circumstances test in Massachusetts

2011Among the relevant factors we consider under the “totality of the circumstances test” are “promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant’s age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986).

2009Among the relevant factors we consider under the “totality of the circumstances test” are “promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant’s age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 (1986).

1998In this Commonwealth, under art. 14, the legality of the stop, that is, the existence of reasonable suspicion, is not determined by the imprecise Federal totality of the circumstances standard but rather by application of the principles stated in determining the existence of probable cause in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373-375 (1985) (reliability of informant and basis of his or her knowledge).

1996In this Commonwealth, under art. 14, the legality of the stop, that is, the existence of reasonable suspicion, is not determined by the imprecise Federal totality of the circumstances standard but rather by application of the principles stated in determining the existence of probable cause in Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 373-375 (1985) (reliability of informant and basis of his or her knowledge).

1971See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7-14 ; Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 62-63 (somewhat restricting Sandrelli v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 129, 132-141 ); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 81, 83-84 .

1971See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-14 ; Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 62-63 (somewhat restricting Sandrelli v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 129, 132-141 ); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 81, 83-84 .

1971See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7-14 ; Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 62-63 (somewhat restricting Sandrelli v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 129, 132-141 ); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 81, 83-84 .

1971See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-14 ; Commonwealth v. Baker, 348 Mass. 60, 62-63 (somewhat restricting Sandrelli v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 129, 132-141 ); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 81, 83-84 .

1998Commonwealth v. Lyons, supra. ‘Because the standard is reasonable suspicion father than probable cause, a less rigorous showing in each of these areas is permissible.’ Id. at 19 .

1995The Supreme Judicial Court has rejected the “totality of the circumstances test” relied upon in Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990), as “unacceptably shapeless and permissive.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 18 (1990).

2017As we have stated previously, “a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Spray, 467 Mass. at 473 .

2015See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) (“a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that defense counsel’s trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, “especially where the mental health defense would have ‘severely weakened’ the defense of self-defense”).

2020After a review of the defendant intake sheet and the 37 (judge's findings and reasons for imposing bail that defendant could not afford satisfied due process, where defendant was charged with murder in first degree and judge weighed, among other factors, defendant's risk of flight, previous record, finances, work history, and family circumstances, as well as nature of charges and strength of Commonwealth's case); A Juvenile, 480 Mass. at 1014-1015 (judges provided sufficient detail to demonstrate that there was no abuse of discretion in setting bail that juvenile could not afford where judges

2015See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) (“a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that defense counsel’s trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, “especially where the mental health defense would have ‘severely weakened’ the defense of self-defense”).

2015See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) ("a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that defense counsel's trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, "especially where the mental health defense would have 'severely weakened' the defense of self-defense").

2015In a divided opinion, the United States Supreme Court recently concluded that while 911 calls are not per se reliable, a “caller’s use of the 911 system is ... one of the relevant circumstances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in the 911 call.” Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2014).

2014A voluntary statement is one that, in addition to considering the totality of the circumstances in the waiver analysis, “was not the product of inquisitorial activity which had overborne [the defendant’s] will.” Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 680 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Genius, 387 Mass. 695, 699 (1982), S.C., 402 Mass. 711 (1988).

2014See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Genius, 387 Mass. 695, 699 (1982), S.C., 402 Mass. 711 (1988).

2011United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875 (1990).

2011See Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 462, 468 (1971).

2008See also Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 343 (1985) (although voluntariness of Miranda waiver and vol-untariness of statement are distinct inquiries, totality of the circumstances test under each analysis is same).

2007See, e.g., Weaver v. Commonwealth, supra at 47-48; Pickett v. Commonwealth, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 647 (1992).

2007See Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that TCPA does not require plaintiff to prove actual monetary loss because statutory damages are punitive in nature).

2004Cf. Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980) (permitting defendant to argue reasonable doubt on basis of police failure to conduct scientific tests or follow procedures).

2003See id.