112 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Coegreen2 sentences2021“In the absence of a general savings clause or a savings clause within the repealing act, the effect of the repeal of a statute ‘is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Coe, 2017 IL App (1st) 161910, ¶ 9 (quoting Isenstein v. Rosewell, 106 Ill. 2d 301, 310 (1985)). 2018U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Coe , 2017 IL App (1st) 161910 , ¶ 19, 420 Ill.Dec. 782 , 98 N.E.3d 399 ; see also Coe , 2017 IL App (1st) 161910 , ¶ 13, 420 Ill.Dec. 782 , 98 N.E.3d 399 (finding that section 15-1502.5 was a special remedial statute without a savings clause and "it follows that, '[t]he unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them. | 3 | 3 |
cluster 760817green2 sentences2007See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 165 F.3d 341 , 347-49 (5th Cir. 1999) (Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains no clear statement providing for preemption of local franchising authority over providers of open video system services). 2007See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 165 F.3d 341 , 347-49 (5th Cir. 1999) (Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains no clear statement providing for preemption of local franchising authority over providers of open video system services). | 3 | 3 |
Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporationgreen2 sentences1999See also Wood v. General Motors Corp. , 865 F.2d 395, 415-16 (1st Cir. 1988). 1992Ct. App. 1986), 487 So. 2d 360 ; see also Wood v. General Motors Corp. (1st Cir. 1988), 865 F.2d 395 , 402 n.10 (court suggests National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which has similar savings clause, does not prohibit State tort action against manufacturer for defective design of installed airbag).) The savings clause (section 4311(g)) has not been applied to find a manufacturer liable for not installing a device it had a choice not to install. | 3 | 3 |
Ogdon v. Gianakosgreen2 sentences1998Ogdon v. Gianakos , 415 Ill. 591, 597 , 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 (1953). 1963Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591 .) But this general rule is not ordinarily applied to statutes which relate, merely to remedies and forms ..of procedure and which do not affect substantive rights, (Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. Industrial Com. 378 Ill. 203 .) Where a statute giving a special remedy is amended without a savings clause, in favor of pending actions, all actions affected must be decided in conformity to the law then existing, both in the trial and Appellate Courts, without regard to whether the actions accrued before or after such change, or whether action had been previously institu | 2 | 3 |
S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexandergreen2 sentences2022Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill.2d 489, 497 (1998) (citing Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338 (1988)). ¶ 33 Joseph Ventrella filed his counterclaim to rescind the conveyances to Property Dynamics in chancery case 15 CH 9589. 2013Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 497 (1998) (citing Gendek v. Jenhangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343-44 (1988)). ¶ 23 The trial court in BankFinancial II expressly found the dismissal of count I of BankFinancial I did not constitute an involuntary dismissal of an action and, therefore, found inapplicable Rule 273, pertaining to the effect of an involuntary dismissal. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Boclairgreen2 sentences2017See Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99 . ¶ 21 The State, by contrast, argues that if a petition is not reinstated within one year after being withdrawn, the savings clause does not apply, and the petition must be treated as a successive petition. 2016See Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99 . ¶ 21 The State, by contrast, argues that if a petition is not reinstated within one year after being withdrawn, the savings clause does not apply, and the petition must be treated as a successive petition. | 2 | 2 |
FIRST NAT'L BK. OF JOLIET v. Hampsongreen2 sentences2010See Hampson, 88 Ill. 2010See Hampson, 88 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Glissongreen2 sentences2008Section 4 of the savings clause prohibits “construing a new statute to affect penalties, punishments, or rights accrued.” People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07 , 782 N.E.2d 251, 256 (2002); 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006). 2008Section 4 of the savings clause prohibits “construing a new statute to affect penalties, punishments, or rights accrued.” People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07 , 782 N.E.2d 251, 256 (2002); 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006). | 2 | 2 |
Clean Air Markets Group v. Patakigreen2 sentences2006See Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts New York Air Pollution Mitigation Law and reasoning that the Clean Air Act's savings clause does not permit one state to control emissions in another state); United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts a federal common law claim of nuisance and reasoning in part that the similarities between the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act allow the interpretations of one act to be applied to comparable provisions of the other). 2006See Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts New York Air Pollution Mitigation Law and reasoning that the Clean Air Act’s savings clause does not permit one state to control emissions in another state); United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding that the Clean Air Act preempts a federal common law claim of nuisance and reasoning in part that the similarities between the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act allow the interpretations of one act to be applied to comparable provisions of the other). | 2 | 2 |
| Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committeegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Robert L. McCord and Oswald Simon v. Dixie Aviation Corporationgreen | 2 | 2 |
Maiter v. Chicago Board of Educationgreen2 sentences1995Accordingly, rules of procedure, including rebuttable presumptions, may be changed by the legislature and applied retroactively, unless there is a savings clause as to existing litigation, without offending any constitutional prohibition. ( Maiter, 82 Ill.2d at 390 , 47 Ill.Dec. 721 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 ; Illinois Public Aid Comm'n v. Brauer (1957), 11 Ill.2d 416, 419 , 142 N.E.2d 789 .) The Nathans' constitutional challenge must therefore be rejected. 1995Accordingly, rules of procedure, including rebuttable presumptions, may be changed by the legislature and applied retroactively, unless there is a savings clause as to existing litigation, without offending any constitutional prohibition. ( Maiter, 82 Ill.2d at 390 , 47 Ill.Dec. 721 , 415 N.E.2d 1034 ; Illinois Public Aid Comm'n v. Brauer (1957), 11 Ill.2d 416, 419 , 142 N.E.2d 789 .) The Nathans' constitutional challenge must therefore be rejected. | 1 | 10 |
Hogan v. Bleekergreen2 sentences2021Id. ¶ 9; see also Hogan v. Bleeker, 29 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1963) (“Where a statute giving a special remedy is amended without a savings clause in favor of pending actions, all actions affected must be decided in conformity to the law then existing, both in the trial and [a]ppellate [c]ourts, without regard to whether the actions accrued before or after such change, or whether action had been previously instituted.”). 1989As stated by the Hogan court: “Where a statute giving a special remedy is amended without a savings clause in favor of pending actions, all actions affected must be decided in conformity to the law then existing, both in the trial and Appellate Courts, without regard to whether the actions accrued before or after such change, or whether action had been previously instituted.” ( 29 Ill. 2d at 184-85 .) In our view, this exception is equally applicable to rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative body pursuant to authority delegated by the legislature. | 1 | 5 |
Gendek v. Jehangirgreen2 sentences2022Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill.2d 489, 497 (1998) (citing Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338 (1988)). ¶ 33 Joseph Ventrella filed his counterclaim to rescind the conveyances to Property Dynamics in chancery case 15 CH 9589. 2013Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 497 (1998) (citing Gendek v. Jenhangir, 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343-44 (1988)). ¶ 23 The trial court in BankFinancial II expressly found the dismissal of count I of BankFinancial I did not constitute an involuntary dismissal of an action and, therefore, found inapplicable Rule 273, pertaining to the effect of an involuntary dismissal. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2019App. 3d at 909 (quoting People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 270 (2000)))—similarly provides that the circuit court may, “ ‘in its discretion,’ ” enter an order allowing various amendatory and filing options “ ‘as is generally provided in civil cases’ ” (id. at 908 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2004))). 2018App. 3d at 909 , 319 Ill.Dec. 534 , 885 N.E.2d 1214 (quoting People v. Johnson , 191 Ill. 2d 257 , 270, 246 Ill.Dec. 642 , 730 N.E.2d 1107 (2000) ) )-similarly, provides that the circuit court may, " 'in its discretion,' " enter an order allowing various amendatory and filing options " 'as is generally provided in civil cases' " ( id. at 908, 319 Ill.Dec. 534 , 885 N.E.2d 1214 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2004) ) ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. McCluregreen2 sentences2019Indeed, these provisions are not mutually exclusive: a limitations period and a savings clause can exist simultaneously without creating a contradiction.” Id. at 388. ¶ 26 The appellate court in English noted that the Act—the proceedings of which are also “ ‘civil in nature’ ” (English, 381 Ill. 2018Indeed, these provisions are not mutually exclusive: a limitations period and a savings clause can exist simultaneously without creating a contradiction." Id. at 388 , 300 Ill.Dec. 50 , 843 N.E.2d 308 . ¶ 26 The appellate court in English , noted that the Act-the proceedings of which are also " 'civil in nature' " ( English , 381 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Manzogreen2 sentences2018Section 1640(e) provides a savings clause for untimely claims: “This subsection does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except as otherwise provided by State law.” Id. ¶ 31 This provision allows a borrower to bring an untimely TILA damages claim if it is brought as a defensive recoupment or set-off, “except as otherwise provided by State law.” Id.; U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Manzo, 201 2018Section 1640(e) provides a savings clause for untimely claims: "This subsection does not bar a person from asserting a violation of this subchapter in an action to collect the debt which was brought more than one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off in such action, except as otherwise provided by State law." Id. ¶ 31 This provision allows a borrower to bring an untimely TILA damages claim if it is brought as a defensive recoupment or set-off, "except as otherwise provided by State law." Id. ; U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Manzo , 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Isenstein v. Rosewellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flynn v. Allis Chalmers Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Eagle Marine Industries, Inc. v. Union Pacific Railroadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Csx Transportation, Inc. v. City of Plymouth, Michigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Thorsbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas A. Donelon, Charles J. Eagan, Jr. v. New Orleans Terminal Company and Federal Railroad Administration of the Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hines v. Davidowitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Show of Shows, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Champaign County, 117 Ill. 1985App. 3d 76 , 452 N.E.2d 847 , dealt with the repeal of a savings clause contained in an amended statute of limitations, which repeal instantaneously barred a cause of action which the savings clause had kept alive. | 7 | 1985–2014 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2005The Court concluded “the savings clause foresees — it does not foreclose — the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre[ ]empt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 870 , 146 L. 2005The Court concluded “the savings clause foresees — it does not foreclose — the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre[ ]empt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts.” Geier, 529 U.S. at 870 , 146 L. | 4 | 2001–2005 |
Sostak v. Sostak
green
2 sentences1989Stat. 1987, ch. 111 1/2, par. 151.2. 1, 2 A presumption exists that an amendatory act is only intended to apply prospectively. ( Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 (1988), 122 Ill.2d 303, 309 .) This presumption is rebuttable only if the act clearly indicates either by express language or necessary implication that the legislature intended a retroactive application. ( Rivard, 122 Ill.2d at 309 .) The presumption does not apply, however, to changes in procedure or remedies. ( 122 Ill.2d at 310 .) If an amendatory act merely affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of 1985It is clear, however, that where an amendment is remedial in nature, all rights of action thereunder will be enforceable under the new procedure, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law or whether suit had been instituted or not, unless there is a savings clause as to existing litigation. ( Sostak v. Sostak (1983), 113 Ill. | 4 | 1985–1989 |
Landgraf v. USI Film Products
green
2 sentences2017The State based its argument on the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001). 2016The State based its argument on the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001). | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector
green
2 sentences2017The State based its argument on the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001). 2016The State based its argument on the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27 (2001). | 3 | 2016–2017 |
People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard
green
2 sentences2017As a result of this savings clause, the court made clear that “an Illinois court will never need to go beyond step one of the Landgraf test.” Id. ¶ 61 Noting both that nothing in the text of the amendment to section 5-130 itself indicates its temporal reach and that the effective date of January 1, 2016, was not expressly chosen by the legislature but applied by default, pursuant to the Effective Date of Laws Act (5 ILCS 75/1(a) (West 2014)), the Howard court determined that the general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes applied. 2017As a result of this savings clause, the court made clear that “an Illinois court will never need to go beyond step one of the Landgraf test.” Id. ¶ 61 Noting both that nothing in the text of the amendment to section 5-130 itself indicates its temporal reach and that the effective date of January 1, 2016, was not expressly chosen by the legislature but applied by default, pursuant to the Effective Date of Laws Act (5 ILCS 75/1(a) (West 2014)), the Howard court determined that the general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes applied. | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Consiglio v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation
green
2 sentences2015We reject this argument and agree with the appellate court that the Act’s reliance on convictions predating its enactment does not render it retroactive as that term has been defined in case law. 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 15 . 2014We reject this argument and agree with the appellate court that the Act’s reliance on convictions predating its enactment does not render it retroactive as that term has been defined in case law. 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 15 . | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Matayka v. Melia
green
2 sentences1988App. 3d 221 , 456 N.E.2d 353 .) However, this court also recognized that when a statute of limitations which shortens the period in which to bring an action is enacted without a savings clause, justice requires that the owner of a cause of action which is barred by the current statute be afforded a reasonable time after its effective date in which to bring his action. 1988Under the facts of Matayka, specifically the “plaintiff’s long standing knowledge of the defects and the defendant’s obvious unwillingness to perform,” the court found plaintiff’s claim barred due to her unreasonable delay in filing suit. 119 Ill. | 3 | 1988–1988 |
