adverse claim in Colorado

1987Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260 , 11 S.Ct. 972 , 35 L.Ed. 678 (1891); Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.1929).

1986Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260 , 11 S.Ct. 972 , 35 L.Ed. 678 (1891); Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.1929).

1987Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260 , 11 S.Ct. 972 , 35 L.Ed. 678 (1891); Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.1929).

1987Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260 , 11 S.Ct. 972 , 35 L.Ed. 678 (1891); Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.1929).

2025In support of this construction of the statute, the supreme court deemed significant that “the legislature provided that the trial court’s CGIA ruling [was] ‘subject to interlocutory appeal’ . . . , not that the right to file an interlocutory appeal must be exercised to preserve the CGIA issue in the case.” Id. (quoting §§ 24-10-108, -118(2.5)). ¶ 24 As the Denver Defendants point out, Walton involved a public entity’s appeal of an order denying CGIA immunity.

2025Rather, because a public entity “has a right, not an obligation, to take an interlocutory appeal” under the statute, it may elect to forgo an immediate appeal of an adverse immunity ruling “in favor of pursuing trial or settlement on the claims, while 12 preserving the CGIA issue in the event of an appeal following final disposition of the case in the trial court.” Id.

2009The language we have emphasized is significant, as the official UCC commentary goes on to explain: "An adverse claim might, however, be based upon principles of equitable remedies that give rise to property claims." Id. » H The present case involves "unusual circumstances" entitling B to "equitable rem *748 edies." While A clearly did breach its contract with B, "the fact that the action involves a breach of contract can hardly be enough to prove relief is not equitable." Sereboff v. Mid, Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 , 126 S.Ct. 1869 , 164 L.Ed.2d 612 (2006).

2009The language we have emphasized is significant, as the official UCC commentary goes on to explain: "An adverse claim might, however, be based upon principles of equitable remedies that give rise to property claims." Id. » H The present case involves "unusual circumstances" entitling B to "equitable rem *748 edies." While A clearly did breach its contract with B, "the fact that the action involves a breach of contract can hardly be enough to prove relief is not equitable." Sereboff v. Mid, Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 363 , 126 S.Ct. 1869 , 164 L.Ed.2d 612 (2006).

2009The commentary explains that this definition, as amended in the 1994 revisions and adopted in Colorado in 1996, was intended to reject case law that "might have been read to suggest that any wrongful action concerning a security, even a simple breach of contract, gave rise to an adverse claim." UCC 8-102(a)(1), § 4-8-102(a)(1) official emt. 1 (rejecting such reading of Pentech International, Inc. v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.1993), and Fallon v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 182 A.D.2d 245 , 586 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1992)).

2009The commentary explains that this definition, as amended in the 1994 revisions and adopted in Colorado in 1996, was intended to reject case law that "might have been read to suggest that any wrongful action concerning a security, even a simple breach of contract, gave rise to an adverse claim." UCC 8-102(a)(1), § 4-8-102(a)(1) official emt. 1 (rejecting such reading of Pentech International, Inc. v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.1993), and Fallon v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 182 A.D.2d 245 , 586 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1992)).

2009The commentary explains that this definition, as amended in the 1994 revisions and adopted in Colorado in 1996, was intended to reject case law that "might have been read to suggest that any wrongful action concerning a security, even a simple breach of contract, gave rise to an adverse claim." UCC 8-102(a)(1), § 4-8-102(a)(1) official emt. 1 (rejecting such reading of Pentech International, Inc. v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.1993), and Fallon v. Wall Street Clearing Co., 182 A.D.2d 245 , 586 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1992)).

2005Similarly, the court determined that the mere uncovering of a fraudulent transaction did not create any priority interest in that asset. 125 F.3d at 545 .

2005Similarly, the court determined that the mere uncovering of a fraudulent transaction did not create any priority interest in that asset. 125 F.3d at 545 .

2004Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt, [ 276 Mont. 229 ] 915 P.2d 840 (Mont.1996) (evidence that county commissioner had declared a road on landowner's ranch supported a finding that the landowner had knowledge of the county's adverse claim to the road).

2004Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt, [ 276 Mont. 229 ] 915 P.2d 840 (Mont.1996) (evidence that county commissioner had declared a road on landowner's ranch supported a finding that the landowner had knowledge of the county's adverse claim to the road).

2004Board of County Comm'rs v. Friendly Haven Ranch Co., 32 N.M. 342 , 257 P. 998 (1927) (recognizing public maintenance of road as evidence that public has gained a prescriptive right).

2004Board of County Comm'rs v. Friendly Haven Ranch Co., 32 N.M. 342 , 257 P. 998 (1927) (recognizing public maintenance of road as evidence that public has gained a prescriptive right).

1997To the contrary, in Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 , 20 S.Ct. 222 , 44 L.Ed. 276 (1900), the United States Supreme Court held that proceedings to determine the right of possession in conjunction with an adverse claim may be commenced in either state or federal court.

1997To the contrary, in Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 , 20 S.Ct. 222 , 44 L.Ed. 276 (1900), the United States Supreme Court held that proceedings to determine the right of possession in conjunction with an adverse claim may be commenced in either state or federal court.

1997Creede & Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uinta Tunnel, Mining & Transportation Co., 196 U.S. 337 , 25 S.Ct. 266 , 49 L.Ed. 501 (1905); see 4 American Law of Mining § 52.02 (1996).

1997Creede & Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uinta Tunnel, Mining & Transportation Co., 196 U.S. 337 , 25 S.Ct. 266 , 49 L.Ed. 501 (1905); see 4 American Law of Mining § 52.02 (1996).

