circumstances test in Washington

2014In general, foreseeability is a question for the jury unless the circumstances of the inquiry are "' so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability. "' Shepard v. Mielke, 75 Wn.

2011As a general rule, foreseeability is a question for the jury unless the circumstances of the inquiry “ ‘are so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability.” Shepard v. Mielke, 75 Wn.

2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry’s “totality of the circumstances analysis” to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as “in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s directions in both Terry and Ybarra”); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )).

2016E.g., United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Terry's "totality of the circumstances analysis" to frisk of individual present at the scene of arrest (a private residence); rejecting a less protective standard as "in direct opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and Ybarra"); United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding Terry standard limited frisk of individual riding in car when officers arrested driver on felony warrant (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 92-93 )).

2014App. 894, 904-05 , 205 P.3d 969 (2009) (noting that requiring both a showing that the informant is reliable and that the tip includes sufficient objective facts to justify detention is a direct paraphrasing of the Aguillar/Spinelli standard that does not apply under the total circumstances test for investigatory stops (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L.

2014App. 894, 904-05 , 205 P.3d 969 (2009) (noting that requiring both a showing that the informant is reliable and that the tip includes sufficient objective facts to justify detention is a direct paraphrasing of the Aguillar/Spinelli standard that does not apply under the total circumstances test for investigatory stops (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L.

2014Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L.

2014Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L.

2014E.g., State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212 , 533 P.2d 123 (1975).

2014E.g., State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wn.2d 207, 212 , 533 P.2d 123 (1975).

2014App. 894, 904-05 , 205 P.3d 969 (2009) (noting that requiring both a showing that the informant is reliable and that the tip includes sufficient objective facts to justify detention is a direct paraphrasing of the Aquillar/Spinelli standard that does not apply under the total circumstances test for investigatory stops (citing Aquilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L.

2014App. 894, 904-05 , 205 P.3d 969 (2009) (noting that requiring both a showing that the informant is reliable and that the tip includes sufficient objective facts to justify detention is a direct paraphrasing of the Aguillar/Spinelli standard that does not apply under the total circumstances test for investigatory stops (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S. Ct. 1509 , 12 L.

2008We noted this very point over 25 years ago in Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn.2d 411, 414 , 610 P.2d 891 (1980), saying, “The trend of many modern cases is to limit or entirely abolish parental immunity.” 7 Indeed, the highest courts in six jurisdictions — Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and the District of Columbia — declined to adopt the doctrine in the first place. 8 Furthermore, courts of last resort in 11 states that once recognized the doctrine have subsequently abolished it. 9 Of the remaining states where parental immunity is still recognized, many have limited the circumstanc

2008We noted this very point over 25 years ago in Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn.2d 411, 414 , 610 P.2d 891 (1980), saying, “The trend of many modern cases is to limit or entirely abolish parental immunity.” 7 Indeed, the highest courts in six jurisdictions — Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and the District of Columbia — declined to adopt the doctrine in the first place. 8 Furthermore, courts of last resort in 11 states that once recognized the doctrine have subsequently abolished it. 9 Of the remaining states where parental immunity is still recognized, many have limited the circumstanc

2026It is an objective test that requires consideration of different factors under the “totality of the circumstances test.” Escalante, 195 Wn.2d 526 .

2019App. 2d 728, 745, 440 P.3d 1032 (2019).

2017Toomey v. City of Truth or Consequences, 2012-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 16-26 , 287 P.3d 364 (applying nine-factor “totality of the circumstances’’ test); Marks v. McKenzie High Sch.

2017Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or. 451, 463-64 , 878 P.2d 417 (1994) (applying six-factor functional equivalency test); Consol.

2017Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or. 451, 463-64 , 878 P.2d 417 (1994) (applying six-factor functional equivalency test); Consol.

2015Even after Albice and Schroeder, Washington law continues to support the application of waiver to individuals like Mr. Merry who, with knowledge of a material violation of the DTA, fail to restrain a sale-as long as courts heed Albice's admonition that "we apply waiver only where it is equitable under the circumstances and where it serves the goals of the act." Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 570 . 9 9 The Hoffmann comment suggests the following circumstances under which waiver should not apply: [B]ecause waiver can occur only when a party has actual or constructive knowledge of the right waived, a party

2014Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L Ed. 2d 637(1969))). 19 State v. Gaddv. 152 Wn.2d 64, 72-73 , 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Wakelev. 29 Wn.

2014Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L Ed. 2d 637(1969))). 19 State v. Gaddv. 152 Wn.2d 64, 72-73 , 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Wakelev. 29 Wn.

2014As such, it counts as arbitrary and capricious action under Abbenhaus, 89 Wn.2d at 858-59 . 3.

2014Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S. Ct. 584 , 21 L Ed. 2d 637(1969))). 19 State v. Gaddv. 152 Wn.2d 64, 72-73 , 93 P.3d 872 (2004); State v. Wakelev. 29 Wn.

2014No. 69852-4-1/8 suspicious.22 But confirming a subject's description, location, or other innocuous facts generally does not satisfy the corroboration requirement.23 The goal of corroboration is to reduce the chance of acting on a malicious prank initiated at the defendant's expense.24 Under the total circumstances test, we consider "the particular circumstances facing the law enforcement officer," including the seriousness of the offense and any threat to public safety.25 Officers investigating reports of emergent risks of imminent violence do not have the opportunity to make detailed inquirie

2014App. 479, 492-93 , 294 P.3d 812 , review denied. 177Wn.2d 1021, 304 P.3d 115 (2013). 23 See Lesnick. 84 Wn.2d at 943 (the fact that informant accurately described the defendant's vehicle is not sufficient corroboration for a stop); Hopkins. 128 Wn.

2013State v. Parra, 96 Wn.

2012Id. at 395 , 219 P.3d 651 . ¶ 28 In Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 777, 224 P.3d 751 , we expressly held, under circumstances directly raising the issue, that "after an arrestee is secured and removed from the automobile, he or she poses no risk of obtaining a weapon or concealing or destroying evidence of the crime of arrest located in the automobile, and thus the arrestee's presence does not justify a warrantless search under the search incident to arrest exception." Accordingly, we overruled State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 152 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), where an eight member majority of the co

2012Id. at 395 , 219 P.3d 651 . ¶ 28 In Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 777, 224 P.3d 751 , we expressly held, under circumstances directly raising the issue, that "after an arrestee is secured and removed from the automobile, he or she poses no risk of obtaining a weapon or concealing or destroying evidence of the crime of arrest located in the automobile, and thus the arrestee's presence does not justify a warrantless search under the search incident to arrest exception." Accordingly, we overruled State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 152 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), where an eight member majority of the co