savings clause in New Jersey

2023We often seek to avoid "[u]nswerving, 'mechanistic' application" of procedural statutes of limitations and have developed a "common law of limitations"—various doctrines that account for "the more equitable and A-1753-22 4 countervailing considerations of individual justice." Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188 , 191–92 (1980); see also Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245 , 258–59 (1982) ("It is now well settled in New Jersey that statutes of limitation will not be applied when they would unnecessarily sacrifice individual justice under the circumstances.").

2022Further, because the Legislature amended the refusal statute to effectuate its determination that interlock devices served as a greater deterrent to drunk driving than a period of license forfeiture, any ameliorative or curative nature of the statute does not warrant retroactive effect. [Ibid.] Consistent with our decision in Scudieri, we reiterate that, "[i]n evaluating whether retroactive application is proper, the savings clause requires a temporal inquiry to determine whether an offense has been 'committed' or penalty 'incurred' prior to the change in the law." Id. at ___ (slip op. at 11).

2021Judge LeMieux nevertheless applied the prior refusal statute because "the A-0352-20 4 Legislature's intent [was] clear on its face." Finally, the judge rejected defendant's reliance on State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202 (1971), concluding "it would not be unjust to sentence [defendant] pursuant to the laws that were in place at the time that he committed this offense." Before us, defendant raises the following two points for our consideration: I.

2004In short, from the existence of the savings clause, 29 U.S.C.A. § 653 (b)(4), we are persuaded that Congress believed "there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save." Geier, supra, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. at 1918 , 146 L.Ed. 2d at 923 .

2004In short, from the existence of the savings clause, 29 U.S.C.A. § 653 (b)(4), we are persuaded that Congress believed "there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save." Geier, supra, 529 U.S. at 868 , 120 S.Ct. at 1918 , 146 L.Ed. 2d at 923 .

2002Ibid.

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2001Plaintiff relies upon Maraziti v. Corigliano, 29 N.J.Super. 86 , 101 A. 2d 559 (App.Div.1953) (holding that an exclusive sales listing agreement in effect for five weeks from the date of the agreement and thereafter until defendant gave the broker ten days written notice of termination violated N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(f), but was not void under the statute's "savings clause" [1] ); the statutory amendment striking the savings clause in express response to Maraziti, supra, L. 1954, c. 193, § 2; Winding Brook Realty v. Platzer, 166 N.J.Super. 575 , 400 A. 2d 145 (Law Div.1979), aff'd, 173 N.J.Super. 4

2000Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to preclude any State cause of action— (A) with respect to which the State exercises its acquired rights under section 1169(b)(3) of this title with respect to a group health plan (as defined in section 1167(1) of this title), or (B) for recoupment of payment with respect to items or services pursuant to a State plan for medical assistance approved under title XIX of the Social Securities Act [ 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.] which would not have been payable if such acquired rights had been executed before payment with respect to such items or s

1997In this State it is the general rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. [Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling Bd., 194 N.J.Super. 34, 42 , 476 A.2d 271 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 643 , 483 A.2d 169 (1984).] Because plaintiff Kemp was less than six months old when the statute was repealed in 1976, the present case cannot be regarded as a

1997In this State it is the general rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. [Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling Bd., 194 N.J.Super. 34, 42 , 476 A.2d 271 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 643 , 483 A.2d 169 (1984).] Because plaintiff Kemp was less than six months old when the statute was repealed in 1976, the present case cannot be regarded as a

1997In this State it is the general rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. [Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling Bd., 194 N.J.Super. 34, 42 , 476 A.2d 271 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 643 , 483 A.2d 169 (1984).] Because plaintiff Kemp was less than six months old when the statute was repealed in 1976, the present case cannot be regarded as a

1997In this State it is the general rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. [Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling Bd., 194 N.J.Super. 34, 42 , 476 A.2d 271 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 643 , 483 A.2d 169 (1984).] Because plaintiff Kemp was less than six months old when the statute was repealed in 1976, the present case cannot be regarded as a

1997In this State it is the general rule that where a statute is repealed and there is no saving[s] clause or a general statute limiting the effect of the repeal, the repealed statute, in regard to its operative effect, is considered as though it had never existed, except as to matters and transactions passed and closed. [Parsippany Hills Assocs. v. Rent Leveling Bd., 194 N.J.Super. 34, 42 , 476 A.2d 271 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 643 , 483 A.2d 169 (1984).] Because plaintiff Kemp was less than six months old when the statute was repealed in 1976, the present case cannot be regarded as a

1996Kaczorowski, supra, 525 A.2d at 630 .

1996After noting the difficulties created by the canons of legislative construction (“Just as in the science of Physics every action has an equal and opposite reaction, so it seems that every canon of statutory construction has an equal and opposite canon.” Kaczorowski 525 A.2d at 631 ), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that, in interpreting legislation, it was necessary to consider the title and function of the legislation, its context, “its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal____ The pur

1994He went on to hold, alternatively, that the preemption clause itself trumped state damage claims, and that the only function of the savings clause was to preserve "all other liability claims except those otherwise abolished by the preemption clause and covered by the regulation." Id. at 898-99 .

1994Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 177 Wis. 2d 207 , 501 N.W. 2d 865 (Ct.App.), rev. denied, 510 N.W. 2d 137 (Wis. 1993), took a different tack to the same mark.

1994Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 177 Wis. 2d 207 , 501 N.W. 2d 865 (Ct.App.), rev. denied, 510 N.W. 2d 137 (Wis. 1993), took a different tack to the same mark.