savings clause in New York

2025Hosp. , 51 NY2d at 253 [a wrongful death action brought by a person other than an appointed administrator constitutes a prior action for purposes of the savings clause in CPLR 205]; Barahona v Long Is.

2025Hosp. , 51 NY2d at 253 [a wrongful death action brought by a person other than an appointed administrator constitutes a prior action for purposes of the savings clause in CPLR 205]; Barahona v Long Is.

2023However, CPLR 205(a) does not apply to extend Federal statutes of limitations ( see Maurizio v Goldsmith , 84 F Supp 2d 455, 463 [SD NY 2000][holding that CPLR 205(a) does not toll federal statute of limitations], affd 230 F3d 518 [2d Cir 2000]).

2023However, CPLR 205(a) does not apply to extend Federal statutes of limitations ( see Maurizio v Goldsmith , 84 F Supp 2d 455, 463 [SD NY 2000][holding that CPLR 205(a) does not toll federal statute of limitations], affd 230 F3d 518 [2d Cir 2000]).

2024In contrast, if the owner or general contractor is not actively negligent, an indemnification provision without a savings clause does not violate GOL § 5-322.1 even if it contemplates full indemnity (Rhodes-Evans v 111 Chelsea LLC, 44 AD3d 430,434 [1st Dept 2007]).

2024In contrast, if the owner or general contractor is not actively negligent, an indemnification provision without a savings clause does not violate GOL § 5-322.1 even if it contemplates full indemnity (Rhodes-Evans v 111 Chelsea LLC, 44 AD3d 430,434 [1st Dept 2007]).

2025The indemnification provision in Mellifont's contract, which contains a savings clause, does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d 204, 209 [2008]).

2025The indemnification provision in Mellifont's contract, which contains a savings clause, does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d 204, 209 [2008]).

2026We agree with other jurisdictions' well settled precedent holding that, in this context "financial responsibility" refers to "state laws which require either liability insurance or a functionally equivalent financial arrangement" (<i>Garcia v Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.</i>, 540 F3d 1242, 1247 [11th Cir 2008]; <i>see Malco Enters. of Nev., Inc. v Woldeyohannes</i>, 140 Nev —, —, 559 P3d 875 , 879 [2024] [collecting cases discussing meaning of "financial responsibility" in the savings clause];<i> see also </i>7A Jordan R.

2026For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the Graves Amendment preempted a Minnesota statute that, although at first appeared to impose an "insurance standard" falling under the Amendment's savings clause, actually functioned as a cap on car rental companies' vicarious liability (<i>see Meyer v Nwokedi</i>, 777 NW2d 218, 225-226 [Minn 2010]; <i>accord Puerini v LaPierre</i>, 208 A3d 1157, 1165 [RI 2019] [deeming a state statute that imposed vicarious liability on rental companies for renters' negligence preempted]; <i>Vargas v Enterprise Leasing Co.</i>, 60 So 3d 1037, 1042-1043 [F

2025Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC , 137 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2016]["Plaintiff timely commenced this action, providing notice of the claim to defendants before the statute of limitations ran, and the dismissal was not on the merits but because of the lack of proper letters of administration, which plaintiff was in the process of obtaining"]; Carmenate v City of New York , 59 AD3d 162, 163 [1st Dept 2009]["This action, seeking damages for wrongful death and negligence, was timely brought by the decedent's brother, who had not then obtained the required letters of administration to prosecute the ma

2025Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC , 137 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2016]["Plaintiff timely commenced this action, providing notice of the claim to defendants before the statute of limitations ran, and the dismissal was not on the merits but because of the lack of proper letters of administration, which plaintiff was in the process of obtaining"]; Carmenate v City of New York , 59 AD3d 162, 163 [1st Dept 2009]["This action, seeking damages for wrongful death and negligence, was timely brought by the decedent's brother, who had not then obtained the required letters of administration to prosecute the ma

2025Importantly, should the Court deny the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, and the statute of limitations on the claims expire prior to petitioners' appointment as administrators of the estate, there is a real risk petitioners might be denied application of the savings clause in CPLR 205(a), arguably leaving them "irretrievably precluded" from pursuing their claims ( see Bernardez v City of New York , 100 AD2d at 800 ; see also Gomez v Mount Sinai Hospital , 231 AD3d 537 , 538-539 [1st Dept 2024]).

