17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1883–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Petersongreen2 sentences2000Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503, 505-06 , 97 N.W. 384, 384-85 (1903). 2000Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503, 505-06 , 97 N.W. 384, 384-85 (1903). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walton v. Perkins
green
2 sentences1896The object of an action under the statute to determine an adverse claim to real estate was stated in Walton v. Perkins, 28 Minn. 413 , 10 N. W. 424 , to be to force one claiming an adverse claim or lien to establish or abandon his claim; that with respect to the claim of the defendant the position of the parties is the reverse of that occupied by the parties to an ordinary action; that the defendant becomes practically plaintiff, and takes the affirmative in pleading and proof, while the plaintiff becomes practically the defendant, and defends against the claim. 1896The object of an action under the statute to determine an adverse claim to real estate was stated in Walton v. Perkins, 28 Minn. 413 , 10 N. W. 424 , to be to force one claiming an adverse claim or lien to establish or abandon his claim; that with respect to the claim of the defendant the position of the parties is the reverse of that occupied by the parties to an ordinary action; that the defendant becomes practically plaintiff, and takes the affirmative in pleading and proof, while the plaintiff becomes practically the defendant, and defends against the claim. | 2 | 1883–1896 |
Brickner v. ONE LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 710 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Himes v. Woodings-Verona Tool Works, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Himes, 565 N.W.2d at 471 . 2005Himes, 565 N.W.2d at 471 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Polites v. United States
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 433 , 81 S.Ct. at 206 . 1990Id. at 433 , 81 S.Ct. at 206 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bryant v. Gustafson
green
1 sentence1988Id. at 10, 40 N.W.2d at 433-34 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Whitney v. Huntington
neutral
2 sentences1948Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197 , 33 N. W. 561 ; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47 , 35 N. W. 570 . *318 We proceed, therefore, to a determination of the issue of whether title to the flax straw at the times of the alleged conversions was in plaintiffs and Gaard as tenants in common or in Gaard as a tenant under a landlord-and-tenant relationship. 1948Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197 , 33 N. W. 561 ; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47 , 35 N. W. 570 . *318 We proceed, therefore, to a determination of the issue of whether title to the flax straw at the times of the alleged conversions was in plaintiffs and Gaard as tenants in common or in Gaard as a tenant under a landlord-and-tenant relationship. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
King v. Merriman
green
2 sentences1948Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197 , 33 N. W. 561 ; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47 , 35 N. W. 570 . *318 We proceed, therefore, to a determination of the issue of whether title to the flax straw at the times of the alleged conversions was in plaintiffs and Gaard as tenants in common or in Gaard as a tenant under a landlord-and-tenant relationship. 1948Whitney v. Huntington, 37 Minn. 197 , 33 N. W. 561 ; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47 , 35 N. W. 570 . *318 We proceed, therefore, to a determination of the issue of whether title to the flax straw at the times of the alleged conversions was in plaintiffs and Gaard as tenants in common or in Gaard as a tenant under a landlord-and-tenant relationship. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Carli
green
2 sentences1939Hence, the user “not being adverse in its inception, does not become so until notice or an assertion of an adverse claim.” Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Carli, 31 Minn. 81, 85 , 16 N. W. 495, 496 . 1939Hence, the user “not being adverse in its inception, does not become so until notice or an assertion of an adverse claim.” Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Carli, 31 Minn. 81, 85 , 16 N. W. 495, 496 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
O'Boyle v. McHugh
green
2 sentences1939Therefore it is a case of permissive rather than hostile user, under the rule of O’Boyle v. McHugh, 66 Minn. 390 , 69 N. W. 37 . 1939Therefore it is a case of permissive rather than hostile user, under the rule of O’Boyle v. McHugh, 66 Minn. 390 , 69 N. W. 37 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Fredericksen v. Henke
green
2 sentences1927Ramsey v. Glenny, supra; Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Carli, supra; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , 209 N. W. 257 , 46 A. L. 1927Ramsey v. Glenny, supra; Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Carli, supra; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , 209 N. W. 257 , 46 A. L. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Reed v. Siddall
neutral
2 sentences1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme 1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Olson v. Burk
neutral
1 sentence1914Olson v. Burk, 94 Minn. 456 , 103 N. W. 335 ; Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503 , 97 N. W. 384 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Burton
green
1 sentence1914Olson v. Burk, 94 Minn. 456 , 103 N. W. 335 ; Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503 , 97 N. W. 384 . | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Owsley v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme 1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Peters v. City of Duluth
green
