savings clause in Pennsylvania

2025If the CAA preserves Pennsylvania’s right to use EHB appeals, I do not see why that right would not also fall under the NGA’s savings clause, absent a specific provision to the contrary. (continued…) [J-13A-2024, J-13B-2024, J-13C-2024 and J-13D-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 6 I add that the majority’s opinion harmonizes with the Third Circuit’s recent precedential opinion in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Pa. EHB, 108 F.4th 144 (3d.

2025If the CAA preserves Pennsylvania’s right to use EHB appeals, I do not see why that right would not also fall under the NGA’s savings clause, absent a specific provision to the contrary. (continued…) [J-13A-2024, J-13B-2024, J-13C-2024 and J-13D-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 6 I add that the majority’s opinion harmonizes with the Third Circuit’s recent precedential opinion in Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Pa. EHB, 108 F.4th 144 (3d.

1996Id. at 333-34 , 567 A.2d at 315 .

1996Id. at 333-34 , 567 A.2d at 315 .

1996See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (claim regarding failure to install antilock brakes in tractor-trailers not preempted); Pokorny, supra (claim regarding failure to install window netting not preempted); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir.1992) (claim regarding additional truck illumination equipment not preempted); Swope v. STI Transit Co., 796 F.Supp. 160 (E.D.Pa.1992) (claim regarding failure to place reflective tape on trailer not preempted).

1996See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1483 , 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995) (claim regarding failure to install antilock brakes in tractor-trailers not preempted); Pokorny, supra (claim regarding failure to install window netting not preempted); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir.1992) (claim regarding additional truck illumination equipment not preempted); Swope v. STI Transit Co., 796 F.Supp. 160 (E.D.Pa.1992) (claim regarding failure to place reflective tape on trailer not preempted).

2025To reject this “‘elective compensation’ [the parties] must carefully comply with the rejection procedures described in the Act in order to overcome the conclusive presumption of acceptance.” Id. [J-28-2024] - 6 According to the trial court, the savings clause was inapplicable, as Herold did not suffer from one of these enumerated occupational diseases.

2020This Court has explained that the defense of unconscionability has typically been construed to include procedural unconscionability, “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties,” as well as substantive unconscionability, “contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Kohlman v. Grane Healthcare Co., 228 A.3d 920 , 926 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

2018Zoning Hearing Bd. , 939 A.2d 430 , 435 (Pa. Commw. 2007) (rejecting Verizon's contention that construction of a cellphone tower was "similar to" a "public utility exemption" because it would "advance Verizon's ability to compete in a marketplace," and "there is an important difference between public and commercial benefits"). 14 Contrary to the Dissent's contention, we do not take the position that oil and gas drilling/development may never occur in a district unless a township amends its zoning ordinance to expressly allow the use, or that applicants may never seek a conditional use permit f

2018Instead, we hold only that in the present case, given the stark differences between the proposed use and those uses expressly allowed in the R-A district (including "public service facilities" and "essential services") as well as Inflection's failure to even attempt to breach this divide through the development of a factual record, the Board erred in granting a conditional use permit under the Ordinance's savings clause. 1 I also disagree with the majority's decision not to address the first issue we accepted for review in this appeal, i.e. , whether the Commonwealth Court's reinstatement of t

2018Instead, we hold only that in the present case, given the stark differences between the proposed use and those uses expressly allowed in the R-A district (including "public service facilities" and "essential services") as well as Inflection's failure to even attempt to breach this divide through the development of a factual record, the Board erred in granting a conditional use permit under the Ordinance's savings clause. 1 I also disagree with the majority's decision not to address the first issue we accepted for review in this appeal, i.e. , whether the Commonwealth Court's reinstatement of t

2017Taylor II, 147 A.3d at 510 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that bifurcation and piecemeal litigation is the tribute that must be paid to Congressional intent.”).7 The Supreme Court in Taylor II also opined: The only exception to a state’s obligation to enforce an arbitration agreement is provided by the savings clause, which permits the application of generally applicable state contract law defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, to ____________________________________________ 6 In our analysis, we expressed our “hesitation in the matter with respect to Taylor [I] as it appear

2016Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 , 109 S.Ct. 1917 , 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); Shearson/Am.

2016Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 , 109 S.Ct. 1917 , 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); Shearson/Am.

2016Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 ; Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.28 Pursuant to the savings clause, the compulsory joinder mandate of Rule 213(e) could bar the trial court from bifurcating the Taylors’ arbitrable survival action from its pending litigation in state court only if it qualifies as a generally applicable contract defense.

2016Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 ; Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 ; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 . 28 Pursuant to the savings clause, the compulsory joinder mandate of Rule 213(e) could bar the trial court from bifurcating the Taylors’ arbitrable survival action from its pending litigation in state court only if it qualifies as a generally applicable contract defense.

2016Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 ; Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.28 Pursuant to the savings clause, the compulsory joinder mandate of Rule 213(e) could bar the trial court from bifurcating the Taylors’ arbitrable survival action from its pending litigation in state court only if it qualifies as a generally applicable contract defense.

2016Casarotto clarified that, although states generally may regulate contracts, they may not decline to enforce arbitration agreements solely because they are arbitration agreements. 17 By striking down state laws targeting arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court has limited the role of state courts to regulating contracts to arbitrate under general contract law principles in accord with the savings clause, under which it has held that only “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravenin

2016Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 ; Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.28 Pursuant to the savings clause, the compulsory joinder mandate of Rule 213(e) could bar the trial court from bifurcating the Taylors’ arbitrable survival action from its pending litigation in state court only if it qualifies as a generally applicable contract defense.

2016Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 , 116 S.Ct. 1652 ; Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 , 109 S.Ct. 1248 ; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 . 28 Pursuant to the savings clause, the compulsory joinder mandate of Rule 213(e) could bar the trial court from bifurcating the Taylors’ arbitrable survival action from its pending litigation in state court only if it qualifies as a generally applicable contract defense.

2015In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Bangs, 393 A.2d 720 (Pa.Super. 1978).

2013Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C.Cir.2005). 10 This definition, applied uniformly for over 25 years, reflects the legislative history of the FRSA: The purpose of [the savings clause] is to enable the states to respond to local situations not capable of being adequately encompassed within the uniform national standards....

2013Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 , 1553 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Cox v. Norfolk & W.

2013Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 , 1553 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Cox v. Norfolk & W.

2013Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 , 1553 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd, 507 U.S. 658 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 , 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Cox v. Norfolk & W.

2013Id.

2012Id. at 225 , 971 A.2d at 1197 .

2012Id. at 225 , 971 A.2d at 1197 .

2011For a discussion of the circumstances under which one crime is equivalent to another, see Commonwealth v. Northrip, 603 Pa. 544 , 985 A.2d 734 (2009) (generally, crimes are equivalent if the first is "substantially identical in nature and definition" to the other, taking into account the elements of each, including whether the crimes are inchoate or specific).

2011For a discussion of the circumstances under which one crime is equivalent to another, see Commonwealth v. Northrip, 603 Pa. 544 , 985 A.2d 734 (2009) (generally, crimes are equivalent if the first is "substantially identical in nature and definition" to the other, taking into account the elements of each, including whether the crimes are inchoate or specific).

2009Co. Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 , 116 S.Ct. 873 , 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); see also International Paper Co. v. *226 Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-93 , 107 S.Ct. 805 , 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987) (“Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the savings clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state causes of action.”).

2009Co. Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 , 116 S.Ct. 873 , 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996); see also International Paper Co. v. *226 Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492-93 , 107 S.Ct. 805 , 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987) (“Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the savings clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state causes of action.”).