2025Importantly, should the Court deny the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, and the statute of limitations on the claims expire prior to petitioners' appointment as administrators of the estate, there is a real risk petitioners might be denied application of the savings clause in CPLR 205(a), arguably leaving them "irretrievably precluded" from pursuing their claims ( see Bernardez v City of New York , 100 AD2d at 800 ; see also Gomez v Mount Sinai Hospital , 231 AD3d 537 , 538-539 [1st Dept 2024]).

2025Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC , 137 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2016]["Plaintiff timely commenced this action, providing notice of the claim to defendants before the statute of limitations ran, and the dismissal was not on the merits but because of the lack of proper letters of administration, which plaintiff was in the process of obtaining"]; Carmenate v City of New York , 59 AD3d 162, 163 [1st Dept 2009]["This action, seeking damages for wrongful death and negligence, was timely brought by the decedent's brother, who had not then obtained the required letters of administration to prosecute the ma

2025Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., LLC , 137 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2016]["Plaintiff timely commenced this action, providing notice of the claim to defendants before the statute of limitations ran, and the dismissal was not on the merits but because of the lack of proper letters of administration, which plaintiff was in the process of obtaining"]; Carmenate v City of New York , 59 AD3d 162, 163 [1st Dept 2009]["This action, seeking damages for wrongful death and negligence, was timely brought by the decedent's brother, who had not then obtained the required letters of administration to prosecute the ma

2022Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans Inc. , 179 AD3d 518, 520 [1st Dept 2020]; Ali v Effron , 106 AD3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2013]).

2022Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans Inc. , 179 AD3d 518, 520 [1st Dept 2020]; Ali v Effron , 106 AD3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2013]).

2022Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans Inc. , 179 AD3d 518, 520 [1st Dept 2020]; Ali v Effron , 106 AD3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2013]).

2022Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans Inc. , 179 AD3d 518, 520 [1st Dept 2020]; Ali v Effron , 106 AD3d 560, 560 [1st Dept 2013]).

2021Contrary to SJE's contention, the laws of contribution, which provide that there can be no unequal apportionment of liability between an employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and the employee himself, do not apply here, since there is no common-law contribution claim at issue ( see Lachhonna v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 170 AD2d 191, 191 [1st Dept 1991]; see also Kendall v Venture Dev. , 206 AD2d 797 , 799 n 3 [3d Dept 1994]).

2021Contrary to SJE's contention, the laws of contribution, which provide that there can be no unequal apportionment of liability between an employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and the employee himself, do not apply here, since there is no common-law contribution claim at issue ( see Lachhonna v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 170 AD2d 191, 191 [1st Dept 1991]; see also Kendall v Venture Dev. , 206 AD2d 797 , 799 n 3 [3d Dept 1994]).

2021Contrary to SJE's contention, the laws of contribution, which provide that there can be no unequal apportionment of liability between an employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and the employee himself, do not apply here, since there is no common-law contribution claim at issue ( see Lachhonna v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 170 AD2d 191, 191 [1st Dept 1991]; see also Kendall v Venture Dev. , 206 AD2d 797 , 799 n 3 [3d Dept 1994]).

2021Contrary to SJE's contention, the laws of contribution, which provide that there can be no unequal apportionment of liability between an employer vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and the employee himself, do not apply here, since there is no common-law contribution claim at issue ( see Lachhonna v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 170 AD2d 191, 191 [1st Dept 1991]; see also Kendall v Venture Dev. , 206 AD2d 797 , 799 n 3 [3d Dept 1994]).

1999In view of the “irreconcilable conflict between the FCC’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of radio frequency interference and the imposition of common-law standards in a damages action” (Broyde v Gotham Tower, supra, at 997), we agree that State law-based claims are impliedly preempted (see, Zimmer Radio v Lake Broadcasting, 937 SW2d 402, 406 [Mo Ct App] [where there is a conflict between the FCA and the common-law remedy at issue, the latter is preempted]).

