savings clause in California

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2024(Buycks, at p. 881 [discussing Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 ].) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.’ ” (Buycks, at p. 881.) The People concede that Assembly Bill No. 2361 applies retroactively to the instant case pursuant to Estrada, supra, 63 C

2021(AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 339 [ 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 ] (Concepcion).) Section 2 of the FAA—its primary substantive provision—states in relevant part: “A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” ( 9 U.S.C. § 2 .) The final clause of section 2, the FAA’s savings

2021(AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 339 [ 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 ] (Concepcion).) Section 2 of the FAA—its primary substantive provision—states in relevant part: “A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” ( 9 U.S.C. § 2 .) The final clause of section 2, the FAA’s savings

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2023Rodriguez does not apply here because all three cases were originally sentenced together with a 4 In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada) [ameliorative changes in sentencing laws are intended to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which include “acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final”]; see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 881 (Buycks) [“The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerni

2023Dowhal held that although section 379r’s savings clause excludes Proposition 65 from express preemption, the clause “does not entirely exclude conflict preemption,” that is, impossibility or obstacle preemption. ( Dowhal, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 923–924, 926.) Dowhal determined that Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., supra, 529 U.S. 861 “established a general rule upholding conflict preemption even if the applicable federal law contains a savings clause” exempting a state requirement from express preemption.

2023(Dowhal, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) Thus, an FDA requirement can preempt a Proposition 65 warning only “on a basis relevant to consumer health, and not because the [warning] would frustrate the FDA’s policy favoring national uniformity.” (Ibid.) The Attorney General claims that under Dowhal, Proposition 65 cannot be preempted in this case unless there is “a conflict, relevant to consumer health, between providing a Proposition 65 cancer warning for NDMA exposure . . . and the FDA’s regulation of the[] products under the FDCA.” He argues that the federal duty of sameness “serves the FDCA’s

2023Dowhal held that although section 379r’s savings clause excludes Proposition 65 from express preemption, the clause “does not entirely exclude conflict preemption,” that is, impossibility or obstacle preemption. ( Dowhal, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 923–924, 926.) Dowhal determined that Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., supra, 529 U.S. 861 “established a general rule upholding conflict preemption even if the applicable federal law contains a savings clause” exempting a state requirement from express preemption.

2021(Sprietsma, at pp. 58, 63-64.) The court in Roberts explained, “Sprietsma held that the clause reached only positive state enactments and grounded its holding on three points: (1) ‘[T]he article “a” before “law or regulation” implies a discreteness—which is embodied in statutes and regulations—that is not present in the common law’ (Sprietsma, at p. 63); (2) the word ‘law’ in ‘law or regulation’ ‘might . . . be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the express reference to “regulation” . . . superfluous’ (ibid.); and (3) the existence of the savings clause, which exists to ‘“s

2021Although ordinarily new statutes are presumed to operate prospectively (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287 ), “ ‘in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, “a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” ’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699 ; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 ; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 7 784, 790

2018Under such circumstances, we presume that newly enacted legislation mitigating criminal punishment reflects a determination that the “former penalty 16 was too severe” and that the ameliorative changes are intended to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which would include those “acts committed before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention

2020(See Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 932-936 [concluding that both the Water Board and the Department of Forestry could regulate water quality impacts of proposed timber harvest, noting that “overlapping jurisdiction” is “an uncontroversial concept under our law even absent a savings clause”].) Indeed, the statutory scheme reflects that the Legislature intended an overlap in regulatory authority and for the Council to work and coordinate its actions with all agencies having responsibilities in the Delta, including the Water Board.

2020(See Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 932-936 [concluding that both the Water Board and the Department of Forestry could regulate water quality impacts of proposed timber harvest, noting that “overlapping jurisdiction” is “an uncontroversial concept under our law even absent a savings clause”].) Indeed, the statutory scheme reflects that the Legislature intended an overlap in regulatory authority and for the Council to work and coordinate its actions with all agencies having responsibilities in the Delta, including the Water Board.

1991(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ].) But here there was a savings clause in the amending legislation.

1991(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ].) But here there was a savings clause in the amending legislation.

2022In People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646 , at pages 655 to 656, our Supreme Court discussed the effect of a savings clause on Estrada’s holding: “In Estrada, we considered the retroactive application of a statutory amendment that reduced the punishment prescribed for the offense of escape without force or violence. ‘The problem,’ we explained, ‘is one of trying to ascertain the legislative intent—did the Legislature intend the old or new statute to apply?

