42 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1905–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (where the trial lawyer could not recall any strategic thinking for failing to object, finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gained by an objection); Morrison v. State, 278 Ga. 808 (3) ( 607 SE2d 577 ) (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney failed to object to a prior conviction because he reasoned that the court would not have sustained the objection). 2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (where the trial lawyer could not recall any strategic thinking for failing to object, finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gained by an objection); Morrison v. State, 278 Ga. 808 (3) ( 607 SE2d 577 ) (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney failed to object to a prior conviction because he reasoned that the court would not have sustained the objection). | 3 | 3 |
Lankford v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2015“These elements, particularly the requirement of intestacy, limit the circumstances under which the doctrine may be applied.” Lankford v. Wright, 489 SE2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1997). 2015“These elements, particularly the requirement of intestacy, limit the circumstances under which the doctrine may be applied.” Lankford v. Wright, 489 SE2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
Ellison v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2015Although the Georgia courts have interpreted the equitable principle of virtual adoption “on numerous occasions, they have never extended it beyond the intestacy situation found in Crawford.” Ellison v. Thompson, 240 Ga. 594, 596 ( 242 SE2d 95 ) (1978). 2015Although the Georgia courts have interpreted the equitable principle of virtual adoption “on numerous occasions, they have never extended it beyond the intestacy situation found in Crawford.” Ellison v. Thompson, 240 Ga. 594, 596 ( 242 SE2d 95 ) (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Ford v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gainedby an objection); Ford v. State, 290 Ga. 45 (5) (c) ( 717 SE2d 464 ) *385 (2011) (“as a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel”). 2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gainedby an objection); Ford v. State, 290 Ga. 45 (5) (c) ( 717 SE2d 464 ) *385 (2011) (“as a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel”). | 2 | 2 |
Gavin v. Vasquezgreen2 sentences2003To the contrary, it demands a much greater substance, approaching perhaps the imprisonment of one who, not only is not guilty of the specific offense for which he is convicted, but, further, is not even culpable in the circumstances under inquiry. [Cit.] Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 569 , 407 S.E.2d 756 (1991). 2003To the contrary, it demands a much greater substance, approaching perhaps the imprisonment of one who, not only is not guilty of the specific offense for which he is convicted, but, further, is not even culpable in the circumstances under inquiry. [Cit.] Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 569 , 407 S.E.2d 756 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Hadaway v. Hadawaygreen2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). | 2 | 2 |
Illinois v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2003In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit to support the issuance of a search warrant, this Court utilizes the following totality of the circumstances test as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238-239 (III) (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). 1999“In deciding whether an affidavit established probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant, it is well settled that we must apply the ‘totality of the circumstances analysis (utilized) in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983).’ State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225 ( 457 SE2d 194 ) (1995), aff’d, Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 ( 465 SE2d 438 ) (1996). ‘Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and | 1 | 6 |
Boykin v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. 2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. 2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. 2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) ( 698 SE2d 384 ) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective 17 assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 ( 673 SE2d 604 ) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Albama, | 1 | 1 |
Dean v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 248 (3) (a) (i) (“[E]valuating whether self-incrimination was compelled depends on the totality of the circumstances[.]”); see generally Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80 (2) (a) (295 8 SE2d 306 ) (1982) (setting out various psychological and other factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to search). | 1 | 1 |
Olevik v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 248 (3) (a) (i) (“[E]valuating whether self-incrimination was compelled depends on the totality of the circumstances[.]”); see generally Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80 (2) (a) (295 8 SE2d 306 ) (1982) (setting out various psychological and other factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to search). | 1 | 1 |
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lacklandgreen1 sentence2019See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 248 (3) (a) (i) (“[E]valuating whether self-incrimination was compelled depends on the totality of the circumstances[.]”); see generally Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80 (2) (a) (295 8 SE2d 306 ) (1982) (setting out various psychological and other factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to search). | 1 | 1 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen1 sentence2016Schneckloth, supra, 412 U. S. at 227 (II) (B). | 1 | 1 |
| Murray v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Penngreen | 1 | 1 |
