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10 Nebraska opinions name it 1 courts 1896–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Taylor Investment Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.green2 sentences1985In Taylor Investment Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 182 Kan. 511, 521 , 322 P.2d 817, 825-26 (1958), the court said: On the state of facts here presented we are compelled to hold as a matter of law that the “Transmission Company” was not asserting an adverse claim hostile to the plaintiff or its predecessors in title, but used and occupied the right of way for its transmission line in complete subservience to the exclusive right of the “Railway Company” prior to the abandonment of the railroad. 1985In Taylor Investment Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 182 Kan. 511, 521 , 322 P.2d 817, 825-26 (1958), the court said: On the state of facts here presented we are compelled to hold as a matter of law that the “Transmission Company” was not asserting an adverse claim hostile to the plaintiff or its predecessors in title, but used and occupied the right of way for its transmission line in complete subservience to the exclusive right of the “Railway Company” prior to the abandonment of the railroad. | 1 | 1 |
Weiss v. Meyergreen2 sentences1983Shirk v. Schmunk, supra. It should be remembered that the principal utility of this evidence of ordinary use of the land is not to demonstrate the adverse possessor’s subjective intent, but rather to demonstrate that the true owner had notice of the adverse claim; thus the proviso that it is enough “that the land be devoted to the ordinary uses of the adverse claimant provided the uses are such as to put the true proprietor on notice.” (Emphasis supplied.) Weiss v. Meyer, 208 Neb. 429, 433 , 303 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1981). 1983Shirk v. Schmunk, supra. It should be remembered that the principal utility of this evidence of ordinary use of the land is not to demonstrate the adverse possessor’s subjective intent, but rather to demonstrate that the true owner had notice of the adverse claim; thus the proviso that it is enough “that the land be devoted to the ordinary uses of the adverse claimant provided the uses are such as to put the true proprietor on notice.” (Emphasis supplied.) Weiss v. Meyer, 208 Neb. 429, 433 , 303 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Walsh v. Walshgreen2 sentences1972See Walsh v. Walsh, 156 Neb. 867 , 58 N. W. 2d 337 . 1972See Walsh v. Walsh, 156 Neb. 867 , 58 N. W. 2d 337 . | 1 | 1 |
Donaldson v. Brainardgreen1 sentence1965See, In re Donaldson’s Estate (Fla. App.), 147 So. 2d 552 ; In re Singleton’s Estate, 26 Nev. 106 , 64 P. 513 ; Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341 , 25 P. 457 , 22 Am. | 1 | 1 |
Duncan v. King's Administratorgreen2 sentences1940See, also, Duncan v. King’s Admr., 163 Ky. 577 , 174 S. W. 34 , wherein it was held that the statute did not begin to run until the expiration of the life estate, although the remainderman might before that time have quieted title against an adverse claim. 1940See, also, Duncan v. King’s Admr., 163 Ky. 577 , 174 S. W. 34 , wherein it was held that the statute did not begin to run until the expiration of the life estate, although the remainderman might before that time have quieted title against an adverse claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gallagher v. Graham (In Re Estate of Graham)
green
2 sentences2020There, we said, “Jurisdiction to enforce a right of retainer does not imply jurisdiction to render a personal judgment.” 21 In a later case, describing the legal regime prior to 1970, we explained, “At least since 1879, the county court has had exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate and the settlement of decedents’ estates, and the District Court has had exclusive original jurisdiction in equity cases.” 22 Thus, at the time of the Lambie decision, a county court simply had no jurisdiction in equity cases. [14-17] Shortly after Lambie, however, that changed, as we explained i 2020There, we said, “Jurisdiction to enforce a right of retainer does not imply jurisdiction to render a personal judgment.” 21 In a later case, describing the legal regime prior to 1970, we explained, “At least since 1879, the county court has had exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate and the settlement of decedents’ estates, and the District Court has had exclusive original jurisdiction in equity cases.” 22 Thus, at the time of the Lambie decision, a county court simply had no jurisdiction in equity cases. [14-17] Shortly after Lambie, however, that changed, as we explained i | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Mora v. Rivera
green
1 sentence1965See, In re Donaldson’s Estate (Fla. App.), 147 So. 2d 552 ; In re Singleton’s Estate, 26 Nev. 106 , 64 P. 513 ; Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341 , 25 P. 457 , 22 Am. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