2022(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747; see People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 184-188 .)” The Conley court further observed: “[W]e have since 20 made clear that . . . such express statements unquestionably suffice to override the Estrada presumption.” (People v. Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 656 .) In People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , at pages 881 to 882, our Supreme Court again clarified: “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative bod

2020Under Estrada, “an amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute’s effective date.” (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 184 ; see also In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761 , 762–763; People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 , 323–324.) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as br

2016Second, defendant argues that pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), he is entitled to a presumption of retroactivity, notwithstanding section 3, which specifies no portion of the Penal Code “is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” He contends Estrada sets forth the following rule: “[U]nless there is a savings clause, a defendant is generally entitled to the benefit of a more recent statute mitigating the punishment for the offense.” As noted, section 3 specifies no part of the Penal Code “is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” Estrada did set forth a qualific

2006(To do so would effectively negate its application to ‘all injuries,’ contrary to the specific intent of the Legislature.)” (Abney, supra, at p. 1557.) In Abney, the WCAB also noted that section 49 of Bill No. 899 regarding urgency legislation “supports the application of the new section 5814 remedy to cases where the alleged unreasonable delay or refusal to pay compensation occurred prior to the June 1, 2004 operative date.” (Abney, supra, at p. 1558.) Abney also properly relies on the statutory repeal rule, stating that “[i]t is well settled that where a right or a right of action depending

2006(To do so would effectively negate its application to ‘all injuries,’ contrary to the specific intent of the Legislature.)” (Abney, supra, at p. 1557.) In Abney, the WCAB also noted that section 49 of Bill No. 899 regarding urgency legislation “supports the application of the new section 5814 remedy to cases where the alleged unreasonable delay or refusal to pay compensation occurred prior to the June 1, 2004 operative date.” (Abney, supra, at p. 1558.) Abney also properly relies on the statutory repeal rule, stating that “[i]t is well settled that where a right or a right of action depending

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2021Like the laws at issue in [People v. Superior Court ([Lara]) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 ] and 5 [People v.] Frahs [(2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 ], Assembly Bill No. 1950 thus ameliorates possible punishment for a class of persons-felony probationers.” (Id. at p. ___ [pp. *26-27].) Because the Legislature did not include a savings clause or otherwise indicate it intended the two-year limitation to apply only prospectively, we concluded “the two-year limitation on felony probation set forth in Assembly Bill No. 1950 is an ameliorative change to the criminal law that is subject to the Estrada presumption of re

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2022In other words, defendant argues he is entitled to Senate Bill No. 81’s benefits because the bill’s amendments to section 1385 would significantly reduce his sentence from what was originally pronounced, and therefore the legislation “goes far beyond the threshold that triggers the Estrada rule, namely, providing ‘a possible ameliorating benefit for a class of persons.’ ” (Citing People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624 .) As we will explain, we conclude that the Legislature did not violate defendant’s rights to equal protection and due process by including a savings clause in Senate Bill No.

2021(Quinn, supra, at pp. *11–13.) Given our determination that the Estrada presumption of retroactivity applies, we do not reach this issue. 22 amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an express saving clause or its equivalent.” (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 .) Assembly Bill No. 1950 does not contain a savings clause evincing a clear intent to overcome the Estrada presumption of retroactivity.

2021(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 748 ; see id. at p. 744.) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 , 881–882 (Buycks), quoting People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 .) “‘The rule in Estrada has been appl

2021They took the extraordinary step of extending the retroactive benefits of the Act beyond the bounds contemplated by Estrada—including even prisoners serving final sentences within the Act’s ameliorative reach.” ( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 657-658.) In People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161 , the Court of Appeal noted, “[t]he Estrada rule does not apply to [Proposition 36’s recall provisions] because section 1170.126 operates as the functional equivalent of a savings clause.” (Id. at p. 172.).

2016The court of appeal rejected this argument and concluded that the resentencing process set forth in Proposition 36 operated as “the functional equivalent of a savings clause.” (Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 175 .) The court held the resentencing procedure required a petition for recall to be filed by any prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence under the former three strikes law.

2023For example, the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) contains a savings clause that preserves “liability at common law or under State law.” ( 46 U.S.C. § 4311 (h); see Sprietsma, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 63 .) Similarly, the savings clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 preserves, among other rights, any “common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.” ( 29 U.S.C. § 653 (b)(4).) The fact that Congress chose to identify on

2023For example, the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) contains a savings clause that preserves “liability at common law or under State law.” ( 46 U.S.C. § 4311 (h); see Sprietsma, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 63 .) Similarly, the savings clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 preserves, among other rights, any “common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.” ( 29 U.S.C. § 653 (b)(4).) The fact that Congress chose to identify on

2023Historically, California courts have held that, pursuant to Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 , “(i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) “ ‘The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, “a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the cri

2021Although ordinarily new statutes are presumed to operate prospectively (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287 ), “ ‘in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, “a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.” ’ ” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 699 ; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 ; People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 7 784, 790

