there, that BWT had seen any of the enumerated items, or that any of the enumerated items had been used in the commission of the assaults. (2) In reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit, we use "totality of the circumstances analysis." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Bower v. State , 769 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Tex. Crim.

1994Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d at 272; Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 107 , 121 L.Ed.2d 66 (1992); Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).

2025Balancing the foregoing circumstances and factors de novo, see Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282 (identifying the balancing test as a legal question and holding that legal questions are reviewed de novo), we encounter little imposition upon the interests underlying the right to a speedy trial.

2024See Creager, 952 S.W.2d at 856 (recognizing that when a defendant alleges his confession was coerced by more than an improper promise, a court should apply a “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether the confession was involuntary).

2024App. 1993) (en banc) (noting that interviewer’s statement that a confession could result in leniency was a statement of fact and not a promise of leniency in exchange for a confession); Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 261 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (officer’s statements that defendant’s situation would “go better” for him if he gave a confession did not amount to a promise). (2) Totality of the circumstances test Aside from the any alleged promise of leniency, Pena also contends we should uphold the trial court’s decision to suppress his confession as involuntary under a

2024In determining probable cause, courts apply a “‘totality-of- the circumstances analysis[.]’” Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858 (citation omitted).

2023City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2011) (“[Governmental immunity’s] boundaries are established by the judiciary, but we have consistently held that waivers of it are the prerogative of the Legislature.”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Crim.