savings clause in Mississippi

2002Beatty v. State, 627 So.2d 355, 357 (Miss.1993).

2000Beatty v. State, 627 So.2d 355, 357 (Miss.1993).

2022The savings clause in section 15-1-59 applies only to actions mentioned in Chapter 1, Title 15, such as the two causes of action discussed supra. See Cole v. State, 608 So. 2d 1313, 1316 (Miss. 1992). ¶20.

1999But see Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313 (Miss.1992) (holding that the savings clause does not apply to the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, which provides its own separate statute of limitation in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)) and Marcum v. Hancock *1042 County Sch.

2020Lula and John later filed an amended 1 Dr. Karcher was one of the three medical doctors who, in May 2016, expressed in writing to Singing River their concerns regarding Dr. Millette. 2 In University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Robinson, 876 So. 2d 337, 341 (Miss. 2004), this Court concluded that “[t]he March 2002 amendment to [Mississippi Code Section] 11-46-11(4) [wa]s unconstitutional to the extent that it ma[de] the savings clause applicable to all claims since April 1, 1993.” Because Section 11-46-11(4) is not at issue in this case, the conclusion set forth in Robinson is inapplicable

2005In University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Robinson, 876 So.2d 337, 340-41 (Miss.2004), we struck down the 2002 amendment that made the minor savings clause retroactive because “[t]he legislature shall have no power to revive any remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of limitations of this state.” Robinson affirmed the constitutionality of the 2000 amendment that included the first minor savings clause, since the Legislature may lengthen statutes of limitation as they apply to existing and future causes of action.

2017Looking at the wrongful-death statute in its current form, we concluded, “There is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action.” Thiroux, 749 So.2d at 1041 . ¶ 18.

2017And under Thiroux, “[tjhere is no question ... that the savings clause, set out in § 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to [this] wrongful death action.” Thiroux, 749 So.2d at 1041 .

2020In Lee v. Thompson, 859 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 2003), our Supreme Court affirmed that once the minority is removed, the 1 We acknowledge, given the employment status of the defendants in this case, “[t]he Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), with certain exceptions, makes governmental entities immune from liability for tortious acts and omissions committed by employees acting within the course and scope of their employment.” Davis v. City of Clarksdale, 18 So. 3d 246, 249 (¶10) (Miss. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Miss.

2007This Court has stated that "the primary purpose of statutory time limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time." Lee v. Thompson, 859 So.2d 981, 992 (Miss.2003); Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1992).

2004See Stockstill, 854 So.2d at 1022 .

2003See Stockstill, 854 So.2d at 1022 .

1999See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 717 So.2d 747, 750 (Miss.1998) (child's claim preserved until he reaches the age of majority pursuant to § 15-1-59 even though father's action dismissed for failure to follow court rules).

1997See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 717 So. 2d 747, 750 (Miss. 1998)(child's claim preserved until he reaches the age of majority pursuant to § 15-1-59 even though father's action dismissed for failure to follow court rules).

2009In Tirouda , where the defendant employed numerous witnesses to deceive the court in order to acquire a fraudulent birth certificate, this Court stated that “fraud upon the court falls within the savings clause of [Rule] 60(b) and is not subject to time constraints.” Id.

2009In Tirouda , where the defendant employed numerous witnesses to deceive the court in order to acquire a fraudulent birth certificate, this Court stated that "fraud upon the court falls within the savings clause of [Rule] 60(b) and is not subject to time constraints." Id.

2020In Lee v. Thompson, 859 So. 2d 981 (Miss. 2003), our Supreme Court affirmed that once the minority is removed, the 1 We acknowledge, given the employment status of the defendants in this case, “[t]he Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), with certain exceptions, makes governmental entities immune from liability for tortious acts and omissions committed by employees acting within the course and scope of their employment.” Davis v. City of Clarksdale, 18 So. 3d 246, 249 (¶10) (Miss. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Miss.

2020Further, our Supreme Court stated that because “the amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had run, the children’s claims, like the estate’s and their mother’s, are barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 989 (¶20) (quoting Curry v. Turner, 832 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 2002), overruled by Pioneer Cmty. Hosp. of Newton v. Roberts, 214 So. 3d 259, 265 (¶24) (Miss. 2017)).

2010The supreme court in Owens v. Mai, 891 So.2d 220, 222 (¶ 13) (Miss.2005), sought to resolve related uncertainties by holding that the “dismissal of a suit for failure to serve process is not a jurisdictional matter for purposes of the savings statute.” In Owens , the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs first action for failure to properly serve process.

2005In the instant case, although the chancellor referred to Rule 60(b)(1) in the motion to show cause, she clearly found that fraud had been committed "on the court." "It is the customary practice, in the name of judicial economy, for an appellate court to affirm the trial court if the right result is reached even though for the wrong reason." Towner v. State, 837 So.2d 221, 225 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 980 (Miss.1993)).

2005We agree that this Court is without *215 authority where Rule 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) is the basis for an action and the motion is brought beyond the six month limitation. [2] Jenkins, 757 So.2d at 343 (¶ 10) (quoting Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 305 (Miss.1990)).

2005In the instant case, although the chancellor referred to Rule 60(b)(1) in the motion to show cause, she clearly found that fraud had been committed "on the court." "It is the customary practice, in the name of judicial economy, for an appellate court to affirm the trial court if the right result is reached even though for the wrong reason." Towner v. State, 837 So.2d 221, 225 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 980 (Miss.1993)).

2005Rule 60(b) expressly provides that the rule "does not limit the power of the court . . . to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." M.R.C.P. 60(b). "`Fraud upon the court' is grounds for relief under the savings clause of Rule 60(b)." See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989). [3] Furthermore, the only time requirement for the catch-all provided in 60(b)(6), which provides relief from judgment for "any other reason justifying relief," is that relief be sought in reasonable time. ¶ 9.

2005See Wilson, 873 F.2d at 872 . ¶ 14.

2005See Accredited Surely, 535 So.2d at 60 .

2005We agree that this Court is without *215 authority where Rule 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) is the basis for an action and the motion is brought beyond the six month limitation. [2] Jenkins, 757 So.2d at 343 (¶ 10) (quoting Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 305 (Miss.1990)).