| York v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dillard v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dearing v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fleming v. Zantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shannon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wade v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Riley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bearden Mercantile Co. v. Madison Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pickelseimer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Atlanta Recycled Fiber Co. v. Tri-Cities Steel Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Belluso v. Sunnyland Foods, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bell v. Campgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heyward v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lanier v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hinton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grant v. Hartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Valenzuela v. Newsome
green
2 sentences2011Id. (emphasis added). 1986To the contrary, it demands a much greater substance, approaching perhaps the imprisonment of one who, not only is not guilty of the specific offense for which he is convicted, but, further, is not even culpable in the circumstances under inquiry. ..." (Emphasis in original.) 253 Ga. at p. 796 . 3. | 3 | 1986–2011 |
State v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2003State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 184 ( 311 SE2d 823 ) (1984); York v. State, 242 Ga. App. 281, 293 (7) ( 528 SE2d 823 ) (2000). 1994“In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes th< probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, we employ th< totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted b} [the Georgia Supreme Court] in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 ( 31 SE2d 823 ) (1984), with the admonition that prudence counsels tha Gates be considered as the outer limit of probable cause. | 2 | 1994–2003 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1999“In deciding whether an affidavit established probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant, it is well settled that we must apply the ‘totality of the circumstances analysis (utilized) in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983).’ State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225 ( 457 SE2d 194 ) (1995), aff’d, Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 ( 465 SE2d 438 ) (1996). ‘Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and 1999“In deciding whether an affidavit established probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant, it is well settled that we must apply the ‘totality of the circumstances analysis (utilized) in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983).’ State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225 ( 457 SE2d 194 ) (1995), aff’d, Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 ( 465 SE2d 438 ) (1996). ‘Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1999“In deciding whether an affidavit established probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant, it is well settled that we must apply the ‘totality of the circumstances analysis (utilized) in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983).’ State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225 ( 457 SE2d 194 ) (1995), aff’d, Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 ( 465 SE2d 438 ) (1996). ‘Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and 1999“In deciding whether an affidavit established probable cause necessary for issuance of a search warrant, it is well settled that we must apply the ‘totality of the circumstances analysis (utilized) in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983).’ State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225 ( 457 SE2d 194 ) (1995), aff’d, Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 ( 465 SE2d 438 ) (1996). ‘Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Roach v. Roach
green
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Smith v. Parlier
neutral
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1941Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Pickens v. Jackson
neutral
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1941Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
McFadden v. Dale
green
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Wallace v. Mize
green
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
Purvis v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). 1957Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374 (2, 3) ( 112 S. E. 724 ); Roach v. Roach, 143 Ga. 486 ( 85 S. E. 703 ); McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 (4) ( 116 S. E. 596 ); Purvis v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698 (3, 5) ( 137 S. E. 50 ); Pickens v. Jackson, 152 Ga. 100 (2) ( 108 S. E. 536 ).” Hadaway v. Hadaway, 192 Ga. 265, 269 ( 14 S. E. 2d 874 ). | 2 | 1941–1957 |
FINNICUM v. State
neutral
2 sentences2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) (698 SE2d 384) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 (673 SE2d 604) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Alabama, 395 U. 2025Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 882-883 (1) ( 698 SE2d 384 ) (2010) (failure to advise defendant that sexual offender registry was collateral consequence of guilty plea could be ineffective 17 assistance of counsel); see also OCGA § 42-1-12; Finnicum v. State, 296 Ga. App. 87, n. 1 ( 673 SE2d 604 ) (2009) (noting that registry became effective in 1996); compare Green, 318 Ga. at 612 (applying totality of the circumstances test and explaining that “the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in Boykin [v. Albama, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bryant v. State
green
