savings clause in Texas

2015Code Ann. § 402.006 (West 2012) (“The prior law governs the acts, contracts, or transactions of the entity or its managerial officials, owners, or members that occur before the mandatory application date [of January 1, 2010].”) with Knight v. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1982) (stating that if a statute is repealed or amended without a savings clause for pending suits, the repeal is given immediate effect). 13 judgment against the general partner).7 The trial court separated the question of Fleming’s individual liability from the initial question whether the Fleming

2012The amendment, revision, or reenactment is preserved and given effect as part of the code provision that revised the statute so amended, revised, or reenacted.”); Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1982) (“This Court has frequently held that if a cause of action is based on a statute, the repeal or amendment of that statute without a savings clause for pending suits is given immediate effect.”); Firemen’s Pension Comm’n v. Jones, 939 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.) (holding same).

2020However, “[t]his common law rule of abatement may be modified by a specific savings clause in the repealing legislation or by a general savings statute limiting the effect of repeals.” Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 128 (Tex. 1998).

2020However, “[t]his common law rule of abatement may be modified by a specific savings clause in the repealing legislation or by a general savings statute limiting the effect of repeals.” Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 128 (Tex. 1998).

2018See Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

2018See Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

2008Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) (“It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated.”); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 203 (“under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored”); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike, 508 S.W.2d

2008Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) (“It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated.”); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 203 (“under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored”); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike, 508 S.W.2d

2018In re Halliburton Co. , 80 S.W.3d 566 , 569-70 (Tex. 2002) (holding that language preventing an employer from retroactively applying arbitration agreement changes to claims of which it had actual knowledge, combined with a provision furnishing ten days' advance notice to employees before unilateral termination of the agreement, rendered the agreement non-illusory because it restricted the employer from "avoid[ing] its promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it altogether"); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Carreon , 458 S.W.3d 621 , 623-24 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2014, no pet.) (ho

2017In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002)(holding that language preventing an employer from retroactively applying arbitration agreement changes to 7 claims of which it had actual knowledge, combined with a provision furnishing ten days’ advance notice to employees before unilateral termination of the agreement, rendered the agreement non-illusory because it restricted the employer from “avoid[ing] its promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it altogether”); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.)(holdi

2015Accordingly, we The approval, disapproval, or must give its repeal immediate effect, and we cannot review conditional approval of an application Circle C's argument that the court of appeals erred in for a permit shall be considered concluding that its original permit applications filed before by each regulatory agency solely on September 1, 1987 were not covered by section 481.143. the basis of any orders, regulations, ordinances, or other duly adopted We were confronted with a similar situation in Dickson v. requirements in effect at the time the Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3,

2015Accordingly, we The approval, disapproval, or must give its repeal immediate effect, and we cannot review conditional approval of an application Circle C's argument that the court of appeals erred in for a permit shall be considered concluding that its original permit applications filed before by each regulatory agency solely on September 1, 1987 were not covered by section 481.143. the basis of any orders, regulations, ordinances, or other duly adopted We were confronted with a similar situation in Dickson v. requirements in effect at the time the Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3,

2019Fund, 196 S.W.3d 271, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting Firemen’s Pension Comm’n v. Jones, 939 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ)). 5 Senate Bill 11 included a savings clause applicable only to the amendments to family code section 263.401, but House Bill 7 also included a general savings clause applicable to the remainder of the amendments.

2012The amendment, revision, or reenactment is preserved and given effect as part of the code provision that revised the statute so amended, revised, or reenacted.”); Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1982) (“This Court has frequently held that if a cause of action is based on a statute, the repeal or amendment of that statute without a savings clause for pending suits is given immediate effect.”); Firemen’s Pension Comm’n v. Jones, 939 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.) (holding same).

