savings clause (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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savings clause in Oregon

14 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1945–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. County of Los Angelesgreen
ca9 · 2022 · cited in 2 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 29 F4th 542, 555 (9th Cir 2022) (flavored tobacco ban not preempted in part because “Congress has allowed the federal government to set the standards regarding how a product would be manufactured and marketed, but has left states, localities, and tribal entities the ability to restrict or opt out of that market altogether”); id. at 558 (concluding “requirement that tobacco retailers or licensees throughout the County not sell flavored tobacco products” fits within “the savings clause” of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act becaus

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 29 F4th 542, 555 (9th Cir 2022) (flavored tobacco ban not preempted in part because “Congress has allowed the federal government to set the standards regarding how a product would be manufactured and marketed, but has left states, localities, and tribal entities the ability to restrict or opt out of that market altogether”); id. at 558 (concluding “requirement that tobacco retailers or licensees throughout the County not sell flavored tobacco products” fits within “the savings clause” of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act becaus

22
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepciongreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020That construction of the savings clause—rejecting claims of unconscionability that would impair the individualized attributes of arbitration—is thought to protect the “princi- pal advantage of arbitration—its informality.” Concepcion, 563 US at 348.

2020It is meant to assure what are assumed to be “the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.” Id.

11
City of Klamath Falls v. Wintersgreen
or · 1980 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 702 , 281 P.2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 781 , 619 P.2d 217 (1980) ("the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself"); State v. Moore, 192 Or. 39, 45 , 233 P.2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes "are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued"); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or.App. 182 ,

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

11
State of Oregon v. Pirkeygreen
or · 1955 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

11
City of Klamath Falls v. Wintersgreen
or · 1980 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992
2 sentences

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 702 , 281 P.2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or. 757, 781 , 619 P.2d 217 (1980) ("the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself"); State v. Moore, 192 Or. 39, 45 , 233 P.2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes "are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued"); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or.App. 182 ,

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

11
Stoddard v. Owingsgreen
sc · 1894 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 1945–1945
1 sentence

1945See Stoddard v. Owings, 42 S. C. 88, 90, 20 S. E. 25 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

CaseCitedYears
PETA v. OHSU neutral
orctapp · 2025
2 sentences

2025Cite as 346 Or App 38 (2025) 53 As such, we conclude that the remedies in ORS 192.407(3) are limited and self-contained, and that the savings clause in subsection (4) does not expand those remedies.

2025It provides: “Nothing in this section limits the authority of a court to act Cite as 346 Or App 38 (2025) 49 under ORS 192.431.” OHSU reads this as a savings clause, included to prevent any overlap between ORS 192.407 and ORS 192.431 from being misinterpreted as a repeal or amendment of ORS 192.431, which was enacted earlier than ORS 192.407.

22025–2025
Ingle v. Matteucci green
or · 2023
2 sentences

2023Representative Mannix described the escape Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023) 439 clause as “a savings clause for unconscionable situations where the system didn’t work.” Id.

2023Representative Mannix described the escape Cite as 371 Or 413 (2023) 439 clause as “a savings clause for unconscionable situations where the system didn’t work.” Id.

12023–2023
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis green
scotus · 2018
2 sentences

2020Id. “[T]his means the saving clause does not save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods, such as by interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, ___ US ___, ___, 138 S Ct 1612, 1622 , 200 L Ed 2d 889 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020Id. “[T]his means the saving clause does not save defenses that target arbitration either by name or by more subtle methods, such as by interfer[ing] with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, ___ US ___, ___, 138 S Ct 1612, 1622 , 200 L Ed 2d 889 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

12020–2020
Gist v. ZoAn Management, Inc. green
orctapp · 2020
2 sentences

2020The savings clause, however, does not permit defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is Cite as 305 Or App 708 (2020) 715 at issue.

2020The savings clause, however, does not permit defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is Cite as 305 Or App 708 (2020) 715 at issue.

12020–2020
Rasmussen v. Kroger green
or · 2011
1 sentence

2011The ballot title is referred to the Attorney General for modification. 1 The petitioners in Rasmussen, 351 Or at 202 n 3, also argued that the caption for Initiative Petition 15 was inadequate because it did not mention a savings clause found in the proposed measure which allowed for the imposition of fees that may be triggered by a person’s death.

12011–2011
Whitsett v. Kroger green
or · 2010
1 sentence

2011Id. at 249 . 3 Petitioners also argue that the caption is inadequate because it does not mention a savings clause in the proposed measure that allows for the imposition of fees on probate and other transactions that may be triggered by a person’s death.

12011–2011
McMullen v. Volkswagen of America green
or · 1976
2 sentences

1995Although the parties dispute the effect of the savings clause, and marshal massive authority from other jurisdictions supporting their positions, 2 plaintiff argues that McMullen v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or 83 , 545 P2d 117 (1976), is controlling and compels reversal.

