20 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2015That is, even if the savings clause in § 379r(e) “removes tort actions from the scope of [an] express pre-emption clause” such as § 379r(a), the savings clause “does not foreclose ... the possibility that a federal [law] will pre-empt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts,” see Geier, supra at 869-870 , and principles of implicit conflict preemption would still bar the plaintiffs’ claim if the result the plaintiffs sought would require the defendants to use a warning label that conflicted with FDA requirements. 2015See id. at 871 (without operation of ordinary preemption principles, “state law could impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal regulatory mandates”). | 3 | 3 |
Wilson v. Headgreen2 sentences1995Pittsley, 298 Mass. at 555 ; Wilson v. Head, 184 Mass. 515, 518 (1884). 1995Pittsley, 298 Mass. at 555 ; Wilson v. Head, 184 Mass. 515, 518 (1884). | 2 | 2 |
Pittsley v. Davidgreen2 sentences1995Pittsley, supra at 555 . 1995Pittsley, 298 Mass. at 555 ; Wilson v. Head, 184 Mass. 515, 518 (1884). | 1 | 4 |
Feeney v. Dell Inc.green1 sentence2013The Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act “prohibits ‘unfair or deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’ ” Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 212 (2009), quoting G.L.c. 93A, §2(a). | 1 | 1 |
Gallant v. Worcestergreen1 sentence2012See Section 18 of St. 1978, c. 512; see Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 710-15 (1981) (actions for injuries from defects of a public way are subject to G.L.c. 84, §15; actions for wrongful death under c. 229 arising out of a defect of a public way are cognizable under c. 258); Trioli v. Town of Sudbury, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 394, 396 (1983) (claims under c. 84 preserved as the exclusive remedy against municipalities for injuries on account of defects in ways since preserved as such under c. 258 legislation). | 1 | 1 |
Trioli v. Town of Sudburygreen1 sentence2012See Section 18 of St. 1978, c. 512; see Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 710-15 (1981) (actions for injuries from defects of a public way are subject to G.L.c. 84, §15; actions for wrongful death under c. 229 arising out of a defect of a public way are cognizable under c. 258); Trioli v. Town of Sudbury, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 394, 396 (1983) (claims under c. 84 preserved as the exclusive remedy against municipalities for injuries on account of defects in ways since preserved as such under c. 258 legislation). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Buttongreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 1 |
State v. Asmussengreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 1 |
Bouters v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 1 |
Luplow v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 1 |
Nayor v. Rent Board of Brooklinegreen1 sentence1996For this proposition, the landlord relies on Nay or v. Rent Bd. of Brookline, 334 Mass. 132, 135-136 (1956), where it was held that the termination of a previous Brookline rent control statute without a savings clause made moot a pending complaint by a tenant challenging a decision by the board allowing a landlord an increase in rent. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 349214green1 sentence1982See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77-79 (1st Cir. 1977); Metropolitan Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire
green
2 sentences2007Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, [ 477 U.S. 207 ,] 222-224 [(1986)]. 2004Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, supra at 222-224 . | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Kilgore v. KeyBank, National Ass'n
green
1 sentence2013VI, and that law renders arbitration agreements enforceable so long as the savings clause is not implicated.” Id. at 963 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenile
green
2 sentences2007In order to avoid impermissible conflict with constitutional protections, the court in A Juvenile, supra, engrafted a savings clause onto § 53, holding that the provision may be applied only “to conduct which involves no lawful exercise of a First Amendment right.” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, supra at 599 . 2007In order to avoid impermissible conflict with constitutional protections, the court in A Juvenile, supra, engrafted a savings clause onto § 53, holding that the provision may be applied only “to conduct which involves no lawful exercise of a First Amendment right.” Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, supra at 599 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lann v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., State v. Brown, 207 Ariz. 231, 233, 235 (Ct. App. 2004) (harassment statute upheld that includes verbal communication “directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person” and excludes “otherwise lawful demonstration, assembly or picketing”); Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 236-237 (Fla. 1995) (stalking statute constitutional where it defined “harasses” as engaging in a course of conduct which is directed at a person, is wilful and malicious, causes | 1 | 2005–2005 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences2005See 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (“A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra. The preemption provision, however, contains a savings clause indicating that a State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order when it “is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard” (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (1). 2005CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, supra. The savings clause relates to specific local hazards that are “aberrations,” involving factors that the Secretary of Transportation did not and, as a practical matter, could not take into account in determining laws or regulations under the FRSA. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bjorkman v. Suffolk Construction Co.
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Farren v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence1996In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite Farren v. General Motors Corp., 708 F.Supp. 436 , (D.Mass. 1989). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rogers v. Metropolitan District Commission
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 339 . 1995Commn., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 337 (1984), expressly states that the repealing language in that clause “provides . . . that any inconsistent statutory provision not mentioned in the savings clause shall not apply” (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Commonwealth v. Federico
green
1 sentence1982Contrast Commonwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485 (1981) (savings clause for “generally applicable” criminal laws). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.