18 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2013This identical savings clause was the basis for this Court’s decisions in State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160 , 740 S.E.2d 501 (2013), and State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119 , 740 S.E.2d 493 (2013). 2013This identical savings clause was the basis for this Court’s decisions in State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160 , 740 S.E.2d 501 (2013), and State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119 , 740 S.E.2d 493 (2013). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bolingreen2 sentences2013To read the savings clause in any other way would result in a prohibited alteration of the statute’s operation.”); Bolin, 381 S.C. at 562 , 673 S.E.2d at 887 (“By stating that the Act is to have no effect on pending actions, criminal prosecutions, rights, duties, or liabilities, and that all laws repealed or amended by the Act must be treated as remaining in full force and effect, the clear language of the Act indicates that it is prospective.”). 2013To read the savings clause in any other way would result in a prohibited alteration of the statute’s operation.”); Bolin, 381 S.C. at 562 , 673 S.E.2d at 887 (“By stating that the Act is to have no effect on pending actions, criminal prosecutions, rights, duties, or liabilities, and that all laws repealed or amended by the Act must be treated as remaining in full force and effect, the clear language of the Act indicates that it is prospective.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dickeygreen2 sentences2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). 2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). | 1 | 2 |
Advance International, Inc. v. North Carolina National Bankgreen2 sentences2002See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533, 534 , 466 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1996). 1996While the general rule is that the repeal of a statute without a savings clause operates retroactively to blot out pending claims, State v. Rider, — S.C. —, 466 S.E. (2d) 367 (1996); Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316 , 360 S.E. (2d) 314 (1987), it is clear that a proper savings clause will have the effect of preserving a pending suit. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pittmangreen2 sentences2013See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”). 2013See State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561 , 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007) (“Where the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dickeygreen2 sentences2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). 2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2013However, in that case, we determined the amendment did not "repeal[] or amend[] any previously existing law as contemplated by the savings clause.” Id. at 510 , 675 S.E.2d at 819 . 2013However, in that case, we determined the amendment did not "repeal[] or amend[] any previously existing law as contemplated by the savings clause.” Id. at 510 , 675 S.E.2d at 819 . | 1 | 1 |
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.green2 sentences2009No. 15 at 39, 43) (holding the savings clause accompanying the enacting legislation did not preclude application of section 17-23-175 to cases tried after the date of its enactment because section 17-23-175 did not repeal or amend any existing law); Id. at 45 (finding the application of section 17-23-175 does not constitute an ex post facto violation because the statute deals with evidentiary matters, which are not penal in nature); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not address additional issues if 2009No. 15 at 39, 43) (holding the savings clause accompanying the enacting legislation did not preclude application of section 17-23-175 to cases tried after the date of its enactment because section 17-23-175 did not repeal or amend any existing law); Id. at 45 (finding the application of section 17-23-175 does not constitute an ex post facto violation because the statute deals with evidentiary matters, which are not penal in nature); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not address additional issues if | 1 | 1 |
Deltoro v. McMullengreen2 sentences2007See Deltoro, 322 S.C. at 333 , 471 S.E.2d at 745 (“[A] proper savings clause will have the effect of preserving a pending suit.”). 2007See Deltoro, 322 S.C. at 333 , 471 S.E.2d at 745 (“[A] proper savings clause will have the effect of preserving a pending suit.”). | 1 | 1 |
Cambridge Co. v. East Slope Investment Corp.green1 sentence2006Corp., 700 P.2d 537, 542 (Colo. 1985); Shiver v. Benton, 251 Ga. 284 , 304 S.E.2d 903, 906-07 (1983); cf. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-6-60(B) (holding that under *370 the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, courts must reform a disposition that was created before July 1, 1987 by inserting a savings clause that preserves the transferor’s plan of distribution “within the limits of the rule against perpetuities”). | 1 | 1 |
Shiver v. Bentongreen2 sentences2006Corp., 700 P.2d 537, 542 (Colo. 1985); Shiver v. Benton, 251 Ga. 284 , 304 S.E.2d 903, 906-07 (1983); cf. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-6-60(B) (holding that under *370 the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, courts must reform a disposition that was created before July 1, 1987 by inserting a savings clause that preserves the transferor’s plan of distribution “within the limits of the rule against perpetuities”). 2006Corp., 700 P.2d 537, 542 (Colo. 1985); Shiver v. Benton, 251 Ga. 284 , 304 S.E.2d 903, 906-07 (1983); cf. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-6-60(B) (holding that under *370 the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, courts must reform a disposition that was created before July 1, 1987 by inserting a savings clause that preserves the transferor’s plan of distribution “within the limits of the rule against perpetuities”). | 1 | 1 |
Coon v. Coongreen2 sentences2005No. 101-665, at 3005 (1990); Coon, 356 S.C. at 350 , 588 S.E.2d at 628 (finding that by “jurisdiction,” the House meant “authority”). 7 We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that the USFSPA’s savings clause, section 1408(e)(5), “further undermines any argument that Congress explicitly directed the fifty-percent limitation is jurisdictional____” Coon, 356 S.C. at 351-52 , 588 S.E.2d at 629 . 2005No. 101-665, at 3005 (1990); Coon, 356 S.C. at 350 , 588 S.E.2d at 628 (finding that by “jurisdiction,” the House meant “authority”). 7 We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that the USFSPA’s savings clause, section 1408(e)(5), “further undermines any argument that Congress explicitly directed the fifty-percent limitation is jurisdictional____” Coon, 356 S.C. at 351-52 , 588 S.E.2d at 629 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ridergreen1 sentence2002See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533, 534 , 466 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pattersongreen2 sentences1994See also State v. Patterson, 220 S.C. 269 , 66 S.E. (2d) 875 (1951); Vaughn v. Kalyvas, 288 S.C. 358 , 342 S.E. (2d) 617 (Ct. App. 1986). 1994See also State v. Patterson, 220 S.C. 269 , 66 S.E. (2d) 875 (1951); Vaughn v. Kalyvas, 288 S.C. 358 , 342 S.E. (2d) 617 (Ct. App. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pierce v. State
