circumstances bar in California

2020(Kurey, at pp. 848–849.) Once the trial court has found a violation of probation it must “decide whether under all of the circumstances the violation of probation warrants revocation.” (People v. Avery (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1204 .) On this second step the trial court is vested with broad discretion (People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1315 ), and its decision is reviewed only for abuse of that discretion.

2014Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), authorizes the trial court to revoke probation after proper notice and a hearing “if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her supervision, has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has been prosecuted for such offenses.” Once a court had determined that a violation of probation has occurred,

2020(Kurey, at pp. 848–849.) Once the trial court has found a violation of probation it must “decide whether under all of the circumstances the violation of probation warrants revocation.” (People v. Avery (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1198, 1204 .) On this second step the trial court is vested with broad discretion (People v. Jones (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1315 ), and its decision is reviewed only for abuse of that discretion.

2014Section 1203.2, subdivision (a), authorizes the trial court to revoke probation after proper notice and a hearing “if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her supervision, has become abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has been prosecuted for such offenses.” Once a court had determined that a violation of probation has occurred,

2014(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

2013(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

1969(E.g., In re Johnson (1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [intent to sell heroin]; In re Ward (1966) supra, 64 Cal.2d 672, 676 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to be crucial not the defendant's possible intent and objective to acquire money, to gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only his intent and objective to commit murder. [9] Although the absence of a single intent and objective does not necessarily preclude application of section 654 (see fn. 1 ante ), it is clear that under the instant circumstances this test of Neal cannot be of aid to defendant. [4b] Petitioner relies heavily upon P

1969(E.g., In re Johnson (1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 393, 395 [intent to sell heroin]; In re Ward (1966) supra, 64 Cal.2d 672, 676 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to be crucial not the defendant's possible intent and objective to acquire money, to gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only his intent and objective to commit murder. [9] Although the absence of a single intent and objective does not necessarily preclude application of section 654 (see fn. 1 ante ), it is clear that under the instant circumstances this test of Neal cannot be of aid to defendant. [4b] Petitioner relies heavily upon P

2026Prejudicial Error But even assuming Sohal met his burden to demonstrate he misunderstood the immigration consequences of his plea, we find that Sohal has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a “reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 .) 11 When considering this factor, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and factors relevant to the inquiry include “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the de

2025Mendoza has adequately shown that there is a “reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 .) In considering this factor, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and factors relevant to the inquiry include “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated

2026Prejudicial Error But even assuming Sohal met his burden to demonstrate he misunderstood the immigration consequences of his plea, we find that Sohal has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a “reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 .) 11 When considering this factor, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and factors relevant to the inquiry include “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the de

2025Mendoza has adequately shown that there is a “reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 .) In considering this factor, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and factors relevant to the inquiry include “ ‘the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated

2024Given “the totality of the circumstances,” Cortez concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the co-defendant’s identification of the defendant as the driver “ ‘so far subjected [the codefendant] to the risk of . . . criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he 41 believed it to be true.’ ” (Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 128 .) The circumstances and factors present in Cortez are present here.

2016The People must still prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that failure.” Our Supreme Court recently discussed the circumstances under which the instruction is properly given in People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101 .

2022(J.J., at p. 1219.) Compliance with the claim presentation requirements is mandatory (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061 ), even when the public entity has actual knowledge of the circumstances of the claim.

2014(Castaneda v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1062 .) 10 Sedrak asserts that he did not need to comply with the claim filing requirement because, since he appealed the denial of his CUP application to the city council, Norco knew about the circumstances of his claim.

2018First, it felt that the employer's proposed totality of the circumstances test would lead to absurd results. ( Choate v. Celite Corporation , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1466, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 .) Second, courts should construe ambiguities in labor statutes in favor of employees. ( Id . at p. 1466, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 .) And third, "[w]e try to harmonize state and federal law. [Citation.] ... [W]aiver of federal statutory rights must be clear and unambiguous. [Citation.] This counsels in favor of requiring the same degree of clarity for waivers of state statutory rights." ( Ibid . )

2018First, it felt that the employer's proposed totality of the circumstances test would lead to absurd results. ( Choate v. Celite Corporation , supra , 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1466, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 .) Second, courts should construe ambiguities in labor statutes in favor of employees. ( Id . at p. 1466, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 .) And third, "[w]e try to harmonize state and federal law. [Citation.] ... [W]aiver of federal statutory rights must be clear and unambiguous. [Citation.] This counsels in favor of requiring the same degree of clarity for waivers of state statutory rights." ( Ibid . )

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2015Under the circumstances the error in failing to give the instruction as requested was not prejudicial.” ( Sanchez, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 571-572, italics added.) In People v. Sandoval (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 885 (Sandoval), the trial court gave the “standard instruction on reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 887.) The trial court also gave defense-requested instructions on self-defense.

2014(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

2013(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

2014(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

2013(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez); People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 .) “ ‘[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .’ ” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 443 .) However, “the facts supporting a revocation of probation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 439.) Also, “the evidence must support a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.” (People

2013But we also note that the identification of the minor was otherwise reliable, considering the totality of the circumstances and factors identified in Manson, supra, 432 U.S. at pages 104–107.

2013(In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 387 .) Our inquiry could end here, but we also note that the identification of appellant was otherwise reliable, considering the totality of the circumstances and factors identified in Manson, supra, 432 U.S. at pages 104–107.

2000(See, e.g., Hubbard v. Boelt (1980) 28 Cal.3d 480 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 620 P.2d 156 ] [police officer injured while attempting to arrest speeder barred from recovery by firefighter’s rule]; Herrle v. Estate of Marshall (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1765 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 ] [nurse’s aide employed specifically to care for violent patient who attacked and injured her, could not recover because patient owed no duty of care].) Additionally, what has been labeled the “veterinarian’s rule” is just another application of the firefighter’s rule in a different context.

2000(See, e.g., Hubbard v. Boelt (1980) 28 Cal.3d 480 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 706 , 620 P.2d 156 ] [police officer injured while attempting to arrest speeder barred from recovery by firefighter’s rule]; Herrle v. Estate of Marshall (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1765 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 ] [nurse’s aide employed specifically to care for violent patient who attacked and injured her, could not recover because patient owed no duty of care].) Additionally, what has been labeled the “veterinarian’s rule” is just another application of the firefighter’s rule in a different context.

2000Thus, "a member of the public who negligently starts a fire owes no duty of care to assure that the firefighter who is summoned to combat the fire is not injured thereby." ( Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 , 882 P.2d 347 .) *645 The Neighbarger court relied on Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296 , 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 , to reiterate that the firefighter's rule is but an application of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. ( Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630 , 882 P.2d 347 .) It noted that the circumstances under which

2000(Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538 .) It noted that the circumstances under which the rule should be applied in a work-related setting are the same as in the sports setting, where, “because of the nature of the activity involved and the parties’ relationship to the activity, the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 538.) The appellation “firefighter’s rule” can be misleading because its application is not limited to situations involving fires or firefighting.