1995Although the parties dispute the effect of the savings clause, and marshal massive authority from other jurisdictions supporting their positions, 2 plaintiff argues that McMullen v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or 83 , 545 P2d 117 (1976), is controlling and compels reversal.

11995–1995
State of Oregon v. Moore green
or · 1951
2 sentences

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

11992–1992
Trueblood v. HEALTH DIV., DEPT. OF HUMAN RES. neutral
orctapp · 1977
2 sentences

1992Trueblood v. Health Division, 28 Or App 433 , 559 P2d 931 , rev den 278 Or 621 (1977).

1992Trueblood v. Health Division, 28 Or App 433 , 559 P2d 931 , rev den 278 Or 621 (1977).

11992–1992
State v. Twilleager neutral
orctapp · 1974
2 sentences

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

1992See also State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 702 , 281 P2d 698 (1955), overruled on different grounds by City of Klamath Falls v. Winters, 289 Or 757, 781 , 619 P2d 217 (1980) (“the statutory provision specifying the punishment for the doing of specific acts constitutes an integral part of the crime itself’); State v. Moore, 192 Or 39, 45 , 233 P2d 253 (1951) (savings clauses in criminal codes “are declarative of a continuing policy of the state that the repeal of any statute shall not release or extinguish any liability incurred or affect any right accrued”); State v. Twilleager, 18 Or App 182 , 524

11992–1992
Smith v. Clackamas County green
or · 1969
2 sentences

1981The court reviewed the enactment's savings clause and noted: "The wording of Section 3 of the amending law brings into conflict two concepts frequently considered as guides to statutory construction: (1) statutes are presumed to be prospective, and will be considered to be retrospective only when *652 such intent is clearly spelled out; and (2) the inclusion of specific matters tends to imply a legislative intent to exclude related matters not mentioned." 252 Or. at 233 , 448 P.2d 512 .

1981The court reviewed the enactment’s savings clause and noted: "The wording of Section 3 of the amending law brings into conflict two concepts frequently considered as guides to statutory construction: (1) statutes are presumed to be prospective, and will be considered to be retrospective only when such intent is clearly spelled out; and (2) the inclusion of specific matters tends to imply a legislative intent to exclude related matters not mentioned.” 252 Or at 233 .

11981–1981
Shapiro v. Thompson green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

11975–1975
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County green
scotus · 1974
2 sentences

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

11975–1975
Dunn v. Blumstein green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

1975The plaintiffs assert that the Oregon legislature must have intended to respect the adjustment in basis which the Illinois court found in Thorpe v. Mahin, supra. It is also argued that not to recognize Illinois’ basis in property would be a violation of equal protection and a burden upon the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 US 250 , 94 S Ct 1076 , 39 L Ed2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US 330 , 92 S Ct 995 , 31 L Ed2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 , 89 S Ct 1322 , 22 L Ed2d 600 (1969).

11975–1975
Koshkonong v. Burton green
scotus · 1882
1 sentence

1945Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668 ; Sohn v. Watterson, 17 Wall 596; McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or. 31 .

11945–1945
McLaughlin v. Hoover green
or · 1853
1 sentence

1945Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668 ; Sohn v. Watterson, 17 Wall 596; McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or. 31 .

11945–1945

Where else courts name it

CA 211 (1947–2026) TX 172 (1947–2025) IL 112 (1952–2023) IN 72 (1971–2026) NY 57 (1946–2026) CT 51 (1985–2025) PA 44 (1953–2025) MS 44 (1958–2024) WA 40 (1971–2026) FL 40 (1979–2026) OH 31 (1966–2025) LA 26 (1941–2021) NJ 21 (1942–2023) IA 21 (1972–2022) MA 20 (1982–2015) MO 20 (1970–2022) AZ 19 (1969–2014) SC 18 (1986–2013) NM 17 (1942–2026) MN 17 (1977–2018) AL 17 (1981–2018) DC 15 (1976–2024) MI 15 (1968–2025) KS 14 (1960–2012) OR 14 (1945–2025) DE 13 (1964–2024) OK 13 (1977–2022) MT 12 (1964–2019) RI 11 (1969–2015) NE 11 (1983–2022) MD 10 (1972–2016) VT 10 (1995–2015) WY 9 (1980–2021) AR 9 (1944–2016) WV 9 (1975–2012) WI 9 (1993–2026) CO 8 (1982–2025) AK 8 (1980–2024) GA 8 (1986–2008) HI 8 (1971–2024) NC 8 (1975–2024) TN 8 (1962–2010) ME 7 (1972–2012) VA 7 (1985–2023) KY 6 (2004–2020) UT 6 (1931–2021) NV 5 (1975–2024) NH 5 (2002–2014) ID 3 (1980–2024) ND 2 (1987–2006) MP 2 (1985–1985)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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