green
2 sentences2009Generally, a savings clause is intended to be “a restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted appeal.” Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139 , 146 n. 3, 526 S.E.2d 222 , 225 n. 3 (2000) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1343 (6th ed. 1990)). 2009Generally, a savings clause is intended to be “a restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted appeal.” Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139 , 146 n. 3, 526 S.E.2d 222 , 225 n. 3 (2000) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1343 (6th ed. 1990)). | 2 | 2009–2013 |
Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). 2013Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 464-70 , 28 S.Ct. 313 , 52 L.Ed. 567 (1908)); see also State v. Dickey, 380 S.C. 384, 405 , 669 S.E.2d 917, 928 (Ct.App.2008) (finding an action is “pending” for purposes of a savings clause where the crime occurred before the effective date of the new legislation), overruled on other grounds, 394 S.C. 491 , 716 S.E.2d 97 (2011). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dawson
green
2 sentences2013This identical savings clause was the basis for this Court’s decisions in State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160 , 740 S.E.2d 501 (2013), and State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119 , 740 S.E.2d 493 (2013). 2013This identical savings clause was the basis for this Court’s decisions in State v. Dawson, 402 S.C. 160 , 740 S.E.2d 501 (2013), and State v. Brown, 402 S.C. 119 , 740 S.E.2d 493 (2013). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Edwards v. State Law Enforcement Division
green
2 sentences2013See Brown, 402 S.C. at 127 , 740 S.E.2d at 496-97 ; Edwards, 395 S.C. at 579 , 720 S.E.2d at 466 . 2013See Brown, 402 S.C. at 127 , 740 S.E.2d at 496-97 ; Edwards, 395 S.C. at 579 , 720 S.E.2d at 466 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2012In Geier , a majority of the USSC found the presence of a statutory savings clause made clear Congress intended state tort suits to fall outside the scope of the express preemption clause; however, the savings clause did not foreclose or limit the operation of "ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 . 2012In Geier , a majority of the USSC found the presence of a statutory savings clause made clear Congress intended state tort suits to fall outside the scope of the express preemption clause; however, the savings clause did not foreclose or limit the operation of "ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux
green
2 sentences1998Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-51 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1553-55 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). 1998Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-51 , 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1553-55 , 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
South Carolina v. Gaillard
green
2 sentences1996State of South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433 , 25 L.Ed. 937 (1879); 20 Am. 1996State of South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433 , 25 L.Ed. 937 (1879); 20 Am. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Taylor v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1996While the general rule is that the repeal of a statute without a savings clause operates retroactively to blot out pending claims, State v. Rider, — S.C. —, 466 S.E. (2d) 367 (1996); Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316 , 360 S.E. (2d) 314 (1987), it is clear that a proper savings clause will have the effect of preserving a pending suit. 1996While the general rule is that the repeal of a statute without a savings clause operates retroactively to blot out pending claims, State v. Rider, — S.C. —, 466 S.E. (2d) 367 (1996); Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316 , 360 S.E. (2d) 314 (1987), it is clear that a proper savings clause will have the effect of preserving a pending suit. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Defee
neutral
2 sentences1994The Respondents argue that in State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E. (2d) 806 (1965), and in State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346 , 181 S.E. 217 (1935), we held that the absence of a savings clause was fatal to continuing prosecutions under a repealed statue. 1994The Respondents argue that in State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E. (2d) 806 (1965), and in State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346 , 181 S.E. 217 (1935), we held that the absence of a savings clause was fatal to continuing prosecutions under a repealed statue. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vaughan v. Kalyvas
green
2 sentences1994See also State v. Patterson, 220 S.C. 269 , 66 S.E. (2d) 875 (1951); Vaughn v. Kalyvas, 288 S.C. 358 , 342 S.E. (2d) 617 (Ct. App. 1986). 1994See also State v. Patterson, 220 S.C. 269 , 66 S.E. (2d) 875 (1951); Vaughn v. Kalyvas, 288 S.C. 358 , 342 S.E. (2d) 617 (Ct. App. 1986). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Spencer
green
2 sentences1994The Respondents argue that in State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E. (2d) 806 (1965), and in State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346 , 181 S.E. 217 (1935), we held that the absence of a savings clause was fatal to continuing prosecutions under a repealed statue. 1994The Respondents argue that in State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E. (2d) 806 (1965), and in State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346 , 181 S.E. 217 (1935), we held that the absence of a savings clause was fatal to continuing prosecutions under a repealed statue. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ewell v. Daggs
green
2 sentences1986Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 , 2 S. Ct. 408 , 27 L. 1986Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143 , 2 S. Ct. 408 , 27 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.