1999In view of the “irreconcilable conflict between the FCC’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of radio frequency interference and the imposition of common-law standards in a damages action” (Broyde v Gotham Tower, supra, at 997), we agree that State law-based claims are impliedly preempted (see, Zimmer Radio v Lake Broadcasting, 937 SW2d 402, 406 [Mo Ct App] [where there is a conflict between the FCA and the common-law remedy at issue, the latter is preempted]).

1999In view of the “irreconcilable conflict between the FCC’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of radio frequency interference and the imposition of common-law standards in a damages action” (Broyde v Gotham Tower, supra, at 997), we agree that State law-based claims are impliedly preempted (see, Zimmer Radio v Lake Broadcasting, 937 SW2d 402, 406 [Mo Ct App] [where there is a conflict between the FCA and the common-law remedy at issue, the latter is preempted]).

1999In view of the “irreconcilable conflict between the FCC’s exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of radio frequency interference and the imposition of common-law standards in a damages action” (Broyde v Gotham Tower, supra, at 997), we agree that State law-based claims are impliedly preempted (see, Zimmer Radio v Lake Broadcasting, 937 SW2d 402, 406 [Mo Ct App] [where there is a conflict between the FCA and the common-law remedy at issue, the latter is preempted]).

2005(See also People v Teixeira, 87 AD2d 895, 895 [2d Dept 1982] [defendant sentenced after effective date of statutory amendment had minimum term reduced; general rule is that, “absent a savings clause, an ameliorative statute will be applied to cases which have not reached final judgment when the ameliorative statute becomes effective”]; People v Jansen, 145 AD2d 870 [3d Dept 1988] [same].) Accordingly, defendant’s application is granted. .

1983(People v Teixeira, 87 AD2d 895 .) The only question is the effect of the savings clause, i.e., does it rebut the presumption announced in Oliver?

2026And "[w]here an examination of the statute as a whole demonstrates that a party's interpretation would lead to absurd or futile results plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, that interpretation should be rejected" (<i>Yerdon v Henry</i>, 91 F3d 370, 376 [2d Cir 1996] [internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted]).</p> <p>The Graves Amendment's savings clause excepts state laws "imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards" on vehicle owners ( 49 USC § 30106 [b] [1]), but does not define "financial responsibility" or "insurance standards" (<i>see id.</

2026This is precisely the type of absurd result, contrary to well-settled insurance law, that bedrock interpretive principles instruct us to avoid (<i>see Yerdon</i>, 91 F3d at 376 ; <i>cf. Zeglen v Minkiewicz</i>, 12 NY2d 497, 499 [1963] ["liability insurance protecting an automobile or its driver or owner does not change the nature or extent of the rights and liabilities of the parties"]).</p> <p>Moreover, interpreting the Graves Amendment in its full context commands that we read the savings clause with an eye toward the Amendment's primary objective: eliminating vicarious liability for rental

2026For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the Graves Amendment preempted a Minnesota statute that, although at first appeared to impose an "insurance standard" falling under the Amendment's savings clause, actually functioned as a cap on car rental companies' vicarious liability (<i>see Meyer v Nwokedi</i>, 777 NW2d 218, 225-226 [Minn 2010]; <i>accord Puerini v LaPierre</i>, 208 A3d 1157, 1165 [RI 2019] [deeming a state statute that imposed vicarious liability on rental companies for renters' negligence preempted]; <i>Vargas v Enterprise Leasing Co.</i>, 60 So 3d 1037, 1042-1043 [F

2026The claims against DAL were also properly dismissed as it established, based on Shawmut's having taken on the responsibility for removing debris, its freedom from negligence and that it did not control the injury-producing work (<i>see Naughton v City of New York</i>, 94 AD3d 1, 10 [1st Dept 2012]).

2026While questions of fact exist concerning Abeken's liability, the indemnification provision is not void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 because it contains a savings clause permitting partial liability ( see Hernandez v Argo Corp. , 95 AD3d 782, 783 [1st Dept 2012]).

