9 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Graham v. Sisco
green
2 sentences1988Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962)] minors have three years after their disabilities are removed in which to bring an action for medical malpractice, that in Graham v. Cisco, 248 Ark. 6 , 449 S.W.2d 949 (1980), we held that the cause of action by a minor for medical malpractice was extended by the savings clause contained in § 37-226, even though the period of limitations for bringing an action for medical malpractice generally was limited to two years under Ark. 1988Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962)] minors have three years after their disabilities are removed in which to bring an action for medical malpractice, that in Graham v. Cisco, 248 Ark. 6 , 449 S.W.2d 949 (1980), we held that the cause of action by a minor for medical malpractice was extended by the savings clause contained in § 37-226, even though the period of limitations for bringing an action for medical malpractice generally was limited to two years under Ark. | 2 | 1979–1988 |
Desoto Gathering Co. v. Ramsey
green
1 sentence2016Cf. Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, supra (granting the writ of prohibition and holding that venue statutes, being procedural in nature, are to be applied retroactively, even as to cases that are properly filed under a repealed statute, unless the new act contains a savings clause). 23 Cite as 2016 Ark. 22 however, prescribes the venue of actions and . . . with the wisdom of its action in such matters, the courts have nothing to do”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States
green
1 sentence2011BedRoc , 541 U.S. at 183 . 27 Having settled on what it took to be the plain reading of the savings clause, the court addressed whether that reading was absurd, as it is required to do under the principles of statutory interpretation noted above. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Thornhill v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2011Sincerely, DUSTIN McDANIEL Attorney General DM/RO:cyh 1 E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88 , 95 (1940). 2 Turner Broad. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dodd v. United States
green
1 sentence2011When the language of a statute is plain, "the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the test is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms." Dodd v. United States , 545 U.S. 353 , [359] (2005). . . . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Johnson v. Pilot Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1976Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962), which provides: “If any person entitled to bring any action, under any law of this state, be, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, under twenty-one [21] years of age, or insane or imprisoned beyond the limits of the state, such person shall be at liberty to bring such action within three [3] years next after full age, or such disability may be removed.” To avoid the effect of the savings clause, appellee relies upon such cases as Johnson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 217 N.C. 139 , 7 S.E. 2d 475 (1940) and Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186 , 72 P. 936 1976Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962), which provides: “If any person entitled to bring any action, under any law of this state, be, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, under twenty-one [21] years of age, or insane or imprisoned beyond the limits of the state, such person shall be at liberty to bring such action within three [3] years next after full age, or such disability may be removed.” To avoid the effect of the savings clause, appellee relies upon such cases as Johnson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 217 N.C. 139 , 7 S.E. 2d 475 (1940) and Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186 , 72 P. 936 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Dignan v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1976Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962), which provides: “If any person entitled to bring any action, under any law of this state, be, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, under twenty-one [21] years of age, or insane or imprisoned beyond the limits of the state, such person shall be at liberty to bring such action within three [3] years next after full age, or such disability may be removed.” To avoid the effect of the savings clause, appellee relies upon such cases as Johnson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 217 N.C. 139 , 7 S.E. 2d 475 (1940) and Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186 , 72 P. 936 1976Stat. Ann. § 37-226 (Repl. 1962), which provides: “If any person entitled to bring any action, under any law of this state, be, at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, under twenty-one [21] years of age, or insane or imprisoned beyond the limits of the state, such person shall be at liberty to bring such action within three [3] years next after full age, or such disability may be removed.” To avoid the effect of the savings clause, appellee relies upon such cases as Johnson v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 217 N.C. 139 , 7 S.E. 2d 475 (1940) and Dignan v. Nelson, 26 Utah 186 , 72 P. 936 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Schuman v. Westbrook
green
1 sentence1970Upon that point we held in Schuman v. Westbrook, 207 Ark. 495 , 181 S. W. 2d (1944), that even though the original savings clause adopted in 1844 was limited to statutes of limitation then on the books, the scope of the savings clause was broadened in 1899 to apply to any cause of action regardless of whether it existed prior to 1844 or after-wards. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Zini v. First Natl. Bank in Little Rock
green
2 sentences1969Zini v. First National Bank of Little Rock, 228 Ark. 325 , 307 S.W. 2d 874 . 1969Zini v. First National Bank of Little Rock, 228 Ark. 325 , 307 S.W. 2d 874 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Rinke v. Weedman
green
2 sentences1969Schuman v. Westbrook, supra. Appellees rely upon the case of Rinke v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 341 S.W. 2d 44 . 1969Schuman v. Westbrook, supra. Appellees rely upon the case of Rinke v. Weedman, 232 Ark. 900 , 341 S.W. 2d 44 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Grimes v. Jones
green
2 sentences1962The case of Grimes v. J ones, 193 Ark. 858 , 103 S. W. 2d 359 , affords the appellants no support; because in that case the nunc pro tunc order contained no savings clause for innocent third persons or unnotified parties; whereas the nunc pro tunc order of December 4, 1961 here before us contains such a savings clause. 1962The case of Grimes v. J ones, 193 Ark. 858 , 103 S. W. 2d 359 , affords the appellants no support; because in that case the nunc pro tunc order contained no savings clause for innocent third persons or unnotified parties; whereas the nunc pro tunc order of December 4, 1961 here before us contains such a savings clause. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Hodges v. Harkleroad
green
2 sentences1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. 1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Lightle v. Laws
neutral
2 sentences1944Cas. 1914C, 419; and Lightle v. Laws, 123 Ark. 537 , 186 S. W. 73 .” The same statute {% 13860) that contains the savings clause for minors (as mentioned in the last quotation) also includes insane persons; so we affirm so much of the decree of the chancery court, in the case at bar, as denied Kaplan’s plea of innocent purchaser. 1944Cas. 1914C, 419; and Lightle v. Laws, 123 Ark. 537 , 186 S. W. 73 .” The same statute {% 13860) that contains the savings clause for minors (as mentioned in the last quotation) also includes insane persons; so we affirm so much of the decree of the chancery court, in the case at bar, as denied Kaplan’s plea of innocent purchaser. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Hisey v. Sloan
neutral
2 sentences1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. 1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
George v. Hefley
neutral
2 sentences1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. 1944Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343 , 85 S. W. 779 ; George v. Hefley, 182 Ark. 678 , 32 S. W. 2d 445 ; Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 ; and cases there cited. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.