2014See Weaver, 982 S.W.2d at 893 (hold *416 ing that venue is proper in any county in which any element of any of the underlying thefts occurred); Dickens, 981 S.W.2d at 188 (holding that the pre-amendment punishment for theft applied because the savings clause in the amended statute stated that an offense was “committed before the effective date of the statute if any element of the offense occurs before the effective date”; at least one underlying theft in this aggregate theft case occurred before the effective date, and “each subsidiary offense is a component of that one offense of aggregated t

2010See Dickens v. State, 981 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (addressing similar savings clause).

2001TEMPORARY CESSATION OF PRODUCTION A. Law The language of a typical oil or gas lease is such that the lease may be kept alive after the primary term only by production in paying quantities or a savings clause, such as a shut-in royalty clause, continuous operations clause, drilling operations clause, etc. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool, 30 S.W.3d 618, 626 , 2000 WL 1513904 *3 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet. h.); Hydrocarbon Mgt., 861 S.W.2d at 431 ; Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd).

2001TEMPORARY CESSATION OF PRODUCTION A. Law The language of a typical oil or gas lease is such that the lease may be kept alive after the primary term only by production in paying quantities or a savings clause, such as a shut-in royalty clause, continuous operations clause, drilling operations clause, etc. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool , 2000 WL 1513904 *3 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2000, no pet. h.); Hydrocarbon Mgt. , 861 S.W.2d at 431 ; Shown v. Getty Oil Co. , 645 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd).

1997A savings clause may cure "an open-ended contingency provision the operation of which may or may not result in a *572 charge of usurious interest." First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied).

1997A savings clause may cure “an open-ended contingency provision the operation of which may or may not result in a charge of usurious interest.” First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, -writ denied).

2015See Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751 , 755 clause renders the specific savings clause redundant, see (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (“The general savings clause of the State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269 , 8 P. 474 , 477 (1885), that Code Construction Act, however, is inapplicable to the new is not the case here.

2015See Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751 , 755 clause renders the specific savings clause redundant, see (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (“The general savings clause of the State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269 , 8 P. 474 , 477 (1885), that Code Construction Act, however, is inapplicable to the new is not the case here.

2010Appellant failed to register in 2008, so under the controlling authority of Harbin , the savings clause cannot apply to him. [3] See id. ; Sierra v. State , 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App. C Fort Worth 2004) (op. on reh = g) (stating that this court is @ bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no authority to disregard or overrule [it] @ ), aff = d , 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

2010Appellant failed to register in 2008, so under the controlling authority of Harbin , the savings clause cannot apply to him. (footnote: 3) See id. ; Sierra v. State , 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (op. on reh’g) (stating that this court is ”bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no authority to disregard or overrule [it]”), aff’d , 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim.

2008Watson v. Rochmill , 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) ("It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated."); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc. , 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool , 124 S.W.3d at 203 ("under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored"); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike , 508

2008Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) (“It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated.”); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 203 (“under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored”); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike, 508 S.W.2d

2008Watson v. Rochmill , 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) ("It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated."); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc. , 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool , 124 S.W.3d at 203 ("under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored"); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike , 508

2008Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565 , 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) (“It appears to be very well settled that under the terms of the lease, upon cessation of production after termination of the primary term, the lease automatically terminated.”); Fuller v. Rainbow Res., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ); see Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 203 (“under the automatic termination rule, without a savings clause, cessation of production in the secondary term automatically terminates the lease, even if profitable production is later restored”); Waggoner & Zeller Oil Co. v. Deike, 508 S.W.2d

2021“Thus, after the primary term, an oil and gas lease generally may be kept alive ‘by production in paying quantities, or a savings clause, such as a shut-in gas well clause, drilling operations clause, or continuous operations clause.’” Id. (quoting Tracker, 861 S.W.2d at 432 ).

2017Thus, after the primary term, an oil and gas lease generally may be kept alive “by production in paying quantities, or a savings clause, such as a shut-in gas well clause, drilling operations clause, or continuous operations clause.” Tracker, 861 S.W.2d at 432 .