2 sentences1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme 1914The purpose of the Torrens Act is to provide a speedy and summary remedy to settle the title to land (Reed v. Siddall, 94 Minn. 216 , 102 N. W. 453 ; Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 106 , 137 N. W. 390 , 41 L.R.A.[N.S.] 1044); the adverse claims statute has the same object (Dunnell, Minn. PI. § 898), and, though the former is more comprehensive in some respects, the general rules of procedure apply in both (Owsley v. Johnson, 95 Minn. 168 , 103 N. W. 903 ), and, as between applicant and any defendant who subsequently brings action against him to determine the adverse claim of the forme | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Gilman v. Van Brunt
green
2 sentences1900It was no doubt intended by the adverse claim statute to require the defendant, instead of the plaintiff, to assert or disclaim his pretended title or interest, and, following the practice in equitable procedure, it should be made under that statute to appear, where a tax title is designated, that the same is apparently a cloud, and its invalidity shown by facts to be properly pleaded (Knudson v. Curley, 30 Minn. 433 , 15 N. W. 873 ); for the reason, as formerly held by this court, that “there is no occasion to go into a court of equity in order to have that determined to be void and invalid w 1900It was no doubt intended by the adverse claim statute to require the defendant, instead of the plaintiff, to assert or disclaim his pretended title or interest, and, following the practice in equitable procedure, it should be made under that statute to appear, where a tax title is designated, that the same is apparently a cloud, and its invalidity shown by facts to be properly pleaded (Knudson v. Curley, 30 Minn. 433 , 15 N. W. 873 ); for the reason, as formerly held by this court, that “there is no occasion to go into a court of equity in order to have that determined to be void and invalid w | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Knudson v. Curley
green
2 sentences1900It was no doubt intended by the adverse claim statute to require the defendant, instead of the plaintiff, to assert or disclaim his pretended title or interest, and, following the practice in equitable procedure, it should be made under that statute to appear, where a tax title is designated, that the same is apparently a cloud, and its invalidity shown by facts to be properly pleaded (Knudson v. Curley, 30 Minn. 433 , 15 N. W. 873 ); for the reason, as formerly held by this court, that “there is no occasion to go into a court of equity in order to have that determined to be void and invalid w 1900It was no doubt intended by the adverse claim statute to require the defendant, instead of the plaintiff, to assert or disclaim his pretended title or interest, and, following the practice in equitable procedure, it should be made under that statute to appear, where a tax title is designated, that the same is apparently a cloud, and its invalidity shown by facts to be properly pleaded (Knudson v. Curley, 30 Minn. 433 , 15 N. W. 873 ); for the reason, as formerly held by this court, that “there is no occasion to go into a court of equity in order to have that determined to be void and invalid w | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Walton v. Perkins
neutral
2 sentences1896And in Walton v. Perkins, 33 Minn. 357 , 23 N. W. 527 , it was held that any interest in or lien upon land may be determined in such an action. 1896And in Walton v. Perkins, 33 Minn. 357 , 23 N. W. 527 , it was held that any interest in or lien upon land may be determined in such an action. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Myrick v. Coursalle
green
2 sentences1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . 1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Herrick v. Churchill
neutral
1 sentence1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Genois v. City of St. Paul
neutral
1 sentence1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Welter v. City of St. Paul
neutral
1 sentence1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Jellison v. Halloran
neutral
1 sentence1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Wakefield v. Day
green
2 sentences1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . 1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Pinney v. Russell & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . 1895Myrick v. Coursalle, 32 Minn. 153 , 19 N. W. 736 ; Herrick v. Churchill, 35 Minn. 318 , 29 N. W. 129 ; Jellison v. Halloran, 40 Minn. 485 , 42 N. W. 392 ; Wakefield v. Day, 41 Minn. 344 , 43 N. W. 71 ; Pinney v. Russell & Co., 52 Minn. 443 , 54 N. W. 484 . | 1 | 1895–1895 |
Elmier v. Brant
green
1 sentence1893The plaintiffs in this action, brought to determine an adverse claim to real estate, were the defendants in Backus v. Burke, 48 Minn. 260 , ( 51 N W. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Backus v. Burke
green
1 sentence1893The plaintiffs in this action, brought to determine an adverse claim to real estate, were the defendants in Backus v. Burke, 48 Minn. 260 , ( 51 N W. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Sanborn v. Mueller
green
2 sentences1889If the action be not to test the title generally, as an action under the statute to determine adverse claims, but only to test the validity of a specific conveyance or claim, which was the ease of Sanborn v. Mueller, 38 Minn. 27 , ( 35 N. W. 1889If the action be not to test the title generally, as an action under the statute to determine adverse claims, but only to test the validity of a specific conveyance or claim, which was the ease of Sanborn v. Mueller, 38 Minn. 27 , ( 35 N. W. | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Bergin v. Hayward
neutral
1 sentence1885Bergin v. Hayward, 102 Mass. 414, 424 ; Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170 . | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| Savacool v. Boughton green | 1 | 1885–1885 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.