savings clause in Arizona

1997The effect of *117 the savings clause is strengthened by the presumption, acknowledged in Myrick , that when a statute addresses preemption its text defines preemptive reach and “implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.” See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288 , 115 S.Ct. at 1488 , quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).

1997The effect of *117 the savings clause is strengthened by the presumption, acknowledged in Myrick , that when a statute addresses preemption its text defines preemptive reach and “implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.” See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288 , 115 S.Ct. at 1488 , quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 , 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2618 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).

2014Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 , 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2337 , 168 L.Ed.2d 28 (2007), and an interpretation of the Part C preemption provision as preempting only positive enactments would contradict the provision’s broad language referring to any state law. ¶25 Further, unlike the FBSA, Medicare Part C does not include a savings clause to save common law claims from preemption.

2014Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 , 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2337 , 168 L.Ed.2d 28 (2007), and an interpretation of the Part C preemption provision as preempting only positive enactments would contradict the provision’s broad language referring to any state law. ¶25 Further, unlike the FBSA, Medicare Part C does not include a savings clause to save common law claims from preemption.

2014Decision of the Court burden of proving circumstances justifying relief under the savings statute, the superior court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying his request.6 See Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86 , 89, 859 P.2d 196 , 199 (App. 1993) (holding that an order denying relief under the savings clause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). ¶14 Although Eastwood admitted to having received the Order, he also argues that the Order provided him with insufficient notice of the “consequences of failing to file a Motion to Set.”7 Eastwood re

2014Decision of the Court burden of proving circumstances justifying relief under the savings statute, the superior court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying his request.6 See Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86 , 89, 859 P.2d 196 , 199 (App. 1993) (holding that an order denying relief under the savings clause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). ¶14 Although Eastwood admitted to having received the Order, he also argues that the Order provided him with insufficient notice of the “consequences of failing to file a Motion to Set.”7 Eastwood re

2014Decision of the Court burden of proving circumstances justifying relief under the savings statute, the superior court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying his request.6 See Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86 , 89, 859 P.2d 196 , 199 (App. 1993) (holding that an order denying relief under the savings clause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). ¶14 Although Eastwood admitted to having received the Order, he also argues that the Order provided him with insufficient notice of the “consequences of failing to file a Motion to Set.”7 Eastwood re

2014Decision of the Court burden of proving circumstances justifying relief under the savings statute, the superior court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying his request.6 See Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum & Exposition Ctr., 176 Ariz. 86 , 89, 859 P.2d 196 , 199 (App. 1993) (holding that an order denying relief under the savings clause is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). ¶14 Although Eastwood admitted to having received the Order, he also argues that the Order provided him with insufficient notice of the “consequences of failing to file a Motion to Set.”7 Eastwood re

2003The second refile on March 27, 2002 is not allowable under any application of the six-month ‘savings clause.’ ” ¶ 5 Relying on this court’s decisions in Johnson and Uhlig v. Lindberg, 189 Ariz. 480 , 943 P.2d 840 (App.1997), the respondent judge denied the state’s subsequent appeal in an order stating that, because the state had “re-filed the [charges] ... within the one-year statute of limitations period[,] ... the savings clause has no application to the State’s later dismissal outside the státute of limitations.” However, Johnson and Uhlig actually compel the opposite conclusion. ¶ 6 In Joh

2003The second refile on March 27, 2002 is not allowable under any application of the six-month ‘savings clause.’ ” ¶ 5 Relying on this court’s decisions in Johnson and Uhlig v. Lindberg, 189 Ariz. 480 , 943 P.2d 840 (App.1997), the respondent judge denied the state’s subsequent appeal in an order stating that, because the state had “re-filed the [charges] ... within the one-year statute of limitations period[,] ... the savings clause has no application to the State’s later dismissal outside the státute of limitations.” However, Johnson and Uhlig actually compel the opposite conclusion. ¶ 6 In Joh

2001The results in Gaddis, Harris, and this case also appear consistent with the Act's savings clause. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (e)(6) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for ... other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under [§ 1408(e)(1) or (e)(4)(B)]."). [8] Section 5301(a), 38 U.S.C., provides: "Payments of [VA disability] benefits ... shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and ... shall be exem

2001The results in Gaddis, Harris, and this case also appear consistent with the Act's savings clause. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (e)(6) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for ... other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the maximum amount permitted under [§ 1408(e)(1) or (e)(4)(B)]."). [8] Section 5301(a), 38 U.S.C., provides: "Payments of [VA disability] benefits ... shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and ... shall be exem

1997Further, as the dissent points out, the Supreme Court has held that a “presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations should be applied not only to determine whether Congress intended any preemption, but also to determine the scope of any express preemption.... [This] is ‘consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.’ ” Id., citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2249-50 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).