1975Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561 , 206 P.2d 600 ; Brian v. Valley View Cattle Ranch, Inc., Colo.App., 535 P. 2d 237 .

1975Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561 , 206 P.2d 600 ; Brian v. Valley View Cattle Ranch, Inc., Colo.App., 535 P. 2d 237 .

1975Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561 , 206 P.2d 600 ; Brian v. Valley View Cattle Ranch, Inc., Colo.App., 535 P. 2d 237 .

1967The question whether the evidence so supplied would be sufficiently credible and convincing to destroy the adverse presumption was one for the jury.” [Emphasis supplied.] Denver Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312 , 35 P.2d 852 .

1967The question whether the evidence so supplied would be sufficiently credible and convincing to destroy the adverse presumption was one for the jury.” [Emphasis supplied.] Denver Tramway Corp. v. Kuttner, 95 Colo. 312 , 35 P.2d 852 .

1967The plaintiff asserts that “unavoidable accident” is not a defense to a negligence action in this state because of our pronouncement in Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 156 Colo. 46 , 396 P.2d 933 , and therefore the court’s finding that the accident was “unavoidable” had no effect on the presumption of defendant’s negligence which the evidence on her behalf had raised.

1967The plaintiff asserts that “unavoidable accident” is not a defense to a negligence action in this state because of our pronouncement in Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 156 Colo. 46 , 396 P.2d 933 , and therefore the court’s finding that the accident was “unavoidable” had no effect on the presumption of defendant’s negligence which the evidence on her behalf had raised.

1937“A corporation is a trustee for its stockholders, and is bound to protect their interests. * * * It holds its property as trustee for its stockholders. * * * A stockholder has the right, therefore, to rely upon the fact that the corporation will preserve his right to his stock, and to presume that it will not assert an adverse claim to it.” Mountain Water Works v. Holme, supra. A corporation proceeding to transfer stock “in the absence of the original certificate,” as here, does so “at its peril, and the real owner of the stock, evidenced by such *520 certificate, loses nothing thereby.” Suppl

1911Cole v. Noble, 63 Texas, at page 434, it is said: “In case of a constructive trust, which is born of fraud, and which presupposes from its beginning an adverse claim of right on the part of the trustee by implication, the statute will commence to run from the period at which the cestui que trust could have indicated his right by action or otherwise.” : Cited in-support of this statement are other cases of Hunter v. Hubbard, 26 Texas 537 ; Anderson v. Stewart, 15 Texas 285 ; Carlisle v. Hart, 27 Texas 350 .

1911Cole v. Noble, 63 Texas, at page 434, it is said: “In case of a constructive trust, which is born of fraud, and which presupposes from its beginning an adverse claim of right on the part of the trustee by implication, the statute will commence to run from the period at which the cestui que trust could have indicated his right by action or otherwise.” : Cited in-support of this statement are other cases of Hunter v. Hubbard, 26 Texas 537 ; Anderson v. Stewart, 15 Texas 285 ; Carlisle v. Hart, 27 Texas 350 .

1911Cole v. Noble, 63 Texas, at page 434, it is said: “In case of a constructive trust, which is born of fraud, and which presupposes from its beginning an adverse claim of right on the part of the trustee by implication, the statute will commence to run from the period at which the cestui que trust could have indicated his right by action or otherwise.” : Cited in-support of this statement are other cases of Hunter v. Hubbard, 26 Texas 537 ; Anderson v. Stewart, 15 Texas 285 ; Carlisle v. Hart, 27 Texas 350 .

1911A stockholder has the right, therefore, to rely upon the fact that the corporation will preserve his right to his stock, and to presume that it will not assert an adverse claim to it.—Owingsville v. Bondurant’s Adm., 54 S. W. 718 .

1910After reciting that, in Manuel v. Wulff, supra, the court had sustained the validity of a conveyance of a mining- location to an alien, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana to the contrary, states that the “decision was based upon the difference between a title by purchase and title by descent, and the doctrine expressed that an alien can take title by purchase and can only be divested of it by office found”; and then quotes from the case of Governeur v. Robertson, 11 Wheat. 332 , as follows: “That an alien can take by deed, and can hold until office found, must now be regarded

1910After reciting that, in Manuel v. Wulff, supra, the court had sustained the validity of a conveyance of a mining- location to an alien, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana to the contrary, states that the “decision was based upon the difference between a title by purchase and title by descent, and the doctrine expressed that an alien can take title by purchase and can only be divested of it by office found”; and then quotes from the case of Governeur v. Robertson, 11 Wheat. 332 , as follows: “That an alien can take by deed, and can hold until office found, must now be regarded

1909The statutes of the United States providing for the prosecution of adverse claims apply only to adverse claims arising out of independent or conflict-, ing locations of the same ground, and not to controversies between co-owners claiming under the same location. —Davidson v. Fraser, 36 Colo. 1 . 3.

1906In a suit in support of an adverse claim, the defendant may show that the plaintiff’s location was made upon ground embraced within a prior, valid, subsisting location, and if he succeeds in the same, it is a bar to- plaintiff’s recovery. —Armstrong et al. v. Lower, 6 Colo. 393; Girard v. Carson, 22 Colo. 345 ; Michael v. Mills, 22 Colo. 439 ; Calhoun Mining Co. v. Ajax Mining Co., 27 Colo. 1 ; Kirk v. Meldrum, 28 Colo. 453 ; Moyle v. Bullene, 7 Colo. App. 308 ; Gwillim v. Donnellan, 115 U. S. 45 ; Del Monte M.