17 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 794138green2 sentences2011Kristian, 446 F.3d at 62 (noting that courts typically prefer “declaring an arbitration agreement unenforceable rather than using severance as a remedy when fundamental elements of the arbitration regime are at issue” and that severing the class arbitration bar would be “difficult to justify” absent a savings clause). 2011Kristian, 446 F.3d at 62 (noting that courts typically prefer "declaring an arbitration agreement unenforceable rather than using severance as a remedy when fundamental elements of the arbitration regime are at issue" and that severing the class arbitration bar would be "difficult to justify" absent a savings clause). | 2 | 2 |
Pulley v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019Pulley , 465 U.S. at 50 , 104 S.Ct. 871 (noting that the constitutionality of a capital sentencing scheme rests on the statutory limitation of the death penalty to offenses involving a statutorily defined aggravating circumstance); see also Pangaea Cinema , 2013-NMSC-044 , ¶ 23, 310 P.3d 604 (prescribing avoidance of a conclusion of, or an allusion to, unconstitutionality in the construction of statutes). 2019Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50 (noting that the constitutionality of a capital sentencing scheme rests on the statutory limitation of the death penalty to the legislative attitude toward the death penalty and a shift in the standards of decency. | 1 | 2 |
Gallup Westside Development, LLC v. City of Gallupgreen2 sentences2026See Gallup Westside Dev., LLC v. City of Gallup, 2004- NMCA-010, ¶¶ 10-11, 135 N.M. 30 , 84 P.3d 78 . {14} In this case, the Lease’s savings clause contains a shut-in provision allowing the Lease to continue in the absence of actual production if “a well [is] capable of producing gas in paying quantities” and the lessee “pay[s] an annual royalty.” Snow shut-in both wells located on the Lease in 2015 and maintained the Lease by making shut-in payments for 2015, 2016, and 2017. 2026See Gallup Westside Dev., LLC v. City of Gallup, 2004- NMCA-010, ¶¶ 10-11, 135 N.M. 30 , 84 P.3d 78 . {14} In this case, the Lease’s savings clause contains a shut-in provision allowing the Lease to continue in the absence of actual production if “a well [is] capable of producing gas in paying quantities” and the lessee “pay[s] an annual royalty.” Snow shut-in both wells located on the Lease in 2015 and maintained the Lease by making shut-in payments for 2015, 2016, and 2017. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pangaea Cinema, L.L.C.green1 sentence2019Pulley , 465 U.S. at 50 , 104 S.Ct. 871 (noting that the constitutionality of a capital sentencing scheme rests on the statutory limitation of the death penalty to offenses involving a statutorily defined aggravating circumstance); see also Pangaea Cinema , 2013-NMSC-044 , ¶ 23, 310 P.3d 604 (prescribing avoidance of a conclusion of, or an allusion to, unconstitutionality in the construction of statutes). | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc.green1 sentence2012The Agreement’s “savings clause” states: “If any provision of this [arbitration [agreement is found to be invalid, the other provisions shall remain enforceable. {20} “When [the Court of Appeals] determines that contract provisions are unenforceable we can either strike the provisions in their entirety or reform the provisions into a fair and balanced agreement.” Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 55 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); see Figueroa, 2012-NMCA-__, ¶ 38. | 1 | 1 |
Prager v. Pragergreen2 sentences1995See generally Prager v. Prager, 80 N.M. 773, 776 , 461 P.2d 906, 909 (1969) (discussing effect of savings clause). 1995See generally Prager v. Prager, 80 N.M. 773, 776 , 461 P.2d 906, 909 (1969) (discussing effect of savings clause). | 1 | 1 |
Shiflet v. Ellergreen2 sentences1988Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120 , 319 S.E.2d 750, 754 (1984); see State ex rel. 1988Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120 , 319 S.E.2d 750, 754 (1984); see State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Bureau of Revenuegreen2 sentences1975See Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 48 , 450 P.2d 934 (Ct.App.1969). 1975See Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 48 , 450 P.2d 934 (Ct.App.1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences2001Plaintiff does not direct our attention to any evidence regarding this element. {22} Second, the Easterwood Court rejected this argument, stating that “the [federally established] speed limits must be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state regulation.” Easter-wood, 507 U.S. at 674 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 . 2001Plaintiff does not direct our attention to any evidence regarding this element. {22} Second, the Easterwood Court rejected this argument, stating that “the [federally established] speed limits must be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state regulation.” Easter-wood, 507 U.S. at 674 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Greer v. Salmon
green
2 sentences2026In Greer v. Salmon, 1971-NMSC-002 , 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 , our Supreme Court held that an oil and gas lease automatically terminated when a lessee failed to make shut-in royalty payments as authorized by the lease’s savings clause. 2026In Greer v. Salmon, 1971-NMSC-002 , 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 , our Supreme Court held that an oil and gas lease automatically terminated when a lessee failed to make shut-in royalty payments as authorized by the lease’s savings clause. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2021In Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., 1990-NMSC-013 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 109 N.M. 492 , 787 P.2d 411 , our Supreme Court held that 37-1-17 prevented application of Section 37-1- 14 in a contract action against the state governed by NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-23 (1976). 2021In Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin., 1990-NMSC-013 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 109 N.M. 492 , 787 P.2d 411 , our Supreme Court held that 37-1-17 prevented application of Section 37-1- 14 in a contract action against the state governed by NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-23 (1976). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2019This would contradict the Legislature's intent in enacting a savings clause for murders committed before July 1, 2009. {61} The Garcia Court's definition of the universe of cases includes one more restriction: we consider only those cases which were affirmed on appeal. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . 2019This would contradict the Legislature's intent in enacting a savings clause for murders committed before July 1, 2009. {61} The Garcia Court's definition of the universe of cases includes one more restriction: we consider only those cases which were affirmed on appeal. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cordova v. World Finance Corp. of NM