2026As we explained in Pasadena: “Generally speaking, a savings clause preserves some preexisting legal authority from the effect of some newly enacted legal authority that contains the savings clause. ‘Saving clauses are usually strictly construed.’ ” (City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 195 ; accord, Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231 [“savings clauses . . . ‘ “are usually strictly construed” ’ ”].) “ ‘[C]ourts have refused to interpret savings clauses in a manner that would authorize activity that directly conflicts with the statutory scheme containing

2025“Generally speaking, a savings clause preserves some preexisting legal authority from the effect of some newly enacted legal authority that contains the savings clause. ‘Saving clauses are usually strictly construed.’ ” (City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 195 ; accord, Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231 [“savings clauses . . . ‘are usually strictly construed’ ”].) “ ‘[C]ourts have refused to interpret savings clauses in a manner that would authorize activity that 63 directly conflicts with the statutory scheme containing the savings clause.’ ” (Coyne,

2021(See People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 70 [“Absent a savings clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law that occurs during the pendency of his or her appeal”].) In Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 , our Supreme Court instructed that when the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen a punishment, “[i]t is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing a new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which includes “acts committed b

2018Under such circumstances, we presume that newly enacted legislation mitigating criminal punishment reflects a determination that the “former penalty 16 was too severe” and that the ameliorative changes are intended to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which would include those “acts committed before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention

2020(Ibid.) A statutory amendment imposing lighter punishment generally operates retroactively (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 ), and in the absence of a savings clause, the repeal of a criminal statute prevents charging a person with a statutory crime (People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 ).

2019(In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 (Estrada); People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 304 ; People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 212 [repeal of criminal statute without a savings clause terminates all criminal prosecutions not reduced to final judgment].) Defendant argues this issue is controlled by People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 (Nasalga), in which our Supreme Court determined that the defendant, whose conviction was not yet final, 38 was entitled to the benefit of the reduced sentence enhancement of the 1992 amendment to section 12022.6, which became operative after the defen

2025(McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 961 .) The fact that the waiver was included in an arbitration agreement does not render it valid, as the McGill Court explained: The FAA places arbitration agreements “ ‘on an equal footing with other contracts’ ” and requires such agreements to be enforced “ ‘according to their terms.’ ” (McGill, at pp. 961–962.) However, this requirement is qualified by the FAA’s savings clause, which permits courts to declare arbitration agreements unenforceable “ ‘ “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” ’ ” (McGill, at 10 p. 962

2022Nor did they make any effort to register the name (by filing a one-page statement) until more than a year later, during the pendency of this appeal. 20 California Supreme Court explained in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 962 , the savings clause in section 2 “‘indicates’ that Congress’s ‘purpose’ in enacting the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” (Quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12 ; accord, Patterson v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 473 , 491; see Ting v. AT&T (9th Cir. 2

2026As we explained in Pasadena: “Generally speaking, a savings clause preserves some preexisting legal authority from the effect of some newly enacted legal authority that contains the savings clause. ‘Saving clauses are usually strictly construed.’ ” (City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 195 ; accord, Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231 [“savings clauses . . . ‘ “are usually strictly construed” ’ ”].) “ ‘[C]ourts have refused to interpret savings clauses in a manner that would authorize activity that directly conflicts with the statutory scheme containing

2025“Generally speaking, a savings clause preserves some preexisting legal authority from the effect of some newly enacted legal authority that contains the savings clause. ‘Saving clauses are usually strictly construed.’ ” (City of Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 170, 195 ; accord, Coyne, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1231 [“savings clauses . . . ‘are usually strictly construed’ ”].) “ ‘[C]ourts have refused to interpret savings clauses in a manner that would authorize activity that 63 directly conflicts with the statutory scheme containing the savings clause.’ ” (Coyne,

2025(See In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–748 (Estrada).) When a new or amendatory statute “mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the [statute] will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id. at p. 748.) More specifically, “[w]hen new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) “The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providi

2023Historically, California courts have held that, pursuant to Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740 , “(i) in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, (ii) legislation that ameliorates punishment (iii) applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 675 .) “ ‘The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention concerning any retroactive effect, “a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the cri

2018Under such circumstances, we presume that newly enacted legislation mitigating criminal punishment reflects a determination that the “former penalty 16 was too severe” and that the ameliorative changes are intended to “apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply,” which would include those “acts committed before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745 .) The Estrada rule rests on the presumption that, in the absence of a savings clause providing only prospective relief or other clear intention

1994(See People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 702 P.2d 205 ]; People v. Vasquez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 763 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 255 ] [absent savings clause, defendant entitled to such benefit of a change in the law occurring during pendency of an appeal].) The amendment in this case benefits defendant since the enhancement can no longer be imposed for his offense within 1,000 feet of a school unless it is proven that the violation occurred in a public area or in a business establishment where minors are legally permitted to conduct business.