circumstances test in Indiana

2015The Court also observed that, “[i]n each of these waiver-by-conduct cases, ... the courts , recognized that, just like an express verbal waiver, an implied waiver is not valid absent a finding under the totality of the circumstances that the waiver is knowing and intelligent” and that “this finding invariably included evidence of an admonition to the defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ). [18] The Court in Poynter then noted that, in United States v. Hoskins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in

2015The Court also observed that, “[i]n each of these waiver-by-conduct cases, ... the courts , recognized that, just like an express verbal waiver, an implied waiver is not valid absent a finding under the totality of the circumstances that the waiver is knowing and intelligent” and that “this finding invariably included evidence of an admonition to the defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ). [18] The Court in Poynter then noted that, in United States v. Hoskins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in

2012See also, Vernon v. The Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind.1999) (using totality of the circumstances test to determine if owner of store owed duty to customer to take reasonable care to protect against a third-party criminal attack in the store parking lot); L.W. v. Western Golf Assoc., 712 N.E.2d 983 (Ind.1999) (using totality of circumstances test to determine if owner of student housing owed duty to protect student against criminal acts of third party).

2012See also, Vernon v. The Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1999) (using totality of the circumstances test to determine if owner of store owed duty to customer to take reasonable care to protect against a third-party criminal attack in the store parking lot); L.W. v. Western Golf Assoc., 712 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. 1999) (using totality of circumstances test to determine if owner of student housing owed duty to protect student against criminal acts of third party).

2012In later cases, our Supreme Court has continued to follow this test and reiterated that “when the landowner is in a position to take reasonable precautions to protect his guest from a foreseeable criminal act, courts should not hesitate to hold that a duty exists.” Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053 ; The Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.2010) (store owner owed duty to protect customer from criminal acts of all third parties, not just other patrons or guests, but issue of fact whether criminal activity was foreseeable).

2012In later cases, our Supreme Court has continued to follow this test and reiterated that “when the landowner is in a position to take reasonable precautions to protect his guest from a foreseeable criminal act, courts should not hesitate to hold that a duty exists.” Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053 ; The Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010) (store owner owed duty to protect customer from criminal acts of all third parties, not just other patrons or guests, but issue of fact whether criminal activity was foreseeable).

2012In later cases, our Supreme Court has continued to follow this test and reiterated that “when the landowner is in a position to take reasonable precautions to protect his guest from a foreseeable criminal act, courts should not hesitate to hold that a duty exists.” Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053 ; The Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.2010) (store owner owed duty to protect customer from criminal acts of all third parties, not just other patrons or guests, but issue of fact whether criminal activity was foreseeable).

2012In later cases, our Supreme Court has continued to follow this test and reiterated that “when the landowner is in a position to take reasonable precautions to protect his guest from a foreseeable criminal act, courts should not hesitate to hold that a duty exists.” Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d at 1053 ; The Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010) (store owner owed duty to protect customer from criminal acts of all third parties, not just other patrons or guests, but issue of fact whether criminal activity was foreseeable).

1986For the reasons stated in my dissent in White v. State, supra , and my dissents in Simpson v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 and Reid v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; I would hold that the Neeley standard applies here, and reverse and remand and require that post-conviction relief be granted.

1986For the reasons stated in my dissent in White v. State, supra, and my dissents in Simpson v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 , Reid v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; I would hold that the Neeley standard applies here, and reverse and remand and require that post-conviction relief be granted in the form of permission to withdraw the plea of guilty and make a new plea.

1986For the reasons stated in my dissent in White v. State, supra , and my dissents in Simpson v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 and Reid v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; I would hold that the Neeley standard applies here, and reverse and remand and require that post-conviction relief be granted.

1986For the reasons stated in my dissent in White v. State, supra, and my dissents in Simpson v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 205 , Reid v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 207 ; I would hold that the Neeley standard applies here, and reverse and remand and require that post-conviction relief be granted in the form of permission to withdraw the plea of guilty and make a new plea.

2020Id. at 568 . [14] Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1 provides, in relevant part: Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only: * * * * (2) by the child’s parent . . . if: (A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right; (B) that person has no interest adverse to the child; (C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and (D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver[.] Furthermore, in determining whether any waiver of rights during

2020Estrada, 969 N.E.2d at 1042 . [18] Here, seventeen-year-old Howard was just over a month shy of his eighteenth birthday when Detective Margetson called his parents, asking to speak with Howard about “an investigation regarding his sister [D.L.].” Tr.

2017Id. [15] Webster argues that even if the Thomas court determined that the jury instruction was harmless based on the fact that there was sufficient evidence Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 71A03-1610-CR-2319 | October 31, 2017 Page 8 of 16 establishing the defendant’s guilt, the same conclusion cannot be made in the present case.

2014State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002)).

2001See Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ; Kneeland, 148 F.3d at 11 ; Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695 ; Weninger, 624 F.2d at 167 .

2001See Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ; Kneeland, 148 F.3d at 11 ; Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695 ; Weninger, 624 F.2d at 167 .

2001See Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ; Kneeland, 148 F.3d at 11 ; Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695 ; Weninger, 624 F.2d at 167 .

1996The law of the case doctrine requires the presence of "facts established at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on which judgment was entered and appeal taken ..." Otte, supra, at 83 .

1984Thomas, 443 N.E.2d at 1199 ; Kern, 426 N.E.2d at 387 ; Magley, 263 Ind. at 628 , 335 N.E.2d at 818 (totality of the circumstances test).

1984"When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a confession and the admission of that confession at trial, we do not reweigh the evidence." Kern, 426 N.E.2d at 387 .

1984Thomas, 443 N.E.2d at 1199 ; Kern, 426 N.E.2d at 387 ; Magley, 263 Ind. at 628 , 335 N.E.2d at 818 (totality of the circumstances test).

1983Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Hedinger (7th Cir.1969), 407 F.2d 655, 656 .

1981Finally it was agreed upon by the parties that a figure of $100.00 per day would be appropriate in the circumstances and this clause was made a part of the agreement of the parties.” *124 4) Due to this continuing liability the Diefenbachs claimed substantially reduced credit power which adversely affected them in that: a) they were denied financing for a new home at an interest rate of 9.5% after which the interest rate increased to over 10.5%; b) the contingent liability interfered with their proposed purchase of Royal Typewriter Company of Fort Wayne, Ind. which was at that time earning app