green
2 sentences2012The Court stated in Cordova “[w]e must strike down the arbitration clause in its entirety to avoid a type of judicial surgery that inevitably would remove provisions that were central to the original mechanisms for resolving disputes between the parties.” 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 40 . {21} In Figueroa, we directly addressed and rejected the defendants’ savings clause argument. 2012-NMCA-__, ¶¶ 38-40. 2012The Court stated in Cordova “[w]e must strike down the arbitration clause in its entirety to avoid a type of judicial surgery that inevitably would remove provisions that were central to the original mechanisms for resolving disputes between the parties.” 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 40 . {21} In Figueroa, we directly addressed and rejected the defendants’ savings clause argument. 2012-NMCA-__, ¶¶ 38-40. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Tipton
green
2 sentences2004Tipton III, 78 N.M. at 603 , 435 P.2d at 433 . 2004Tipton III, 78 N.M. at 603 , 435 P.2d at 433 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences1994The Court of Appeals relied on two cases from states with mandatory jurisdiction under Public Law 280, California and Alaska, for its holding that § 1360(b) deprived state courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate a non-Indian’s interest in land owned by an Indian tribe. 116 N.M. at 327 , 862 P.2d at 435 . 1994The Court of Appeals relied on two cases from states with mandatory jurisdiction under Public Law 280, California and Alaska, for its holding that § 1360(b) deprived state courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate a non-Indian’s interest in land owned by an Indian tribe. 116 N.M. at 327 , 862 P.2d at 435 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. v. PFOST, COMMISSIONER OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, Et Al.
green
2 sentences1967Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 , 52 S.Ct. 548 , 76 L.Ed. 1038 (1932). 1967Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 , 52 S.Ct. 548 , 76 L.Ed. 1038 (1932). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Collier v. Smaltz
green
2 sentences1952The statute continues during the entire time of disability, and for one year thereafter.” In construing another Iowa statute limiting the time for filing suit where the wife of a grantor had not joined, which statute did not have a savings clause extending the time for minors or insane persons to sue, the court said in Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230 , 128 N.W. 396 , 399: “* * * but it must not be overlooked that an insane person, if not so judicially declared, may maintain an action in court. 22 Cyc. 1222; Mentz [Menz] v. Beebe, 95 Wis. 383 , 70 N. W. 468 , 60 Am.St.Rep. 120 ; Speck v. Pullma 1952The statute continues during the entire time of disability, and for one year thereafter.” In construing another Iowa statute limiting the time for filing suit where the wife of a grantor had not joined, which statute did not have a savings clause extending the time for minors or insane persons to sue, the court said in Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230 , 128 N.W. 396 , 399: “* * * but it must not be overlooked that an insane person, if not so judicially declared, may maintain an action in court. 22 Cyc. 1222; Mentz [Menz] v. Beebe, 95 Wis. 383 , 70 N. W. 468 , 60 Am.St.Rep. 120 ; Speck v. Pullma | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Menz v. Beebe
neutral
2 sentences1952The statute continues during the entire time of disability, and for one year thereafter.” In construing another Iowa statute limiting the time for filing suit where the wife of a grantor had not joined, which statute did not have a savings clause extending the time for minors or insane persons to sue, the court said in Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230 , 128 N.W. 396 , 399: “* * * but it must not be overlooked that an insane person, if not so judicially declared, may maintain an action in court. 22 Cyc. 1222; Mentz [Menz] v. Beebe, 95 Wis. 383 , 70 N. W. 468 , 60 Am.St.Rep. 120 ; Speck v. Pullma 1952The statute continues during the entire time of disability, and for one year thereafter.” In construing another Iowa statute limiting the time for filing suit where the wife of a grantor had not joined, which statute did not have a savings clause extending the time for minors or insane persons to sue, the court said in Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230 , 128 N.W. 396 , 399: “* * * but it must not be overlooked that an insane person, if not so judicially declared, may maintain an action in court. 22 Cyc. 1222; Mentz [Menz] v. Beebe, 95 Wis. 383 , 70 N. W. 468 , 60 Am.St.Rep. 120 ; Speck v. Pullma | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Hill v. Wallace
green
2 sentences1942“The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Safeway Stores v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 [ 57 P.2d 287 ], cited with approval Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 [ 42 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed. 822 ], which held that such a savings clause still left the matter a question of interpretation and of legislative intent. 1942“The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Safeway Stores v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 [ 57 P.2d 287 ], cited with approval Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 [ 42 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed. 822 ], which held that such a savings clause still left the matter a question of interpretation and of legislative intent. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil
green
2 sentences1942“The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Safeway Stores v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 [ 57 P.2d 287 ], cited with approval Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 [ 42 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed. 822 ], which held that such a savings clause still left the matter a question of interpretation and of legislative intent. 1942“The Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Safeway Stores v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 [ 57 P.2d 287 ], cited with approval Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 [ 42 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed. 822 ], which held that such a savings clause still left the matter a question of interpretation and of legislative intent. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.