2026While questions of fact exist concerning Abeken's liability, the indemnification provision is not void under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 because it contains a savings clause permitting partial liability (<i>see Hernandez v Argo Corp.</i>, 95 AD3d 782, 783 [1st Dept 2012]). </p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.</p> <p>ENTERED: April 21, 2026</p> </div> <div> <footer> <div> <p>Court Decisions</p> All Court Decisions Official Reports Service Bound Volumes Decision Search </div> <div> <p>Resources</p> RSS Feeds Style Manual

2026This is not how a savings clause works—one does not "harmonize" a savings clause with the statute's other provisions by overriding the plain language of those substantive provisions (majority op at 13; see Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v Urbach , 96 NY2d 124, 134 [2001]).

2026This is not how a savings clause works—one does not "harmonize" a savings clause with the statute's other provisions by overriding the plain language of those substantive provisions (majority op at 13; see Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v Urbach , 96 NY2d 124, 134 [2001]).

2026FN4 Our canons of statutory construction require us to harmonize these provisions and to treat the legislature's word choice as deliberate and meaningful ( see Bank of Am., N.A. v Kessler , 39 NY3d 317, 325 [2023]; Matter of DeVera v Elia , 32 NY3d 423, 436 [2018]; Matter of Burger King v State Tax Commn. , 51 NY2d 614, 620-621 [1980]; People v Sharp , 107 NY 427, 455 [1887]).

2026FN4 Our canons of statutory construction require us to harmonize these provisions and to treat the legislature's word choice as deliberate and meaningful ( see Bank of Am., N.A. v Kessler , 39 NY3d 317 , 325 [2023]; Matter of DeVera v Elia , 32 NY3d 423, 436 [2018]; Matter of Burger King v State Tax Commn. , 51 NY2d 614, 620-621 [1980]; People v Sharp , 107 NY 427, 455 [1887]).

2026For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the Graves Amendment preempted a Minnesota statute that, although at first appeared to impose an "insurance standard" falling under the Amendment's savings clause, actually functioned as a cap on car rental companies' vicarious liability (<i>see Meyer v Nwokedi</i>, 777 NW2d 218, 225-226 [Minn 2010]; <i>accord Puerini v LaPierre</i>, 208 A3d 1157, 1165 [RI 2019] [deeming a state statute that imposed vicarious liability on rental companies for renters' negligence preempted]; <i>Vargas v Enterprise Leasing Co.</i>, 60 So 3d 1037, 1042-1043 [F

2026For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the Graves Amendment preempted a Minnesota statute that, although at first appeared to impose an "insurance standard" falling under the Amendment's savings clause, actually functioned as a cap on car rental companies' vicarious liability (<i>see Meyer v Nwokedi</i>, 777 NW2d 218, 225-226 [Minn 2010]; <i>accord Puerini v LaPierre</i>, 208 A3d 1157, 1165 [RI 2019] [deeming a state statute that imposed vicarious liability on rental companies for renters' negligence preempted]; <i>Vargas v Enterprise Leasing Co.</i>, 60 So 3d 1037, 1042-1043 [F

2026This is precisely the type of absurd result, contrary to well-settled insurance law, that bedrock interpretive principles instruct us to avoid (<i>see Yerdon</i>, 91 F3d at 376 ; <i>cf. Zeglen v Minkiewicz</i>, 12 NY2d 497, 499 [1963] ["liability insurance protecting an automobile or its driver or owner does not change the nature or extent of the rights and liabilities of the parties"]).</p> <p>Moreover, interpreting the Graves Amendment in its full context commands that we read the savings clause with an eye toward the Amendment's primary objective: eliminating vicarious liability for rental

2026It is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, however, and not the savings clause, that underlies the Second Circuit majority's certification ( see 148 F4th at 95-96, 103 [citing People v Marquan M. , 24 NY3d 1 [2014]; People v Dietze , 75 NY2d 47 [1989]).

2026It is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, however, and not the savings clause, that underlies the Second Circuit majority's certification ( see 148 F4th at 95-96, 103 [citing People v Marquan M. , 24 NY3d 1 [2014]; People v Dietze , 75 NY2d 47 [1989]).