2 sentences2018We therefore review a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant using the same "totality of the circumstances analysis" applied by the lower court, Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876 , 892 (13) (a), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011), "to ensure that the [magistrate] had a substantial basis" for finding the existence of probable cause, Banks v. State , 277 Ga. 543 , 545 (2), 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004). 2018We therefore review a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant using the same "totality of the circumstances analysis" applied by the lower court, Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876 , 892 (13) (a), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011), "to ensure that the [magistrate] had a substantial basis" for finding the existence of probable cause, Banks v. State , 277 Ga. 543 , 545 (2), 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Banks v. State
green
2 sentences2018We therefore review a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant using the same "totality of the circumstances analysis" applied by the lower court, Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876 , 892 (13) (a), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011), "to ensure that the [magistrate] had a substantial basis" for finding the existence of probable cause, Banks v. State , 277 Ga. 543 , 545 (2), 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004). 2018We therefore review a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant using the same "totality of the circumstances analysis" applied by the lower court, Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876 , 892 (13) (a), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011), "to ensure that the [magistrate] had a substantial basis" for finding the existence of probable cause, Banks v. State , 277 Ga. 543 , 545 (2), 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Morrison v. State
green
2 sentences2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (where the trial lawyer could not recall any strategic thinking for failing to object, finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gained by an objection); Morrison v. State, 278 Ga. 808 (3) ( 607 SE2d 577 ) (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney failed to object to a prior conviction because he reasoned that the court would not have sustained the objection). 2014See Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743 (2) (b) ( 733 SE2d 294 ) (2012) (where the trial lawyer could not recall any strategic thinking for failing to object, finding no deficient performance because under the circumstances a defense lawyer might have reasonably concluded that little would have been gained by an objection); Morrison v. State, 278 Ga. 808 (3) ( 607 SE2d 577 ) (2005) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney failed to object to a prior conviction because he reasoned that the court would not have sustained the objection). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bussey v. State
green
2 sentences2011In making a determination [as to whether] probable cause exists, the magistrate judge is entitled to make a good faith determination of the weight and credibility to be given hearsay evidence based on “. . . the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying the hearsay information . . . .” Bussey v. State, 263 Ga. App. 56 [, 60 (3)] ( 587 SE2d 134 ) (2003). 2011In making a determination [as to whether] probable cause exists, the magistrate judge is entitled to make a good faith determination of the weight and credibility to be given hearsay evidence based on “. . . the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying the hearsay information . . . .” Bussey v. State, 263 Ga. App. 56 [, 60 (3)] ( 587 SE2d 134 ) (2003). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Aiken
green
2 sentences2010In State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132 ( 646 SE2d 222 ) (2007), this Court adopted the “totality of the circumstances test” for evaluating whether a public employee’s statement to investigators was voluntary or coerced: Factors that a court may consider [in evaluating whether an employee’s statement to investigators was coerced] include . . . whether the State actor made an overt threat to the defendant of the loss of his job if he did not speak with investigators or whether a statute, rule, or ordinance of *168 which the defendant was aware provided that the defendant would lose his job for failing t 2010In State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132 ( 646 SE2d 222 ) (2007), this Court adopted the “totality of the circumstances test” for evaluating whether a public employee’s statement to investigators was voluntary or coerced: Factors that a court may consider [in evaluating whether an employee’s statement to investigators was coerced] include . . . whether the State actor made an overt threat to the defendant of the loss of his job if he did not speak with investigators or whether a statute, rule, or ordinance of *168 which the defendant was aware provided that the defendant would lose his job for failing t | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Terry v. Ohio green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Oboh v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Spurlin v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Sanders v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Arnold v. State neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Geter v. State neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Dickens v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Stone v. Marshall & Co. green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Daniel v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Haden v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Walker v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Yaughan v. State neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Robinson v. State green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Simmons v. State green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Nelson v. State green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Gunter v. Smith green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Wilkins, Neely & Jones v. Gibson green | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| Rolfe v. Rolfe neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Wilson v. Brandon & Shanhon green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.