savings clause in Minnesota

2018Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 7 (2014), provides that "[c]onduct is not a crime under this section if it is ... authorized, required, or protected by ... the state, federal, or tribal constitutions." In Machholz , the supreme court briefly discussed this "savings clause" and agreed that "a general savings provision cannot substantively operate to save an otherwise invalid statute, since it is a mere restatement of well-settled constitutional restrictions on the construction of statutory *502 enactments." 574 N.W.2d at 421 n.4 (quotation omitted).

2009Id. at 421 n. 4.

2017See La Porte v. State, 14 Ariz. 530 , 132 P. 563, 564-65 (1913) (explaining that, in the absence of Arizona’s savings clause, which mirrors Minn. Stat. § 645.35 , repealing a criminal statute would “effect many legislative pardons”). 7 Finally, the State .argues that the Legislature’s enactment and repeal of retroac-tivity provisions in Minn. Stat. § 244.09 , subd. 11, reveals a- legislative intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine.

2017See La Porte v. State, 14 Ariz. 530 , 132 P. 563, 564-65 (1913) (explaining that, in the absence of Arizona’s savings clause, which mirrors Minn. Stat. § 645.35 , repealing a criminal statute would “effect many legislative pardons”). 7 Finally, the State .argues that the Legislature’s enactment and repeal of retroac-tivity provisions in Minn. Stat. § 244.09 , subd. 11, reveals a- legislative intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine.

2014The constitutional-avoidance canon provides a “presumption ... that a statute is constitutional, and we are required to place a construction on the statute that will find it so if at all possible.” Kline v. Berg Drywall Inc., 685 N.W.2d 12, 23 (Minn.2004) (emphasis added) (citing In re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 467 , 136 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965)).

2014The constitutional-avoidance canon provides a “presumption ... that a statute is constitutional, and we are required to place a construction on the statute that will find it so if at all possible.” Kline v. Berg Drywall Inc., 685 N.W.2d 12, 23 (Minn.2004) (emphasis added) (citing In re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 467 , 136 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965)).

2014The constitutional-avoidance canon provides a “presumption ... that a statute is constitutional, and we are required to place a construction on the statute that will find it so if at all possible.” Kline v. Berg Drywall Inc., 685 N.W.2d 12, 23 (Minn.2004) (emphasis added) (citing In re Cold Spring Granite Co., 271 Minn. 460, 467 , 136 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1965)).

2009In support of this contention, Meyer cites Johnson v. Americar Rental Sys., 613 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000), claiming the case holds that, to satisfy the minimum insurance requirements of Minn.Stat. § 65B.48, a rental-vehicle company must provide the coverage specified by Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 5a(i)(2) — not the lower amount of $30,000 per person or $60,000 per accident specified in Minn.Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3(1).

2001Id. at 555 (quoting Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 129 , 35 S.Ct. 484, 487 (1915)); see also AT & T v. Centr.

2001Id. at 555 (quoting Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 129 , 35 S.Ct. 484, 487 (1915)); see also AT & T v. Centr.

2001Therefore, the Blackburn court concluded that the FCA’s savings clause has limited significance because even in light of the clause, “the preemption question turns on whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the purposes of the [FCA] and the common-law remedy at issue.” Blackburn, 353 N.W.2d at 555 ; see also Smith, 783 S.W.2d at 586 -37 (citing the Blackburn language). *568 Other courts have not been so quick to dismiss the impact of the savings clause on the preservation of state-law claims under the FCA, but have limited its scope in essentially the same way as the Blackburn

2001Lamminen v. City of Cloquet, 987 F.Supp. 723, 731 (D.Minn.1997) (citing United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Minn.1982)). 4 The district court based the reasons for its order dismissing appellants’ claim for tortious interference with business expectancy on the grounds that, even with the savings clause, the claim is not “distinguishable from those created under the act.” The district court concluded, “The Plaintiffs claims here do not arise out of any separate contractual arrangement * * * but arise solely from the order of the [FCC].” Therefore, the “claims are predicate

2001Zimmer, 937 S.W.2d at 405 .

2001Id. at 406 (quotation and citations omitted).

2001Communications, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 867 F.Supp. 1511, 1516 (D.Utah 1994); see also Kellerman, 98 Ill.Dec. 24 , 493 N.E.2d at 1051 .

2001Lamminen v. City of Cloquet, 987 F.Supp. 723, 731 (D.Minn.1997) (citing United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Minn.1982)). 4 The district court based the reasons for its order dismissing appellants’ claim for tortious interference with business expectancy on the grounds that, even with the savings clause, the claim is not “distinguishable from those created under the act.” The district court concluded, “The Plaintiffs claims here do not arise out of any separate contractual arrangement * * * but arise solely from the order of the [FCC].” Therefore, the “claims are predicate

2001Communications, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 867 F.Supp. 1511, 1516 (D.Utah 1994); see also Kellerman, 98 Ill.Dec. 24 , 493 N.E.2d at 1051 .

1997Id.; see also Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1265 (5th Cir.1992). (recognizing that a manufacturer who chooses to “meet only the bare minimum performance requirements will be burdened with the potential for [common law] liability, but this is the exact burden that Congress preserved in the Savings Clause”).

1997See, e.g., Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987) (common law claims that a car is defective because it has one restraint option authorized under FMVSS 208 instead of another FMVSS 208 restraint with an air bag are preempted un-, der the Safety Act), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17,1988). . *617 Wickstrom explains how the savings clause operates to retain common law liability while allowing implied preemption of some claims: The clear meaning of the [Safety Act’s savings clause] is that compliance with federal standards will not protect automobile manufacturers f

1997See, e.g., Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987) (common law claims that a car is defective because it has one restraint option authorized under FMVSS 208 instead of another FMVSS 208 restraint with an air bag are preempted un-, der the Safety Act), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17,1988). . *617 Wickstrom explains how the savings clause operates to retain common law liability while allowing implied preemption of some claims: The clear meaning of the [Safety Act’s savings clause] is that compliance with federal standards will not protect automobile manufacturers f

1993See Hunt, 345 N.W.2d at 753 .

1979Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 , 84 S.Ct. 1814, 1817 , 12 L.Ed.2d 822, 826 (1964); Sekt v. Justice’s Court, 26 Cal.2d 297, 304 , 159 P.2d 17, 21 , cert. denied, 326 U.S. 756 , 66 S.Ct. 96 , 90 L.Ed.2d 454 (1945).

1979Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 230 , 84 S.Ct. 1814, 1817 , 12 L.Ed.2d 822, 826 (1964); Sekt v. Justice’s Court, 26 Cal.2d 297, 304 , 159 P.2d 17, 21 , cert. denied, 326 U.S. 756 , 66 S.Ct. 96 , 90 L.Ed.2d 454 (1945).