In Re the Estate of Singleton
neutral
2 sentences1965See, In re Donaldson’s Estate (Fla. App.), 147 So. 2d 552 ; In re Singleton’s Estate, 26 Nev. 106 , 64 P. 513 ; Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341 , 25 P. 457 , 22 Am. 1965See, In re Donaldson’s Estate (Fla. App.), 147 So. 2d 552 ; In re Singleton’s Estate, 26 Nev. 106 , 64 P. 513 ; Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341 , 25 P. 457 , 22 Am. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Stewart v. Lohr
green
1 sentence1965See, In re Donaldson’s Estate (Fla. App.), 147 So. 2d 552 ; In re Singleton’s Estate, 26 Nev. 106 , 64 P. 513 ; Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341 , 25 P. 457 , 22 Am. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennings
neutral
1 sentence1955Besides, as we have already seen, the remedy at common law is not confined to real property at all, and the statute is an enlarging rather than a restricting one.” In Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 407 , 6 *455 P. 2d 546, the court considered a statute providing that an action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property adverse to him and held: “A leasehold interest against an adverse claim is sufficient interest in real property to maintain an action under said last-named section.” See, also, Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennin | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc.
green
1 sentence1955Besides, as we have already seen, the remedy at common law is not confined to real property at all, and the statute is an enlarging rather than a restricting one.” In Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 407 , 6 *455 P. 2d 546, the court considered a statute providing that an action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property adverse to him and held: “A leasehold interest against an adverse claim is sufficient interest in real property to maintain an action under said last-named section.” See, also, Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennin | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Langstaff v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence1955Besides, as we have already seen, the remedy at common law is not confined to real property at all, and the statute is an enlarging rather than a restricting one.” In Langstaff v. Mitchell, 119 Cal. App. 407 , 6 *455 P. 2d 546, the court considered a statute providing that an action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property adverse to him and held: “A leasehold interest against an adverse claim is sufficient interest in real property to maintain an action under said last-named section.” See, also, Elk Fork Oil & Gas Co. v. Jennin | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Castle Brook Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell
neutral
1 sentence1955App.), 299 S. W. 499 ; Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Cozart v. Crenshaw
neutral
1 sentence1955App.), 299 S. W. 499 ; Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Walter v. Walter
green
2 sentences1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . 1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Gramann v. Beatty
neutral
2 sentences1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . 1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Schields v. Horbach
green
2 sentences1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . 1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Ross v. McManigal
neutral
2 sentences1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . 1953Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 , 68 N. W. 524 ; Ross v. McManigal, 61 Neb. 90 , 84 N. W. 610 ; Walter v. Walter, 117 Neb. 671 , 222 N. W. 49 ; Gramann v. Beatty, 134 Neb. 568 , 279 N. W. 204 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Hoyt v. Schuyler
neutral
1 sentence1896In Pleasants v. Blodgett, 32 Neb., 427 , the language already quoted from Hoyt v. Schuyler, supra, to the effect that a conveyance by quitclaim “repels the inference of a Iona -fide purchaser,” was repeated; but the holding of the court was that the grantee had actual notice of the adverse claim. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Pleasants v. Blodgett
neutral
1 sentence1896In Pleasants v. Blodgett, 32 Neb., 427 , the language already quoted from Hoyt v. Schuyler, supra, to the effect that a conveyance by quitclaim “repels the inference of a Iona -fide purchaser,” was repeated; but the holding of the court was that the grantee had actual notice of the adverse claim. | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Pleasants v. Blodgett
neutral
1 sentence1896This was also the doctrine of the court on the rehearing of the same case ( 39 Neb., 741 ). | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.