circumstances analysis in Minnesota

2024We acknowledge that this is a close case, but under well-established law, “doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be 19 accorded to warrants.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704 ); see also Harris, 589 N.W.2d at 791 ; Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 .

2024Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 384–85.

2024We acknowledge that this is a close case, but under well-established law, “doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be 19 accorded to warrants.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704 ); see also Harris, 589 N.W.2d at 791 ; Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268 .

2010The relevant circumstances under rule 807 are “those circumstances actually surrounding the making of the statements.” State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 , 111 S.Ct. 693 , 112 L.Ed.2d 684 (1991).

2010The relevant circumstances under rule 807 are “those circumstances actually surrounding the making of the statements.” State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 , 111 S.Ct. 693 , 112 L.Ed.2d 684 (1991).

2007Totality of the Circumstances Analysis Our presumption that Anderson’s probation condition was validly imposed and that he therefore was “unambiguously informed of it” supports a conclusion that the condition “significantly diminished [Anderson’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 , 122 S.Ct. 587 .

2007Totality of the Circumstances Analysis Our presumption that Anderson’s probation condition was validly imposed and that he therefore was “unambiguously informed of it” supports a conclusion that the condition “significantly diminished [Anderson’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 , 122 S.Ct. 587 .

2005The majority opinion states that we "make a subjective factual inquiry to determine whether under the totality of the circumstances the waiver was valid" and later that "we subjectively analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the district court committed clear error by ruling that the state has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Burrell's *608 Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." (pp. 17 and 27-28.) These statements are drawn from State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168-69 (Minn.1997), but there the court appears to have conflated the review

2005The majority opinion states that we ‘'‘make a subjective factual inquiry to determine whether under the totality of the circumstances the waiver was valid” and later that “we subjectively analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the district court committed clear error by ruling that the state has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Burrell’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (pp. 17 and 27-28.) These statements are drawn from State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168-69 (Minn.1997), but there the court appears to have conflated the review of

2002HRA, 310 Minn. at 321 , 251 N.W.2d at 624 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492 ).

2002HRA, 310 Minn. at 321 , 251 N.W.2d at 624 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492 ).

2002Id.

2002HRA, 310 Minn. at 321 , 251 N.W.2d at 624 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492 ).

2002HRA, 310 Minn. at 321 , 251 N.W.2d at 624 (quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 492 ).

1999See E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781 -82 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Royer, 460 U.S. at 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 ).

1999See E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d at 781 -82 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Royer, 460 U.S. at 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 ).

1997Id.

1994This determination should be made under the “totality of the circumstances test.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

1994This determination should be made under the “totality of the circumstances test.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn.1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

1990An FBI agent in Price sued a media defendant for allegedly defamatory statements and implications contained in a book, but was not allowed to recover largely because the challenged assertions of improper motive were protected opinion under the Janklow totality of the circumstances analysis. 881 F.2d at 1432 .

1990An FBI agent in Price sued a media defendant for allegedly defamatory statements and implications contained in a book, but was not allowed to recover largely because the challenged assertions of improper motive were protected opinion under the Jank-low totality of the circumstances analysis. 881 F.2d at 1432 .

1989The standard for determining the adequacy of a waiver was outlined by this court in State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734 (Minn.1978): In an ordinary case if the prosecutor shows that the warning was given and that defendant stated he understood his rights and then gave a statement, the state will be deemed to have met its burden of proof, unless there is other evidence indicating that there was no knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. * * * However, if there is other such evidence, then the trial court must make a subjective factual inquiry to determine whether under the totality of the circu

1989Id. at 735 .

1964Under the doctrine of res judicata, it is well recognized that parties to an action may be estopped from relitigating issues in a subsequent action that were raised and determined in a prior action. 1 Apart from the general requirements regarding identity of parties and the finality of the adjudication, application of the rule of estoppel by verdict requires the party asserting it to establish that the precise question was in fact presented and necessarily determined by the verdict in the former trial. 2 As stated in Wolfson v. Northern States Management Co. 221 Minn. 474, 479 , 22 N. W. (2d)

1964Under the doctrine of res judicata, it is well recognized that parties to an action may be estopped from relitigating issues in a subsequent action that were raised and determined in a prior action. 1 Apart from the general requirements regarding identity of parties and the finality of the adjudication, application of the rule of estoppel by verdict requires the party asserting it to establish that the precise question was in fact presented and necessarily determined by the verdict in the former trial. 2 As stated in Wolfson v. Northern States Management Co. 221 Minn. 474, 479 , 22 N. W. (2d)

1962State v. Hurst, 153 Minn. 525, 535 , 193 N. W. 680, 683 .

1962State v. Hurst, 153 Minn. 525, 535 , 193 N. W. 680, 683 .