Songer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1984Both versions provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees '*** as part of the taxable costs in the action ***.’ [Citations.] It has been held that there is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure, and statutory amendments affecting procedural rights, including recovery of costs and attorney’s fees, should be applied in litigation instituted prior to the amendment, in the absence of a savings clause pertaining to existing litigation.” ( 91 Ill. 1984Both versions provide for the recovery of attorney's fees `* * * as part of the taxable costs in the action * * *.' [Citations.] It has been held that there is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure, and statutory amendments affecting procedural rights, including recovery of costs and attorney's fees, should be applied in litigation instituted prior to the amendment, in the absence of a savings clause pertaining to existing litigation." ( 91 Ill. | 3 | 1983–1984 |
People v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2023The State argues that when putting aside the explicit reasons for prospective application, we should look no further than our supreme court’s decision in Richardson in disposing of defendant’s equal protection challenge. ¶ 44 In Richardson, 2015 IL 118255 , ¶¶ 3-4, the defendant asserted an equal protection challenge to the savings clause of amended section 5-120 (705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp. 2013)) because the legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 - 16 - ILCS 405/1 et seq. 2016People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255 , ¶ 3. | 2 | 2016–2023 |
People v. English
green
2 sentences2019Indeed, these provisions are not mutually exclusive: a limitations period and a savings clause can exist simultaneously without creating a contradiction.” Id. at 388. ¶ 26 The appellate court in English noted that the Act—the proceedings of which are also “ ‘civil in nature’ ” (English, 381 Ill. 2018Indeed, these provisions are not mutually exclusive: a limitations period and a savings clause can exist simultaneously without creating a contradiction." Id. at 388 , 300 Ill.Dec. 50 , 843 N.E.2d 308 . ¶ 26 The appellate court in English , noted that the Act-the proceedings of which are also " 'civil in nature' " ( English , 381 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Mt. Vernon Memorial Estates, Inc. v. Wood
neutral
2 sentences2018Vernon Memorial Estates, Inc. v. Wood, 88 Ill. 2018Vernon Memorial Estates, Inc. v. Wood , 88 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Starnes
green
2 sentences2008However, "procedural changes, even those which work to the disadvantage of a defen- - 8 - dant, may be applied retroactively if they do not create a new offense or increase punishment." People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. 2008However, “procedural changes, even those which work to the disadvantage of a defendant, may be applied retroactively if they do not create a new offense or increase punishment.” People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Muskat v. Sternberg
green
2 sentences2007Neither of respondent’s cited cases, Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41 , 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 , 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996), involve amended statutes containing a savings clause. 2007Neither of respondent’s cited cases, Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41 , 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 , 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996), involve amended statutes containing a savings clause. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Nitz
green
2 sentences2007Neither of respondent’s cited cases, Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41 , 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 , 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996), involve amended statutes containing a savings clause. 2007Neither of respondent’s cited cases, Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41 , 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 , 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996), involve amended statutes containing a savings clause. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Moore green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Estate of Rice v. Universal Scheduling Co. green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| Joan Carstensen v. Brunswick Corporation, Mercury Marine Corporation, and Sea Ray Boats, Inc. green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Geier, Alexis v. Amer Honda Mtr Co green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Anne Duffy Pokorny, Administratrix of the Estate of John Duffy, Deceased v. Ford Motor Company green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| cluster 764893 green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Dardeen v. Heartland Manor, Inc. green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| Department of Public Aid ex rel. Evans v. Lively green | 2 | 1996–1996 |
| Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 green | 2 | 1989–1992 |
| Kim v. Kim green | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| Freddie F. Davis v. State of Georgia green | 2 | 1985–1990 |
| Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education green | 2 | 1985–1990 |
| Nelson v. Miller green | 2 | 1983–1987 |
| The PEOPLE v. Bilderback green | 2 | 1965–1986 |
| Board of Managers of Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. green | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Balzer v. Inland Steel Co. green | 2 | 1983–1985 |
| People v. Frieder green | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| People Ex Rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer green | 2 | 1952–1975 |
| People v. Grant green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| US BANK NAT. ASS'N v. Manzo green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. McClure green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. English green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.