1997Further, as the dissent points out, the Supreme Court has held that a “presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations should be applied not only to determine whether Congress intended any preemption, but also to determine the scope of any express preemption.... [This] is ‘consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.’ ” Id., citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2249-50 , 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).

1994United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513, 520 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (courts have a duty to give effect to every clause in a statute, if possible).

1994United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513, 520 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (courts have a duty to give effect to every clause in a statute, if possible).

1994Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford Inc., 882 S.W.2d 149 (Mo.Ct.App.1994), transfer denied (the savings clause is a reliable indicium of congressional intent to save a common-law airbag claim).

1993A. Appellant argues that, because the legislature did not include a savings clause in the amendment to A.R.S. section 13-1410, the common law rule enunciated in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 , 84 S.Ct. 1814 , 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964), applies.

1993A. Appellant argues that, because the legislature did not include a savings clause in the amendment to A.R.S. section 13-1410, the common law rule enunciated in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 , 84 S.Ct. 1814 , 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964), applies.

1993In view of the clear analysis in Hall, 149 Ariz. at 130 , 717 P.2d at 434 , the statement in Brown Wholesale that "an action wholly dependent on the existence of a statute abates if the statute is repealed without a savings clause before judgment is final" is mere dictum and ought not control the result in this case.

1993In view of the clear analysis in Hall, 149 Ariz. at 130 , 717 P.2d at 434 , the statement in Brown Wholesale that "an action wholly dependent on the existence of a statute abates if the statute is repealed without a savings clause before judgment is final" is mere dictum and ought not control the result in this case.

1992Although not dispositive, the supreme court’s decision in Million, 120 Ariz. 10 , 583 P.2d 897 , supports the manner in which the state pursued its appeal in the present case.

1992Although not dispositive, the supreme court’s decision in Million, 120 Ariz. 10 , 583 P.2d 897 , supports the manner in which the state pursued its appeal in the present case.

1986Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 (1978); Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 239 Iowa 829 , 33 N.W.2d 569 (1948); Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry.

1986Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 (1978); Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 239 Iowa 829 , 33 N.W.2d 569 (1948); Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry.

1986Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 (1978); Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 239 Iowa 829 , 33 N.W.2d 569 (1948); Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry.

1986Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 (1978); Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 239 Iowa 829 , 33 N.W.2d 569 (1948); Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry.

1973A more recent Florida decision, Telservice Co., Inc. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667 (Fla.1969) has facts almost parallel to the case here involved.

1969We are, however, urged to reverse the trial court notwithstanding the absence of a savings clause to the FELA limitation period because of the United States Supreme Court case of Burnett v. New York Central Co., 380 U.S. 424 , 85 S.Ct. 1050 , 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965), which held: “ * * * [W]hen a plaintiff begins a timely FELA action in a state court having jurisdiction, and serves the defendant with process and plaintiff’s case is dismissed for improper venue, the FELA limitation is tolled during the pendency of the state suit.” 380 U.S. at 434-435 , 85 S.Ct. at 1058 .

1969We are, however, urged to reverse the trial court notwithstanding the absence of a savings clause to the FELA limitation period because of the United States Supreme Court case of Burnett v. New York Central Co., 380 U.S. 424 , 85 S.Ct. 1050 , 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965), which held: “ * * * [W]hen a plaintiff begins a timely FELA action in a state court having jurisdiction, and serves the defendant with process and plaintiff’s case is dismissed for improper venue, the FELA limitation is tolled during the pendency of the state suit.” 380 U.S. at 434-435 , 85 S.Ct. at 1058 .