2018In re Halliburton Co. , 80 S.W.3d 566 , 569-70 (Tex. 2002) (holding that language preventing an employer from retroactively applying arbitration agreement changes to claims of which it had actual knowledge, combined with a provision furnishing ten days' advance notice to employees before unilateral termination of the agreement, rendered the agreement non-illusory because it restricted the employer from "avoid[ing] its promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it altogether"); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Carreon , 458 S.W.3d 621 , 623-24 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2014, no pet.) (ho

2017In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002)(holding that language preventing an employer from retroactively applying arbitration agreement changes to 7 claims of which it had actual knowledge, combined with a provision furnishing ten days’ advance notice to employees before unilateral termination of the agreement, rendered the agreement non-illusory because it restricted the employer from “avoid[ing] its promise to arbitrate by amending the provision or terminating it altogether”); ReadyOne Industries, Inc. v. Carreon, 458 S.W.3d 621, 623-24 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014, no pet.)(holdi

2019Fund, 196 S.W.3d 271, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting Firemen’s Pension Comm’n v. Jones, 939 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ)). 5 Senate Bill 11 included a savings clause applicable only to the amendments to family code section 263.401, but House Bill 7 also included a general savings clause applicable to the remainder of the amendments.

2017City of Houston v. The Houston Firefighters’ Relief and Retirement Fund, 196 S.W.3d 271, 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2015See State v. permit application was filed after September 1, 1987, such as Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57 , 569 P.2d 67, 70 (1977) (en banc) the one application for preliminary subdivision approval filed (“Although [the specific savings clause] exempts three in 1992.

2015See State v. permit application was filed after September 1, 1987, such as Fenter, 89 Wash.2d 57 , 569 P.2d 67, 70 (1977) (en banc) the one application for preliminary subdivision approval filed (“Although [the specific savings clause] exempts three in 1992.

2013See Cleveland Const., Inc. v. Levco Const., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 843, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] pet. dism’d) (holding 14 that “a savings clause was not required for the arbitration provision . . . to survive any termination”); see also Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d) (“[A]n arbitration agreement contained within a contract survives the termination of the contract as a whole.”).

2012Analysis of Levco’s Termination and Savings Clause Argument Levco also argues that CCI is complaining of work primarily completed after CCI terminated the Construction Contract and that the dispute resolution clause in the Construction Contract cannot survive the termination because it did not contain a savings clause. “[A]n arbitration agreement contained within a contract survives the termination or repudiation of the contract as a whole.” Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d) (relying, in context of TAA, on line of reasoning that agreement to arbitra

2015Laws at 4803; see also Turner, 443 S.W.3d at 129 n.2.

2015Laws at 4803; see also Turner, 443 S.W.3d at 129 n.2.

1999See Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (“The general savings clause of the Code Construction Act, however, is inapplicable to the new Penal Code because a specific savings clause was provided by the Legislature.”); Scott v. State, 916 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.); Wilson v. State, 899 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1995, pet. refd); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.026.

1999See Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. Crim.App.1978) ("The general savings clause of the Code Construction Act, however, is inapplicable to the new Penal Code because a specific savings clause was provided by the Legislature."); Scott v. State, 916 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.); Wilson v. State, 899 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, pet. ref'd); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 311.026.

2010Appellant failed to register in 2008, so under the controlling authority of Harbin , the savings clause cannot apply to him. (footnote: 3) See id. ; Sierra v. State , 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (op. on reh’g) (stating that this court is ”bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no authority to disregard or overrule [it]”), aff’d , 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim.

2010Appellant failed to register in 2008, so under the controlling authority of Harbin, the savings clause cannot apply to him. 3 See id.; Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (op. on reh’g) (stating that this court is ”bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no authority to disregard or overrule [it]”), aff’d, 218 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Crim.

2009Robert Joseph Phillips Living Trust v. Scurry, 988 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied).

2009Robert Joseph Phillips Living Trust v. Scurry, 988 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, pet. denied).